

THE
CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.
QUARTERLY---NO. IV.

DECEMBER, 1829.

ART. I.—REVIEW OF ADAM CLARKE'S DISCOURSES.

Discourses on various Subjects relative to the Being and Attributes of God, and his Works in Creation, Providence, and Grace; by ADAM CLARKE, LL. D., F. A. S. etc. etc. New-York. 1829. 8vo. pp. 304.

THE writings of Dr. Adam Clarke are a strange compound—we will not say of sense and nonsense—but of *common* sense and that which is singularly *uncommon*. From his Commentary on the scriptures, which opens with some ten or twenty reasons to prove that the serpent who tempted Eve was a *ba-boon*, down to the volume of sermons now before us, they abound in learned lore, ingenious conjectures, gross inconsistencies, very doubtful metaphysics, and much excellent feeling, which are poured out upon the reader with but little regard to order or selection. If Dr. Clarke does not act on the fixed principle of exhibiting the whole amount of his knowledge on every subject as it comes before him, he at least deals it forth with a lavish hand; leaving it, however, very often to the reader, to discover at his leisure the precise relevancy of his facts and quotations. Though frequently *pungent* in his public discourses, yet, where his subject or the occasion would prompt him to be *eloquent*, we commonly find him either coldly learned, or drily casuistical. Of this his Charity sermons are a striking illustration.

This profusion of learning, science, and metaphysics, appears a little singular in one who stands at the head of a sect so distinguished for fervid declamation against human learning and “*man-made ministers*.” Precisely what proportion of his brethren in this country, whether bishops, priests, or laity, will be able to follow him in his quotations from the

Saxon, Latin, Greek, Hebrew, Samaritan, Arabic, and Ethiopic languages, with which he has variegated his pages, we cannot say. We regret, however, that some one could not be found to correct so obvious a slip of the pen, as occurs in a translation of a short Hebrew phrase, on page 254, where Dr. Clarke twice writes *day* for *night*; as well as to present his Hebrew quotations to the American public, without the blunder of making them read, as on pages 253—5, from the lower line to the one above. But, to wave this subject, it is no anomaly at all in human nature, to find our methodist friends indulging rather unduly in their exultation over this wonderful display of learning in their champion. Perhaps the very vehemence with which they had decried "human knowledge," only prepared them to hail, with greater rapture, so powerful an auxiliary, and even to overrate his prowess, when they saw him coming to their aid, loaded with the spoils of so many unknown languages and nations. Had Dr. Scott crowded his works, in this way, with learned and abstruse matter, what would have been the result? Could they ever have become generally popular, till the abstruse and the illegible matter was swept from his pages? Would his bible, especially, ever have become a "*family bible*?" And yet we have now before us an edition of A. Clarke's Commentary on the New Testament, on coarse paper and in cheap binding, to accommodate it to the means of all; and even in this edition, the stiff and stately Hebrew, the nimble Greek, the sprawling Arabic, and almost all other conceivable characters, are found parading the pages in dumb show. Had these costly accompaniments been omitted, the paper and execution might have been much better at the same price, and the work equally useful to those for whom it was chiefly designed.

After all, we do not object to this in the least. We only wonder at it,—and wondering, rejoice to see it. For, however unprofitable in itself, the indirect and ultimate bearing of that work will be propitious. Widely circulated as it is, it will tend powerfully to change for the better one broad feature in the character of those, who will be the principal admirers of Adam Clarke. They will cease to decry learning; and, we hope, will become its zealous promoters, and do much to raise the standard of knowledge among the more uninformed in this country and in Great Britain. Such a change is now rapidly taking place. Their seminaries are rising in different parts of our land with considerable promise; and we doubt not there are already many of their number, who are ashamed of what has heretofore been said by both preachers

and laymen on this subject. This increase of light, will do much to dispel doctrinal error, and cure fanaticism.*

Should the change in this respect become complete in all our existing denominations, it would not be surprising, if a new sect should arise to promote ignorance as its distinctive object; and thus allure to its standard, the miserable remnant of those who should still believe that a preacher is the more likely to be aided with a direct inspiration from heaven, just in proportion as he is incapacitated to read or understand the revelation which God has given in his word. Lest any one should think this conjecture extravagant, we beg leave to add, that we once knew of a preacher in a distant part of our country, who openly boasted in a public assembly, as he requested a woman to find and read his text, that he had never been able to read himself, but had received his gift of preaching from a higher source. This man found not a few to admire and caress him. We ought in justice, however, to say, that he was not a methodist.

The sermons before us will help forward the desirable revolution to which we have already alluded. They bear the same aspect as the author's other productions. Open at any page, and you recognize the personal identity of Adam Clarke,—the same exhibition of diversified learning, old and new,—the same parade of science,—the same style of reasoning,—the same quaintness and tartness of expression,—the same mingling of things high and low, dignified and vulgar. We are sorry to be compelled to add, that occasionally his vulgarity of expression on sacred themes, too nearly resembles the coarse language of the profane. To illustrate this remark, as well as the one just made respecting his incongruous mingling of things high and low, we extract the following short, but entire note, from his commentary on Acts xii.

How true is the saying, there is neither counsel nor might against the Lord. In the midst of all troubles and afflictions, that kingdom of heaven which is like a grain of mustard seed, grew and increased, and became a mighty tree which is now filling the whole earth; and fowl of every wing are flying to lodge in its branches. *Ride on, and be thou prosperous, O Christ! we wish thee good LUCK with thine honour.*

It will not be thought strange, that the man who can thus speak of *luck* with reference to an omniscient and omnipo-

* We would recommend that Dr. C.'s sermon on "*christian moderation*, the last in this volume, be publicly read at the opening of every camp-meeting,—and perhaps read again, if found necessary, some time during the last night. Though not expressly designed for such an occasion, it would doubtless be found very useful.

tent Being, should also deny the decrees and the perfect foreknowledge of God.

Still, with all his faults, the writings of this original and indefatigable author seldom fail to interest. Sometimes he is quite amusing in manner or matter. He deals in thought of some kind; and is quite instructive to the mind, and often searching to the conscience. His air is rather antique, and one is tempted to think him born out of his age by a few centuries, and that he properly belongs to a period some generations nearer to that of Thomas Aquinas, whom he admires as "an *eminent divine*." He aims at great *acumen*, and is fond of discussing curious questions in a curious way. But, while he is often perspicuous and forcible, he is occasionally very obscure; and sometimes falls into the most palpable contradictions on the same page. He does not stoop to modify his assertions or his reasoning; but drives right on with a very comfortable self-reliance, and where it is not convenient to give *reasons*, he substitutes *dogmas*,—sometimes very forcibly expressed and very true, and sometimes very false and absurd.

The sermons before us, fifteen in number, are on miscellaneous subjects, some are very long, others are quite short; and all are thickly studied with figures denoting numerical divisions. The third, which is by no means the longest, contains, if we mistake not, *ninety-six* formal divisions and subdivisions. It is quite possible that others have still more, but having counted the number in only two of the discourses, we cannot vouch for the fact.

In an advertisement prefixed to the work, Dr. Clarke gives some brief notices of himself which may gratify the curious, as they show, among other things, the estimation in which his friends in England hold him as a preacher.

During my long ministerial life, I have written but very few sermons, most of which have been already published; and, for want of time and health, they have been permitted to get out of print. I wished to have republished those, and to have added a few more, which I had prepared for the press; but the editors having got most of my MSS., without properly consulting me, announced a volume of *original* sermons, for which I was not prepared. Many were brought to me which were said to have been "taken down by short-hand writers;" but, when I came to peruse them, I found I could make no kind of use of them. They were neither in *language* nor in *matter* any thing to which I could creditably or with a good conscience set my hand. I afterwards understood that my enunciation, though distinct, was too *rapid* to be caught by those artists, in consequence of which many *half sentences* appeared, and the *reasoning* was marred, unconnected, unfinished, and indeed, sometimes contradictory to itself. This was the case particularly with several which had been taken down, some years ago, at the instance of *some gentlemen*, who, believing that I was near death, (for I was then in a bad state of health,) thought

they could oblige the public and *themselves*, by having my last discourses ready by the time I might be interred! Their good intentions have been hitherto frustrated, and I think it is well for all concerned, and who might have been concerned, that such *odds and ends* never appeared, and this imperfect taking down was nearly the same in all: for let the artists be whom [who] they might, I found, on examining the fruits of their labors, that they had, to a man, given me a *strange language*, worse by many degrees than my own; that they had often *perverted* my sense, misrepresented my criticisms, and confounded my reasoning. pp. 3, 4.

It is not our object to remark on this passage, but we may be permitted to say, that we fully believe 'his reasoning appeared marred, unconnected, unfinished, and sometimes *contradictory to itself*.' But how much of all this is to be charged to his stenographer, is not so clear a point. If a man can deliberately *write* contradictions, it is very possible he may have uttered them in his *extempore* effusions. Before closing this article, we shall give a few specimens, which may serve, at least, to palliate the errors, complained of in the stenographers.

We give another paragraph from the advertisement, for the purpose of making a few remarks on the topics which it contains.

As I believe that *just notions* of God are the foundation of true religion and of all rational worship, I have endeavored to introduce such in the Discourses on the *Being and Attributes of God*. Some think it is always best to leave such difficult and sublime subjects untouched. I am not of this mind; and I am sorry that this notion has prevailed so much: through it many are weak, and all easily stumbled, that have got under its influence. What can we rationally believe, and how can we worship, if we have not tolerably correct notions of Him in whom we live and move, and from whom we have our being? If spared, I may resume even this subject, and endeavor to calculate with greater accuracy several matters, that might be considered in exacter detail. pp. 4, 5.

We hope indeed he will be spared to "*calculate*" these matters with far "*greater accuracy*," than we have yet seen from his pen.

We agree with him perfectly in considering these *deep* matters the very foundation. A proper knowledge of the attributes of God in connection with a like knowledge of the attributes of man, comprises almost all the knowledge of true religion which we need, or can possibly gain in this world. And we are as sorry as he can be, that any one should think a preacher ought to leave untouched the profound or the sublime parts of what God has seen fit to reveal. Where such a prejudice predominates, it is proof enough that the people are weak, misguided, or thoroughly depraved. We fear our own

age is not a little in fault in this matter ; though we hope, just at the present moment, that we are not, (in this part of our country at least,) relapsing any deeper into this error. The alarm begins in a measure to be felt, lest the reading of ephemeral matter should be *all* our reading ; and the preaching which the people will desire, and ministers will be induced to give, should become little else than that which is fitted to gratify a superficial habit of thought, or regale an appetite for mere excitement. We hope the tide in this respect is beginning to turn, and that there will be a call for profounder research, and a readiness in preachers and writers to meet the call. The question with the catholics, which seems about to be revived, will incidentally aid the progress of thought and research. The rising of "the man of sin" among us, we hope will be the occasion of deeper knowledge and greater holiness, in those who may be called to guard against his seducing wiles.

But while we should preach, and hear, and study with patience and delight, the *revealed* attributes of God and of man, let us beware of that excessive passion for theory, which leads its devotee to supply from imagination the real or supposed chasms which God has left in his word. Let the inquisitive lover of truth penetrate to the depths, or soar to the sublime heights where revelation would lead him, but there let him stop. At a period like this, when a taste for investigation appears to be awaking with new vigor, there is peculiar need both of the encouragement and the caution, contained in that memorable declaration of the aged Moses to the generation of Israel, who had grown up under his instruction. "*The secret things belong unto the Lord our God ; but those things which are revealed belong unto us and to our children forever, that we may do all the words of this law.*" On this passage Dr. Scott has the following remark. "Almost all the heresies and controversies, which have corrupted the purity, or disturbed the peace of the church in every age, have originated from disregard to this distinction ; from vain attempts, by human reasonings and authority, to fill up supposed chasms in revelation, and to make it more apparently consistent and systematical than it hath pleased God to make it ; from deducing disputable consequences from revelation, or tracing back its sacred mysteries to some *unrevealed* antecedent causes." Admirable reflection, on a most admirable theme ! Would to God, that both text and comment were inscribed on brass, and placed in the study and right before the eye of every one, who is to preach, or write, or speak, or think on the great doctrines of godliness. With this in view, let each one of us, young and

old, review most prayerfully his present creed, and compare it with the word of God; ready to remove, with a cautious but unsparing hand, all those portions which shall appear manifestly of mere human fabrication. And having done this, let us proceed with the like circumspect regard to revelation, to enlarge and fill up the measure of our faith, that we may no longer be incumbered, or be the means of incumbering others, with that which at best is but "wood, hay, and stubble." Absolutely here, if any where in the whole range of intellect, man needs to know and to keep steadily in view, the proper boundaries to the province of human reason; yet no where have they been so frequently or so violently trampled down. Is there not some one of all the gifted sons of the church, to rise up in the hour of need, and mark more clearly to our vision these sacred confines? An effective work "on the province of human reason," would be as great an encouragement to thorough investigation, as it would a barrier to vain and hurtful speculation. And designedly such is the rapid and comet-like outline, given in the brief declaration from the lips of Moses, on "secret and revealed things." It is designed at once as a *stimulus* and *guide* to the candid inquirer, and a *frowning barrier* to the audacious theorist.

Had Dr. C. among others, been suitably mindful of the revealed caution on this subject, we surely should never have had such speculations from his pen as some of those which it now becomes our duty to notice.

There are attributes which now belong to God, that are not essential to his nature. He is *merciful*; but before the fall of man this could not have been one of his attributes; in like manner, he is *long-suffering*, he is the *Forgiver* of iniquity, transgression, and sin; and in a word, he is God, *our SAVIOR*. But though all these spring from his infinite *goodness*, which ever was, and must be, an essential attribute of his nature, yet it was only in consequence of *sin* entering into the world, that his innate essential goodness became necessary to be expressed by these *manifestations*, and their concomitant acts. p. 75.

For aught we can conceive, Dr. Clarke might go on to say just the same of every divine attribute which finds its appropriate object in creation. If God could not be merciful or long-suffering till there was a sinful object towards which to exercise these attributes, how could he even have been good, till there was some other being than himself to be the object of his goodness? How could he have been wise, or powerful, until the very period of calling these attributes into exercise? How could he have been any thing at all, except the supreme God of the Bramins,—a being not only destitute of passions, but of all qualities? But the absurdity of Dr. C.'s position.

whether it goes necessarily to this full extent or not, requires to be met only by his own direct contradiction, which we find under the same head, and within the compass of a single page.

There is *one* God.—There is one self-existing, infinite, eternal Being: possessed of all possible perfections, and of each in an infinite manner. An *eternity* of perfections; and each perfection absolutely so. He is so perfect, that no perfection is wanting: and so absolutely perfect, that no perfection can be added. This God is the Good Being; the Fountain of goodness—the Source of blessedness. p. 74.

‘An *eternity* of all *possible* perfections,’ must surely have included the perfection of *mercy*, just as truly as any other perfection, which finds its appropriate object in the precincts of time and creation.

We strongly object to such views of God, as countenance at all the position, that any of his attributes first spring into existence, when the period arrives for their visible manifestation. Such views are extremely derogatory to the divine character. They are entirely at war with the doctrine of his immutability; and leave us no assurance that he will continue forever to be the same just, merciful, or holy being, which he now is. They find not the least countenance in the word of God. They find no place in any system, but one which denies the foreknowledge and the strict immutability of Jehovah. The constituent parts of such a system, we deem it a sacred duty to expose, wherever we meet them.

But perhaps some of our readers, not extensively versed in the doctrines of methodism, may think it uncandid and unjust, to insinuate that the doctrine of divine foreknowledge is denied by any of the distinguished teachers of this system. They may, indeed, be ready enough to say, that any system which denies the purposes of God as extending to every event, and which argues against them on the *score of fatality*, must be compelled, if it would be consistent, to deny also his foreknowledge. For no truth can possibly be clearer than this, that an event, which can be the subject of foreknowledge, must be just as *certain*, and therefore just as fixed or established, as if it were decreed by God. But, notwithstanding the strong temptation which the system presents to its adherents to deny God's proper omniscience, yet is it possible for any man, with the bible in his hands, to be so infatuated with a system, as to hesitate for a moment on this cardinal point? and, especially, is this possible in one, who has written a very labored commentary upon the whole bible itself?

That we may do Dr. C. no injustice on this topic, instead of selecting some insulated remarks which he may occasion-

ly have made in connection with other subjects, we will quote an entire passage expressly on the point. For this purpose, we turn to the concluding remarks in his commentary on the second chapter of Acts, where we find a passage on this subject, which we have no doubt he would himself select for citation, in preference to any other we remember to have seen in his writings.—No wonder he should exclaim at the first breath, an “*awful subject* ;” connected as foreknowledge is with his darling position;—so difficult to deny—so fatal to admit. We cannot but pity his obvious embarrassment and distress throughout the whole passage, and the deplorable absurdity into which he is at once plunged.

On that awful subject, the *foreknowledge* of God, something has already been spoken, see ver. 23. Though it is a subject which no finite nature can comprehend, yet it is possible so to understand what relates to *us* in it, as to avoid those rocks of *presumption* and *despondency* on which multitudes have been shipwrecked. The foreknowledge of God is never spoken of in reference to *himself*, but in reference to *us*: in him properly, there is neither *foreknowledge* nor *afterknowledge*. Omniscience, or the *power to know all things*, is an attribute of God, and exists in him as *omnipotence*, or the power to do all things. He can do whatsoever he will; and he does whatsoever is fit or proper to be done. God cannot have *foreknowledge* strictly speaking, because this would suppose that there was something *coming*, in what we call *futurity*, which had not yet arrived at the *presence of the Deity*. Neither can he have any *afterknowledge* strictly speaking, for this would suppose that something that *had taken place*, in what we call *pretereity* or *past time*, had now got *beyond the presence of the Deity*. As God exists in all that can be called *eternity*, so he is *equally* every where: nothing can be *future* to him, because he lives in all *futurity*: nothing can be *past* to him, because he equally exists in all *past time*: futurity and pretereity are relative terms to us; but they can have no relation to that God who dwells in every point of eternity, with whom all that is *past*, and all that is *present*, and all that is *future* to man, exists in one infinite, indivisible, and eternal NOW. As God's omnipotence implies his *power to do all things*; so God's omniscience implies his *power to know all things*; but we must take heed that we meddle not with the infinite *free agency* of this Eternal Being. Though God *can* do all things, he *does not* all things. Infinite judgment directs the operation of his power, so that though he *can*, yet he *does not* do all things, but only such things as are proper to be done. In what is called illimitable space, he *can* make millions of millions of systems; but he does not see proper to do this. He *can* destroy the solar system; but he *does not* do it: he can fashion and order, in endless variety, all the different beings which now exist, whether material, animal, or intellectual; but he does not do this, because he does not see it *proper* to be done. Therefore it does not follow that because God *can do all things*, that therefore he *must do all things*. God is omniscient, and *can know* all things; but does it follow from this, that he *must know all things*? Is he not as *free* in the *volitions* of his *wisdom*, as he is in the *volitions* of his *power*? God has ordained some things as *absolutely certain*: these he knows as *absolutely certain*. He has ordained other things as *contingent*; these he knows as *contingent*. It would be absurd to say, that he foreknows a thing as only *contingent*, which he has made *absolute*.

ly certain. And it would be as absurd to say, that he foreknows a thing to be *absolutely certain*, which in his own eternal counsel he has made *contingent*. By *absolutely certain*, I mean a thing which *must* be in that order, time, place, and form in which divine Wisdom has ordained it to be; and that it can be no *otherwise* than this infinite counsel has ordained. By *contingent*, I mean such things as the infinite wisdom of God has thought proper to poise on the *possibility of being or not being*, leaving it to the will of intelligent beings to turn the scale. To deny this would involve the most palpable contradictions, and the most monstrous absurdities. If there be no such things as *contingencies* in the world, then every thing is *fixed* and *determined* by an unalterable decree and purpose of God; and not only all *free agency* is destroyed, but all *agency* of *every kind*, except that of the Creator himself; for on this ground, God is the *only operator* either in time or eternity. All created beings are only *instruments*, and do nothing but as impelled and acted upon by this almighty and sole Agent. Consequently, every act is *his own*; for if he have purposed them all as *absolutely certain*, having nothing *contingent* in them, then he has *ordained them to be so*: and if no *contingency*, then no *free agency*, and God, alone is the sole actor. Hence, the *blasphemous*, though, from the premises, *fair conclusion*, that God is the author of all the evil and sin that are in the world; and hence follows that absurdity, that as God can do nothing that is *wrong*, *WHATEVER IS, IS RIGHT*. Sin is no more sin; a vicious human action is no crime, if God have *decreed* it, and by his foreknowledge and will impelled the creature to act it. On this ground there can be no *punishment* for delinquencies; for if every thing be done as God has *predetermined*, and his determinations must necessarily be all *right*, then neither the *instrument* nor the *agent* has done *wrong*. Thus all vice and virtue, praise and blame, merit and demerit, guilt and innocence, are at once *confounded*; and all distinctions of this kind confounded with them. Now, allowing the doctrine of the contingency of human actions, (and it must be allowed in order to shun the above absurdities and blasphemies) then we see every intelligent creature accountable for its own works, and for the use it makes of the power with which God has endued it: and to grant all this consistently, we must also grant, that God foresees nothing as *absolutely and inevitably certain*, which he has made *contingent*; and because he has designed it to be *contingent*, therefore he cannot know it as *absolutely and inevitably certain*. I conclude that God, although omniscient, is not obliged, in consequence of this, to *know all that he can know*; no more than he is obliged, because he is *omnipotent*, to *do all that he can do*.

How many, by confounding the self and free agency of God with a sort of continual impulsive necessity, have raised that necessity into an *all-commanding* and *over-ruling energy*, to which God himself is made subject. *Commentary, Acts Chap. II.*

Here follows a hackneyed quotation from Milton, which we need not repeat. The note closes with a citation from another author, in quite a different strain; and which we may subsequently adduce, as we are much better pleased with it than Dr. C. appears to be.

On the above passage, we would willingly say more than our limits will now permit. We shall restrict ourselves to the few following points.

First, the eternal now. We have often seen statements on this topic, from writers of various sects; but none more full

and absolute, than this of Dr. C. It is not a peculiar doctrine of Methodism : indeed, it is utterly subversive of that scheme, so far as it relates to the divine omniscience and purposes. We can see no object, therefore, in introducing it here, unless it be to cast a degree of obscurity over a plain subject, and thus to elude, in the view of the superficial, the pressure of an overwhelming argument.

So far as mere victory is concerned, we should be content to leave untouched this statement of the mode of God's existence, with relation to time or duration. But truth is still more important : and victory, indeed, is secure, with any modification that can be made of the fact, on which this statement is based.

Is it then a fact, that, in the *literal* sense, there can be any such thing as an *eternal now* with God? We say at once, it is just as impossible as it is in man's existence. We hope no one of our readers will be startled, as though we were rashly encroaching on some sacred mystery of the word of God, or precipitately discarding phraseology sanctioned by antiquity, and the authority of great and good men. We do not make war upon the words; but upon a *meaning* affixed to them, to which there is nothing analagous in the word of God,—nothing which can possibly exist in the nature of the subject to which they refer. Long had we heard such language from divines, both great and small, before we ever dreamed that any one of them designed to be understood in the *literal* sense. And we have no idea now, that one out of hundreds of them, did ever so intend. We understood it just as we must always understand the inspired declaration, "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years; and a thousand years as one day." Such declarations are a vivid illustration of some important truth. But they cannot be regarded by common sense as *literally*, and in all respects true, so long as there is, *in fact*, any difference between a thousand years, and one day. If there is, then, a difference between these two periods, God sees that difference, at least as distinctly as we do; and, therefore, they cannot be both alike to Him, any farther than they are alike *in fact*. We had, therefore, been accustomed to understand divines, when they said there was no succession of time with God, but that all duration was one *eternal now*, as meaning, in a strong and vivid manner, to express his perfect omniscience. Succession of time with us, is attended and marked by new ideas. Not so with God. "He sees the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done." In this obvious sense, we have ourselves used this language, and shall continue to use it, because we

think it accordant with the free and powerful use which the bible makes of figurative language. But we shall ever be as cautious as the same scriptures are, about using it in metaphysical reasoning, and basing an argument on its literal sense.

Whatever rashness of speculation there may be on this subject, it is far more chargeable on him who affirms the *eternal now*, than on him who denies it. We have already intimated that we can find nothing in scripture or reason to support such an affirmation. Indeed, we know not that an extended proof has ever been attempted. We more generally, as in the quotation before us, find nothing but an *assertion* of the fact, to which we are expected to give our assent as to a sacred dogma; and in many minds, there seems a remarkable readiness to receive such dogmas without examination. As most things are different with God from what they are with us, men seem ready to assent to almost any proposition that shall mark a difference; and the wider that difference, the more credible and satisfactory the proposition that affirms it.

Having incidentally intimated our answer to whatever of argument we have seen in support of the doctrine, we will delay the reader for a moment only, while we state a few reasons to shew its falsity. The common language of the bible with reference to God, is such as leads to the belief of a past and a future with him, though not a succession of knowledge, as truly as with man. God is spoken of in the past and in the future tense without the least appearance of reserve, as often as there is occasion for it. The apparent exceptions to this rule, are nothing when compared with its verifications by the inspired writers. The remarkable declaration of Christ; "*before Abraham was, I am,*" is generally held by Trinitarians as referring to the appellation, *I am*, which God assumed when addressing Moses. And this appellation is considered as designed to indicate his *self-existence* as well as the *reality* of his existence, in distinction from fabled deities. Here, then, is a sufficient reason for Christ's using the present tense in this particular case. It is not, therefore, logical to suppose any further reason; and especially such a reason as is contradicted by the uniform use of inspired language elsewhere, with reference to Jehovah.

The manner in which the bible speaks of the *acts of God*, is equally decisive. If it is literally an eternal *present*, with nothing past and nothing to come, as Dr. C. declares, then none of the divine acts are past to God, and none are future. All is one *present and eternal act*. He has not *created* the world nor *will* he destroy it: but he is *now* creating, and is *now* destroying it. He never *did* decree any of his own acts,

and he never *will*: but he is now decreeing all that creatures ever saw him do, or ever will see him do. The bible justifies no such language as this. If it did, it is not enough to say, that men would not believe it: they *could* not, in the literal sense. To construe the sacred book in this way, is to throw utter darkness over every page, and to make an infidel of every reader. Yet so it must be construed, if God does not really mean to speak with reference to Himself, but only with reference to man, when treating of the relations of time.

To the man who still affirms that succession of time has no relation to God, we beg leave to put the question whether there *is any such thing as succession?* or is it all an illusion of mortals? Is there any difference between yesterday and to-day? or are they both only one and the same day? He must say there is a difference; that succession is a reality and not an illusion. Does not every reality then, hold a relation to God? and its own proper relation, to the full extent in which it *is* a reality? If, then, there is such a thing as succession in time, does it not, just as truly, bear a relation to God as to man? What, then, can possibly be meant by the eternal *now*? Plainly nothing but the perfect omniscience of God, which, at one intuitive and changeless view, beholds the past, the present, and the future.

We know that men may bewilder themselves on the simplest objects in nature, till words seem no longer to have any import: and perhaps this is more common on very simple subjects, than on such as are really abstruse. A man may even doubt whether there is much, if any difference, between time and space; or rather, may seem to lose the very ideas which a child, with perfect accuracy, attaches to these words. Lest we should be deemed too uncharitable in this remark, we subjoin the following from the sermons before us.

Time and space are properly consequences of creation, and could not previously have existed. *All* was eternity, and this was inhabited by God. The *revolutions* of the heavenly bodies ascertained *time*: the *place* where created beings exist is *space*. Without a *creation* we can have no idea of time; without *created beings*, we can have no proper idea of *space*; for what is unlimited space, and what is infinite duration, but eternity? p. 50.

Absolute space, which is considered without regard to any thing external, always remaining the same, being infinite and immoveable, is either a confused idea expressing nearly the same as time, or is here confounded with eternity. p. 50.

It is therefore His *presence* that constitutes this *space*, without which, it could not exist; and since every particle of space is always, and in every indivisible moment, *every where*, the Creator and Lord of all things cannot be *never* or *no where*. p. 15.

More of the same kind is found in this book, and we presume an abundance of it in the mighty tomes of the schoolmen. From such specimens, we suppose it possible for a man to speculate on time for the purpose of grasping an adequate idea of eternity, till his brain becomes dizzy; and then on space, to gain a conception of immensity, till his bewildered mind concludes that abstract time and space are about the same thing;—and then, that both of them are eternity;—and finally, that ‘eternity itself is but a stationary moment, and immensity but a point!’ From such philosophy, may theology soon be delivered.

On our extract from the Commentary, we remark, *secondly*; that it is with very singular absurdity, Dr. C. denies the proper omniscience of God, in immediate connection with such an assertion of the eternal “*now*.” It will be seen, by turning back to our extract, that Dr. C. admits the omniscience of God in no other sense than that of “the *power* to know all things;” just as his omnipotence is “the power to do all things.” This, we say, is no sense at all. Is actual knowledge the same thing as the power to gain knowledge? Does a child know all which he has power to learn? And could God be said to be omniscient, if in fact he did not know any thing? As well may a new-born infant be said to know all that his faculties are adapted to acquire in the whole compass of his existence. There is nothing here, but a confusion of terms. *Knowledge* is made to consist in *power*, just as, in the former instance, time and space are identified, and resolved into eternity. It is a real denial of God’s omniscience, though a very timid and awkward one; or else a very artful denial for the purpose of bewildering feeble minds.

This is not only a denial of what the bible teaches, but it is a denial of what Dr. Clarke himself affirms in the same passage. Grant all he asserts in support of the eternal “*now*,” viz: that “in God there is neither foreknowledge nor *after*-knowledge,” and what follows? Plainly this; that God now knows all he ever *will* know. But whatever is now future with us and in itself “contingent,” God will know when it *actually* takes place, as absolutely certain. Of course, he must *now* know it as thus certain, or else there will be “after knowledge” in God. What, then becomes of Dr. Clarke’s famous distinction between events as “contingent,” and as “certain” in the divine view? If God has no “*after* knowledge,” they are all equally certain; and his argument, “if no contingency, then no free agency,” is set aside by his own showing. To say, that all things are actually present with God, in the indivisible and unchanging moment of his eter-

nal existence, but that as he is a free agent in the exercise of his wisdom, he may not *choose* to know what is thus present to him, is indeed to talk most weakly : and the reported reply of the simple slave at the south, is a sufficient refutation. ' God must first know all things, in order to decide as to what things it will be wise for him *not* to know.'

But groundless and puerile as this supposition is in itself, it is doubly absurd in its present connection ; for the time will come, as agreed by all, when he will know the things which he may now choose not to know. When they transpire, he will then *first* know them, according to this supposition. And if so, what becomes of Dr. C.'s denial of " after-knowledge ?" and of his assertion of God's changeless knowledge ? and of the eternal "*now* ?" Such an assemblage and complication of solecisms, we never before saw in the same compass.

And what is the cause or object of all this ? Simply to escape the *doctrine of divine decrees* ;—which, after all, he is compelled to admit, on his own principles ; and for aught we can see, to admit in just the *sense we hold to them*.

To evince the truth of the last assertion, we now proceed, *thirdly*, to remark on what Dr. C. says of God's foreknowing and also decreeing *some things as certain*, and *other things as contingent*. Here he is fully aware of what some appear willingly ignorant, viz. that God's foreknowledge throws just as great a stumbling block in the path of man's freedom, as his decrees do. He seems also conscious of the inadequate relief provided by the supposition, *that God may not choose to know all things*. For if they are objects which can be reached by God's "*power to know all things*," then they must be equally *certain* in themselves, whether God sees fit to exercise this power to ascertain their futurity, or not. We should also think him ready to concede, that God cannot be indifferent to any thing in his moral system, which he does know ; and that He will, therefore, have some purpose concerning all the objects of his actual knowledge. Such we should consider the state of his convictions on the general subject of controversy, when he admits that God knows and ordains some things as certain, and some as contingent.

The only question now left, is this : What does Dr. Clarke mean by the word *contingent* ? We know of no single word, on the doubtful meaning of which, as actually used in controversy, so much seems to depend, as on this same word *contingent*. And now, if in the very turning point of its application, its true import can be ascertained as held by those who use it ; and if this same *meaning* is actually adopted by Calvinists though they do not use the word, and adopted for the

express purpose of so modifying their doctrine as to free it from the objections against which the word contingent is employed by Dr. Clarke to guard, we can see nothing here remaining, but a bitter contention about one sorry word. Now that such is the fact, we shall attempt to show.

What then does Dr. Clarke mean by contingent, when used in such a connection? Take his own definition. "By contingent, I mean such things as the infinite wisdom of God has thought proper to poise on the *possibility of being or not being*, leaving it to the will of intelligent beings to turn the scale." He adds immediately; "to deny this, would involve the most palpable contradictions and the most monstrous absurdities:" i. e. 'human freedom would be destroyed, and God would be made a tyrant.' Here, it is manifest that the word contingent is used for the purpose solely of guarding the doctrines of foreknowledge and decrees, respecting human acts, so that free agency shall not be impaired. Precisely this very point, would *we* guard in the most strong and unexceptionable language. The same object is aimed at by the qualifying language on both sides. Both agree that God foreknows and ordains accountable acts; and both contend that it is in such a way as not to infringe on man's freedom. What great matter then, whether we agree in the use of a particular word to denote the all-important qualification?

In truth, we feel no insuperable repugnance to the adoption of this word, provided all will use it on this subject, in the sense just indicated. But we do object to its admission, if its import is to be shifted by our opponents, the moment it has served the temporary purpose of warding off the deadly thrust of our argument. We will not consent to have it here used, merely to guard against *fatality*, and then in all other connections to indicate a real ignorance and a destitution of purpose in the divine mind. This is an artifice to which we cannot consent to be accessory. But let all disputants adopt the use here made of the word, and *retain* this as the invariable use when applied to God's knowledge and purposes, and we trust it will at once be acquiesced in, and that thus the controversy on the divine decrees, will be ended among all good men.

But, perhaps, it will be said that we mistake the meaning of Dr. C. and others, in their use of the word in such a connection. Let us take a particular example for the sake of illustration. Christ knew that Judas would betray him. This, Dr. C. says, he foreknew as *contingent*. Does he mean that Christ had any *doubt* in his mind, whether Judas would perform the deed? No; but simply that Judas would do it as a *free agent*,

and not by *fatality*. It was not the foreknowledge of Christ, but the "will" of Judas, that was "to turn the scale." Yet Christ knew, perfectly, *which way* it would turn. There is no room for any other import of the word in so plain a case. Hear Dr. C. himself as to Judas :—

It is said of these *testimonies*, that they are sure or true. Yes, we may say with David, "true from the beginning to the end." Every *type* has been illustrated and fulfilled by the *ante-type*. There is not one *testimony* in the bible relative to Christ, that has not been fulfilled in Him. Very trifling circumstances apparently, have been predicted, or typically represented; and these very circumstances have been fulfilled with the *utmost exactitude*. The truth of God's word is not seen more in any thing than in the fulfilment of circumstances, which, from their nature, would appear to be wholly *fortuitous*. Among these, the betraying of Christ by one of his disciples, the selling of him for a certain sum of silver, his scourging, nailing to the cross, the piercing of his side with a spear, the not breaking his legs, which was a *coup de grace* to all that were crucified, the laying his body in the tomb of a rich man, etc., are circumstances of this kind, worthy of the most attentive regard. These were all *sure, true, and fixed*, and were fulfilled to the utmost precision. pp. 272, 273.

To say, if any should think of so saying, that Christ did not know that Judas would do it with sinful motives, is nothing to the present purpose. He knew that he would *do it*, and do it *freely*. This is what is meant by his foreknowing the act *as contingent* or "*fortuitous*."

It is thus that God foreknows *voluntary* acts; i. e. he knows that these acts will be voluntary, instead of being involuntary like the motions of matter. Nor has Dr. C. any hesitancy in saying that God also ordains human acts in this sense. He, in fact, contends for that cardinal truth; and argues from it, that as God ordains human acts in this contingent sense, it must be only in this sense that he foreknows them. The amount of what he says on the point, is this. God has ordained involuntary acts, "as absolutely certain;" and voluntary acts, "as contingent;" and, therefore, it is absurd to suppose that he foreknows either class of them, in any other sense than that in which he has ordained it. To all this we give our hearty *amen*. In *this* sense, we are willing to adopt the word *contingent*; and if Dr. C. and his brethren are willing to abide by this sense throughout all the relations of these doctrines, the dispute is ended. And we verily hope that in this way it will be ended at last.

That this happy result may be hastened, let Calvinists be cautious in their statements of these doctrines, lest they use language which will be justly liable to be misunderstood, by men trained in a different school. And let Arminians cease to deny the very doctrines which they themselves are compelled,

at certain stages of the discussion, to admit, and to admit in *precisely the same sense in which we hold them*. They must cease to deny the proper omniscience and the purposes of God, and they would do well also to cease railing against Calvinists as holding these doctrines in a sense in which we do not hold them. They will thus save themselves much strength for better purposes, and will avoid the unhappiness of deceiving their ignorant brethren, as to the real views of a great class of their fellow christians.

We must not forget the promised quotation, with which Dr. C. closes the famous note on Acts ii., which has detained us already, we fear, too long for the patience of some of our readers. We are the more desirous to make room for it, as we are persuaded our readers will receive it as a strong confirmation of the correctness of some of the views which we have advanced, respecting a similarity of belief in the great doctrine in question.

I shall conclude these observations with a short extract from Mr. Bird's *Conférences*, where in answer to the objection, "If many things fall out *contingently*, or as it were, by *accident*, God's *foreknowledge* of them can be but *contingent*, dependent on *man's free-will*;" he answers; "It is one thing to know that a thing will be done necessarily; and another to know necessarily, that a thing will be done. God doth necessarily foreknow all that will be done; but he doth not know, that those things which shall be done voluntarily, will be done necessarily: he knoweth that they will be done: but he knoweth withal, that they might have fallen out otherwise, for aught he had ordered to the contrary. So likewise, God knew that Adam would fall: and yet he knew that he would not fall necessarily; for it was possible for him not to have fallen. And as touching God's pre-ordination going before his prescience, as the cause of all events: this would be to make God the author of all the sin in the world; his knowledge comprehending that, as well as other things. God indeed, foreknoweth all things, because they will be done; but things are not (therefore) done, because he foreknoweth them. It is impossible that any man, by his voluntary manner of working, should elude God's foresight; but then, this foresight doth not necessitate the will; for this were, to take it wholly away. For as the knowledge of things present, imports no necessity on that which is done; so, the foreknowledge of things future, lays no necessity on that which shall be: because, whosoever knows and sees things, he knows and sees them as they are, and not as they are not: so that God's knowledge doth not confound things, but reaches to all events, not only which come to pass, but as they come to pass, whether contingently or necessarily. As for example; when you see a man walking upon the earth, and at the very same instant the sun's shining in the heavens; do you not see the first as voluntary, and the second as natural? And though at the instant you see both done, there is a necessity that they be done, (or else you could not see them at all); yet there was a necessity of one only, before they were done, (namely, the sun's shining in the heavens.) but none at all of the other, (viz. the man's walking upon the earth. The sun could not but shine, as being a natural agent; the man might not have walked, as being a voluntary one." This is a good argument; but I prefer that which states the knowledge of God to be absolutely free. *Commentary, Acts, Chap. II.*

We have only to add, that this extract from Mr. Bird, expresses our own views, and that if Dr. C. can consistently pronounce it "*a good argument*," he cannot, after all, mean by 'the *freedom* of God's knowledge,' that God does not, in fact, know all things*. An argument which asserts that 'he does necessarily know all things,' surely cannot be "*good*," and at the same time an argument that denies His perfect knowledge, be *better*.

We turn with great pleasure to some remarks of Dr. C. in the sermons before us, on *free will*.

The question about *free will* has long agitated divines and philosophers; with their contentions I have nothing to do: but the *subject* of their controversies, as far as the *term* which they use is concerned, is absurd. *Will* necessarily implies *mental freedom*, or a *power in the soul to chuse or refuse*: the addition of the word *free* to it is absurd and ridiculous, because *freedom* is essential to the *being* of *WILL*; *bound will* or *will over-ruled by necessity*, is equally absurd; because *binding* and *necessitating* imply in themselves, when connected with *will*, or the *power to choose and refuse*, essentially opposite ideas; *WILL bound or necessitated*, is *WILL annihilated*. When *free volition*, in reference to *choice and refusal* ends; then, the thing itself *ceases to exist*, and another principle takes its place. The *forcing* of the *will*, implies such an essential contradiction, and impossibility, that it is one of those things which cannot be done by Omnipotence itself; because it implies *absurdity* and *contradiction*. God may annihilate the will; but He cannot *force* it; for this would be to undo, by an absolute contradiction, the work of His own hands.

God gave man this faculty, that he might be a *free*, rewardable, or punishable *moral agent*; and by His own eternal power and energy, He supports this faculty, rendering it *superior to all force or constraint*, that He may continue man a rational creature; preserve his accountableness, and render him capable of salvation. On this supposition, and on this alone, is the whole *Revelation of God* addressed to man, in all its promises, threatenings, exhortations, entreaties, expostulations, and warnings. p.193

This is perfectly correct. We have before thought it one of the most absurd things in the world, to speak of the will as any otherwise than *free*; but we do not recollect to have met with such a statement in any other author. The whole subject is indeed begun and ended forever, for aught we can see, by simply putting the unanswerable question, what can that volition be which is not *voluntary*?—which is not *free*? It savors not at all of rashness, to say, that neither God nor any other being can touch the freedom of the will, without destroying all power to will. And this is saying no more than that God cannot cause a thing to be and not to be, at the same time. *Will* in its very nature must be *free*, or not *exist* at all.

We would therefore earnestly desire Dr. C. and all other men, to bear in mind the great absurdity of speaking of the decrees

* We need not say, that the necessity against which Mr. Bird contends as a "cause," is not the *moral* necessity, i. e. *certainly*, maintained by Edwards, for this is admitted.

of God as destroying the *freedom* of the will. If we find that we still have the power to will at all, we may safely rest in the assurance which both reason and our own consciousness afford, that we are perfectly free.

Bnt while we so strongly approve of Dr. Clarke's present statement and wish him and all to remember it as a caution on all occasions, we still think a stronger proposition requisite in order to reach the full truth. The proposition is this; that, from the nature of the case, neither God nor any other being can impair free agency, without impairing our *discernment between good and evil*. This we consider as a legitimate doctrine from such passages of scripture as the following: "He that *knoweth* to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Such a declaration is not to be restricted to bodily acts. Whosoever knows what is good or right to be *felt* as well as done, is bound to exercise a right feeling in view of what he knows. And all that the scriptures or reason suggest, as requisite to create this obligation is merely a *knowledge* of what is morally right. With this knowledge, the mind is prepared to act, and what is more, it cannot refrain from acting. It must will either right or wrong.

If such is the nature of a moral being, some important lessons on religious discussion, are decisively taught by it. We will specify one or two of them.

Should God make just such decrees as some impute to the Calvinistic theory, still these decrees could not infringe human freedom, except by destroying man's moral discernment. He must be rendered no longer capable of judging of right and wrong.

A second lesson is this. It is absurd to speak of the influences of God's spirit as in any degree requisite to prepare an intelligent being to become a free agent. If it could be shown that divine influence is requisite in order to *make* him intelligent, this, indeed, would be a different thing.

As a third lesson, it is equally absurd to speak of any supposable degree of divine influence, or any thing else which God can do to man, as impairing his moral freedom, unless moral discernment is likewise impaired by it.

Another lesson is, that no degree of temptation, or of direct evil influence on the heart, (if such influence be exerted,) can exculpate the being who violates *known* law.

In this connection, we will adduce a passage from Dr. C. on the state of fallen Adam, in which we suppose he speaks the language of Methodism.

Had man been left just as he was when he fell from God, he in all probability, had been utterly *unsalvable*; as he appears to have lost all his

spiritual light and understanding, and even his *moral feeling*. We have no mean proof of this, in his endeavoring to *hide himself* among the trees of the garden, from the presence and eye of Him, whom, previously to this transgression, he knew to be *every where present*; to whose eye the darkness and the light are both alike; and who discerns the most secret thoughts of the heart of man. Add to this, it appears as if he had neither *self-abasement* nor *contrition*; and therefore he charged his crime upon the woman, and indirectly upon God; while the woman on her side, charged her delinquency upon the serpent. As they were, so would have been all their posterity, had not some gracious principle been supernaturally restored to enlighten their minds, to give them some knowledge of good and evil—of right and wrong—of virtue and vice—and thus bring them into a salvable state. Now, the gracious *Mediator* is expressly said to be, that “true Light which lightens every man that cometh into the world,” John i. 9.; and it is from this Light that we have *conscience*, for conscience is neither a *principle of light* nor a *power of discernment*; but a *recipient subject*, which is capable of receiving light, and transmitting it to the judgment, in order to enable it to form a proper estimate of the moral conduct of its owner. It is precisely the same to the *soul* what the *eye* is to the *body*. The *eye* is not light, nor a *principle of light*, nor can it of itself discern any thing; it is a proper recipient of light, without which there is no *vision*. As the sun, or in his absence, *borrowed or artificial light*, shines upon and through the different humors of the eye, so objects within the range of vision are discerned: and as Jesus, the *true Light*, by His Spirit, shines upon conscience, so a man is capable of forming a just estimate of his spiritual state. This light is both *directive* and *convicting*, and affords to every fallen soul a grand antagonist power, by which it may resist evil; by the proper use of which, those who are brought to God receive *more grace*; and for the *abuse* of which, every man shall be judged in the great day. This light, Jesus, as *Mediator*, has imparted to all men, in all ages, and in all countries. It is this saving principle that has ever remonstrated against evil, showed man his transgressions, shone upon his guilt, and convinced him of his own helplessness. pp. 77, 78.

Whether this speculation on fallen Adam previous to his gaining any relief, is of much practical moment or not, we think it proper to state our objections to its accuracy. We must say, then, that the evidence adduced in proof of it, appears to us only in the light of refutation. We think the fact that he endeavoured to hide himself from God, though it may show that he had forgotten the doctrine of God's omnipresence, (*if he had ever been taught it*), is still a clear proof that he had *not* “lost all his spiritual light and understanding, and even his moral feeling.” The other fact, also, of his casting the blame on the woman, and she on the serpent, is a proof that they were *not* ‘divested of understanding or of conscience.’ And had this been the case, we see not the proof that all their posterity would have been born idiots, without a miraculous restoration! In good truth, we confess we are tired and utterly disgusted with the baseless speculations and worse than “old wives’ fables,” which have been made to fill up the brief, but important notices which God has seen fit to

give us of Adam,—speculations on the condition of unaided man after the fall,—what we should all have been, had he not fallen,—or had he not been aided, etc. Far be it from us, for ever far, to speak or think lightly of any thing on such subjects, to which the bible gives us any real clue. But to have the vagaries of imagination, on these topics, imposed upon us and handed down by a sort of sacred tradition, and then to see these vagaries made the basis of grave reasoning in systems of theology, is what, we confess, we unutterably abhor. If our language seem strong, it will at least serve to indicate the surprise and disappointment we experienced when we first came carefully to search for ourselves the records of creation in quest of proof for statements on these subjects, which have been so confidently made, and so implicitly believed. To be turned off to the pages of Milton, or to the authority of some less poetic brain, perhaps some unknown dreaming schoolman of the dark ages, is but poor consolation for the imposition under which one's mind has laboured, and by which its views of truth have been obscured for years. Where, for instance, is that 'covenant record' which stipulates that if Adam had not fallen, all his posterity would have been sinless for ever? Or where is the assignment of a definite period of probation for Adam, after which he was to be confirmed in holiness? and all his descendants with him? Or where, (but in the pages of a late German author*) do we learn that the forbidden fruit was a literal and hereditary poison to the body, inflaming the passions and appetites, and thus propelling us all to sin? and that the tree of life afforded a literal remedy for all this poison of the body? Or where do we find an intimation to support Adam Clarke's tradition, that the mental powers of man were utterly ruined by the fall? But enough of this.

So far as Dr. C. is concerned, however, he comes very near to contradicting himself before closing his book, as is happily quite common with him on points where he is wrong, so that he reaches the truth at some stage of his progress. On page 198 he says; "though the soul be fallen, yet it has not lost its *powers and capacities*."

But could Dr. C. or any other man seriously believe, without positive evidence, that the sin of our first parents could make such havoc of their natural powers? Was their sin different in its nature from the sin of fallen angels? or the sin of men at present? or do we know that it was even greater in *degree*? Why then imagine that it could destroy con-

* Storr.

science, and the other mental faculties?—Again; are we to cherish such conceptions of God's government, as to suppose that it would best subserve his object to reduce sinning beings to such a state of fatuity, that they could not even know that they had done *wrong*, and then punish them, while they could not know *why*? Is it thus he now punishes Satan? Or has all the sin of that prime rebel reduced his spirit to such fatuity? Is it thus he will punish wicked souls in hell? Will they there have no conscience to upbraid them?—the worm that shall *never die*? Has the Devil no moral sense by which he is any longer capable of being “a liar” or a tempter? Will wretched souls, then, have no conscience nor capacities by which they can still sin? Will they, then, curse God and yet be guiltless?—To far other views of this whole subject, do the scriptures lead us, from beginning to end;—views too of vital importance in a moral system.

Some of our readers may not be aware, that the groundless assumption which we have now examined, is the foundation of the most ingenious and prevalent scheme of Arminianism at the present day. Man, it is said, has lost by the fall, his original freedom of will, and his capability of moral action. A portion of divine influence is, therefore, imparted to each individual of our race, in order to restore his “lapsed powers.” If this influence is rightly used, it will, in the end, be increased to such a point, that the soul becomes renewed by the Holy Spirit. If, on the contrary, it is abused and resisted, this divine influence will be gradually withdrawn, until—here the expounders of the scheme are backward to state the consequence, but it follows irresistably,—until the whole influence being withdrawn, the man sinks back to a state *in which he ceases to be a moral agent*. Whether this ever happens before death, we are not informed. But one thing is certain on this scheme—we state it with reluctance and horror—that after death, the influences of the Holy Spirit must be forever continued to lost souls in the prison of despair, or they must cease to be moral agents; and the retributions of eternity be poured out on beings who have no power of feeling a sense of sin, of knowing why they suffer, of justifying God in their punishment, or of condemning themselves. And why is such a scheme invented? Solely to avoid the necessity of acknowledging that God is a sovereign in the dispensation of His renewing grace! That man as a complete moral agent and capable of doing his duty, is so hardened in rebellion against his Maker, that, left to himself, he will certainly and righteously perish. That if God, therefore, in his infinite wisdom sees fit to renew the souls of a part only, the rest have

no reason to complain, *all* having the *power* to do their duty, and *thus* to enter on eternal life. That God does actually thus distinguish between men; that He "hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth," or leaves to the hardening operation of their own perverse wills. And now, what is there in this doctrine of ELECTION—too clearly stated in the ninth of Romans ever to be set aside—what is there that ought to awaken the wrath of man, or to quicken all his ingenuity to explain and fritter it away? Do not men uniformly thus act, in bestowing favors on the wilfully perverse and rebellious? Is it not a source of exultation and joy to the holy angels, that when all might justly have been left to perish, a part of mankind (by far the greater part, probably, when we include those under the millennium) are rescued by the grace of God, from the consequences of their guilt and folly?

It does not appear that Dr. C. went into this speculation for the purpose of avoiding the doctrine of original sin as now attaching to men. He does not suppose, (as perhaps some Arminians have done,) that Christ, by restoring the lost faculties to our race, put away original sin and its effects on man.

Leaving his incongruous notions about the manner in which Christ, "as the light of the world," restored conscience; we proceed to his views of original sin.

There is a *contagion* in *human nature*, an evil principle that is opposed to the *truth* and *holiness* of God. This is the *grand hidden cause* of all transgression. It is a contagion from which *no soul* of man is free: it is propagated with the human species—no human being *was ever born without it*:—it is the *infection of our nature*; is commonly called *original sin*—*SIN*, because it is without conformity to the nature, will, and law of God; and is constantly in opposition to all *three*. The doctrine of *original sin* has been denied by many, while its opposers as well as those who allow it, give the most unequivocal proofs that they are subjects of its working. I have seen its *opposers* and *supporters* impugn and defend it with an *asperity of temper* and *coarseness of diction*, that gave sufficient evidence of a *fallen nature*; both, *Jonah-like*, thinking *they did well to be angry*! A late writer on the subject has excelled in this way; and by his bad tempers spoiled his works. *Evil tempers* are *leprous spots*, which sufficiently indicate the deeply radicated contagion in the *hearts* of those, in whose *lives* they are evident. pp. 145, 146.

We give his entire paragraph on the subject, as our readers may be pleased to examine not only his *statement*, but also his *proof* of the doctrine. His language about original sin, as '*propagated* like the hereditary contagion of leprosy,' (for leprosy is the subject of this sermon,) is in good keeping with Storr's notion of a literal poison. But as we have no wish to say more on this subject at present, we turn to other topics.

Dr. C. as a good Methodist, holds to perfection and assurance. Whether it is "a perfection which, after all, is *no* perfection," (as Southey says of J. Wesley's,) our readers will judge. Let us hear him on these points as he presents them together.

This adoption is manifested to believers *two* ways: I. **NEGATIVELY**; and II. **POSITIVELY**.

I. **NEGATIVELY.**

1. By the removal of their guilt—giving them ease and peace of conscience.

2. By taking away their darkness, and diffusing throughout their souls His heavenly light.

3. By removing their burthensome miserable sense of guilt, so that they no longer feel self-condemnation, beyond which, the soul cannot suffer an evil more distressing on this side eternity. Hence they feel no longer that dreadful apprehension of God's wrath: that fearful looking for a fiery indignation that shall devour the adversaries.

II. **POSITIVELY.**

1. The Holy Spirit is sent forth to witness with their spirit. He is to bear His testimony *where* it is absolutely *necessary*—*where* it can be properly *discerned*—*where* it can be *fully understood*—*and where* it cannot be *mistaken*:—viz. in *their hearts*; or, as St. Paul says, Rom. viii. 16, "the Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit." The Spirit of God with the *spirit* of man—*Spirit* with *spirit*—Intelligence with intelligence—the testimony given and received by the same kind of agency. A Spiritual agent in a spiritual substance.

2. This *witness* is not borne in their *passions*, nor in impressions made upon their *imagination*; for this must be from its very nature doubtful and evanescent: but it is borne in their understanding, not by a transitory manifestation, but continually: unless a man by sins of omission or commission grieve that Divine Spirit, and cause Him to withdraw His *testimony*, which is the same thing as the *Divine approbation*. And God cannot continue to the soul a sense of His *approbation*, when it has departed from the holy commandment that was given to it. But even in this case the man may return by repentance and faith to God, through Christ, when pardon will be granted and the witness restored.

3. Wherever this Spirit comes, it bears a testimony to *itself*. It shows that it is the Divine Spirit by its own light; and he who receives it is perfectly satisfied of this. It brings a light, a power, and conviction, more full, more clear, and more convincing to the understanding and judgment, than they ever had, or ever can have, of any circumstance or fact brought before the intellect. The man knows that it is the Divine Spirit, and he knows and feels that it bears testimony to the state of grace in which he stands.

4. So convincing and satisfactory is this testimony, that a man receiving it is enabled to call God HIS FATHER, with the utmost *filial confidence*. Surprised and convinced, he cries out at once, Abba, Father! My father! My father! Having as full a consciousness that he is a child of God, as the most tenderly beloved child has of his filiation to his natural parents. He has the *πληρωφωρία πίστεως*, the *full assurance of faith*—the meridian evidence that puts all doubts to flight.

5. And this, as was observed above, *continues*—for it is the very voice of the in-dwelling spirit: for *κραζον*, *crying*, is not only the *participle* of the present tense, denoting the *continuation of the action*: but being *neuter*, it

agrees with το πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, the SPIRIT of his son—so it is the Divine Spirit which *continues* to cry, *Abba, Father!* in the heart of the true believer. And it is ever worthy to be remarked, that when a man has been *unfaithful* to the grace given, or has fallen into any kind of sin, he has no power to utter this cry. The spirit is grieved and has departed, and the cry is lost! No power of the man's reason, fancy, or imagination, can restore this cry. Were he to utter the words with his lips, his heart would disown them. But on the other hand, while he continues faithful, the *witness is continued*, the light and conviction, and the *cry*, are maintained. It is the glory of this grace that no man can *command* this cry: and none can *assume* it. Where it *is*, it is the faithful and true witness: where it is *not*, all is uncertainty and doubt. pp. 60—62.

We think it clear, that he means to hold to a *bona fide* perfection, and a perfect assurance. It would seem, too, that such is his doctrine, not merely with reference to a few, of rare attainments, but with reference to every individual, who has any grace at all. The third particular under the second head just quoted, expresses this idea, if it is possible to express it.

But though such was doubtless his opinion at the time of writing this discourse, he appears to have entertained a different opinion while writing some other portions of this volume.

When you had most hope, faith and love, you needed *more*, in order to qualify you fully for heaven: If you have less now, are you getting to glory? p. 291.

Here he seems to think, that at the very best, a believer, while in the flesh, is not fully qualified for heaven. We must then, still allow Dr. C. his accustomed licence, or else, to make him consistent, we must, after all, (as in the case of Wesley,) understand his 'perfection as no perfection.' We ought, however, to say, that he exhibits much less of contradiction on this topic, in proportion to the extent in which he treats of it, than on any other of his favorite doctrines. Perfection connected with assurance, is his darling theme. He urges it with a more steady and fervent zeal than any other distinctive doctrine of his sect. And in fact, we are quite willing he should preach perfection in many of its practical bearings, with all the power of man or angel. We will show how far we can go with him—and where we stop—and why.

We agree that God's law requires us to be perfect, and that its requirements are righteous. Of course we agree that man has the requisite ability to become perfect. Perfection is, in its *nature attainable* at any stage in this life, and ought so to be preached with all possible urgency. We mean such a

perfection as fits the pardoned soul for heaven. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." Whoever does not attain to this, is guilty of sin for the abuse of his faculties and the neglect of his means. He is of course to be charged with the full guilt, and not pitied for the mere misfortune. We should even be ready, on the exhibition of suitable *evidence*, to believe of any one, that he may have been perfect for a given portion of time. Nor do we see any difficulty, in the mere nature of man, in supposing him to be perfect *to day* and imperfect *to morrow*. But here we stop. When the question comes to the matter of fact; and the inquiry is put, *are real christians generally perfect?* We say, *no*. Are a considerable proportion thus perfect? *No*. Are there a few in every age? We still answer *no*; for we remember it was once said, "*there is not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not.*" Is there one now living? We doubt it. Why? Because it requires evidence to authorize positive belief. *The bible* affords us no such evidence. On the other hand, Paul who was probably at least as holy as any man now upon earth, disavows all claim to such perfection. *Our experience* affords no evidence. *Our observation* presents none. On the contrary, the best men we have known, are among the most ready to declare that they know they are imperfect. *Credible evidence* from all other sources, is wanting. Not that we have never known or heard of those who '*said they were perfect.*' But their declarations in connection with their lives, most sadly '*proved them perverse.*'

Sincerely believing the doctrine of *actual* perfection as preached in these sermons, to be false and of very pernicious tendency, we feel it a duty to specify some of the pernicious bearings.

It tends to lower the standard of holiness which God has presented in his law. We are at the best, but too ready 'to measure ourselves by ourselves and compare ourselves among ourselves'—too ready to think ourselves *good enough*, if we are equally good with some of the best around us. Only tell us, then, that these men are *perfect*, that they come up to the requisitions of God's law; and what will you say to induce us to reach forth after greater holiness?

It inflates spiritual pride. For a man to believe himself perfect when he is not, is one of the worst of evils in the sight of both God and man.

It may lead to fatally erroneous views of the nature, as well as the extent, of sin. Such views we believe many of those actually entertain, who lay claim to this attainment.

Did they rightly understand the evil of sin, or know "the plague of their own hearts," we think they would see themselves "in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity." We think it has in every way a most baleful tendency to encourage young converts to think themselves perfect. Such sermons as these, are directly fitted to produce and foster this presumption.

We pass to another topic—the *saint's perseverance*. On this Dr. C. says but little; but we rejoice to see that this little is mostly if not entirely correct, whether he expressly designed to teach the doctrine or not.

He freely uses such expressions as this; "there is no infallible *necessity* of continuence," in a state of grace. And so say we with equal emphasis. The only question is, *will* God complete the work of grace in every heart where he begins it? No where that we know of, does Dr. C. deny this; but in several passages his language encourages us to presume that he believes it to be true. Did we not know the author to be a staunch methodist, we should consider the following passages as expressly designed to prove the doctrine, in the exact sense in which we hold it; and we are on the whole inclined to think he intends to put his brethren right on this point. We do not say his arguments are all sound in their full extent. We will first quote from a sermon on Philippians i. 9—11.

And this I pray, that your love may abound yet more and more in knowledge and in all judgment; that ye may approve things that are excellent, that ye may be sincere and without offence till the day of Christ: being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of God. p. 100.

After speaking of the benefit of intercessory prayer in general, he says;

But there is an essential difference between the *prayers of inspired men* and those of *private christians*, how good or holy soever they may be; as the former pray for the church and the world, according to *direct inspiration*, God having determined to grant the blessings for which he excites them to pray. Hence, all such *prayers* may be viewed as direct *promises*, and claimed as such by those in whose behalf they are offered. On this principle, the prayer in the above verses must have been considered by the Philippians, as containing a series of promises, the fulfilment of which they had a right to expect, if faithful to the grace by which they were thus favored. "And this I pray, that ye may," etc. But can *we* who live at such a distance from apostolic times, take up this prayer in the *same light*, and expect with equal confidence its fulfilment? This inquiry may be fully answered by the following considerations:—1. The church of Christ is a society of godly people subsisting in various places, through all ages. 2. The sacred writings were given to the *church* of Christ.

3. Those writings do not come to a *particular people*, in a *particular place*; much less to *individuals*, *nominally* or *specifically* considered; but they are sent to *characters* and *circumstances*. 4. All persons therefore, of the *same character*, or in the *same religious state*, and all who are in the *same circumstances*, are those contemplated by the Divine Spirit in the Revelation which He has given. If, then, we are in the same spiritual state—wish for the same blessings—and look to the same unchanged God, through that Christ who is the same yesterday, to-day and for ever; we have an equal interest in these promises, may claim their fulfilment, and considering ourselves in the place of the *Phillippians*, receive with meekness that *engrafted word*, which is able to make us wise unto salvation. pp. 101, 102.

When the apostle prays that “they may be sincere and without offence,” he prays that their *heart* may be *always right before God*; and their *conduct* always *unblameable before Men*. These *two* constitute the character of the perfect christian:—The character of him in whose heart Christ dwells by faith; and whose actions are governed by the *law of love* to God and man.

This purity is not to last for a *day*, or a *particular time* merely, but during the *whole of life*—*till the day of Christ*; i. e. the day in which Christ shall come to judge the world. p. 110.

It will be recollected that, according to Dr. C. this is a prophetic prayer for all true believers, so far as it is applicable to their circumstances; and (whatever may be true as to the circumstances for gaining knowledge,) it is surely applicable to the *circumstances of all* to continue in *love* “till the day of Christ.”

Christ's intercessory prayer for his disciples and for all who should ever believe on his name, is the passage which is most directly and indisputably in point, for the proof of this doctrine in this particular manner. All must admit *Christ's* prayer on that occasion, as prophetic, whatever they may be disposed to say of the prayers of his apostles. We wish Dr. C. had selected that wonderful passage for the purpose. None can doubt its applicability to all believers in every age.

Again, on 1 Peter i. 3—5, speaking of the incorruptible and unfading inheritance;

But for *whom* is it kept? Ans. For *them who are kept by the power of God*: τοὺς ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ φρουρούμενους—for *them who are defended as in a fortress by the power of God*. There is a remarkable correspondence between the *two verbs* used in this sentence: the first verb τηρῶ, signifies, to *keep watch, guard*; and τηρεῖς, is a *place of custody, or prison*; and the other verb, φρουρῶ, from φρουρός, a *sentinel*, signifies to *keep as under a military guard*. The true disciples of Christ are under the continual watchful care of God; and the inheritance is guarded for them. In some countries *military posts* are continually kept upon the *confines*, in order to prevent irruptions from a neighboring people; and in many places, *heirs*, while in their *minority*, are kept in *fortified places*, under *military guards*, lest they should sustain any injury, or be carried away.

The *heirs*, in the text are kept by the power of God; ἐν δυνάμει Θεοῦ, by the mighty miraculous power of God; for nothing less is necessary to keep and preserve in this state of continual trial, a soul from the contagion that is in the world. God's providence is the safe place, and God's power is the guard in that safe place. As it requires the same power to preserve that it required to create, so nothing less than the sovereign power of God will suffice to keep that soul in a state of purity which that power has purified. Thus the power and grace which save us are still necessary to keep us in the saved state.

But how is this power exerted? Ans. By faith. He that shall ultimately get the inheritance, is he who shall be found faithful unto death. Faith interests the power of God in behalf of His followers; and the power of God preserves the inheritance for the man and the man for the inheritance. No persevering without this power, and no power without faith. The oracle of God is, "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee the crown of life." This is salvation, redemption, from sin in and during life, and glory after death. p. 289.

This is all we wish any man to say on perseverance. For 'God to preserve the inheritance for the man and the man for the inheritance,' is the whole of our doctrine, and just as we hold it. Infinitely far are we from imagining that any one will reach heaven without perseverance in holiness, or without being kept by the power of God.

We have now touched on the main topics of controversy between us and the Methodists, so far as they are brought to view in these sermons. And we rejoice to say, that we feel encouraged to hope, that works like this will essentially conduce to reconcile multitudes to the truth. What Dr. C. concedes, we hope they will concede;—and on points where he contradicts himself, we hope there will be many to cast away the error, and embrace the truth, and hereafter defend it with greater consistency than he has done. We say we hope this. We would still more emphatically say, we desire it. We are not among the number who expect a speedy amalgamation of all sects, nor do we believe the Christian world yet prepared to profit by such an event. Still we are at a much greater remove from those who would widen the breach, or slacken the hand in repairing it. Thrice welcome the day, whenever Providence shall send it, in which all "shall see eye to eye." To this glorious consummation, let every heart, and tongue, and pen be devoted. While we contend earnestly for the truth, and expose error and contradiction and absurdity in such a manner that they may be seen in their genuine features, it must always be for the purpose, that all may be brought "to refuse the evil and choose the good."

We have confined our attention chiefly to Dr. Clarke's doctrinal statements, and have, therefore, passed over in silence his numerous specimens of inaccuracy or negligence, on minor points. We might speak of his professedly 'a priori argu-

ment for the necessity of God's existence,' which he adopts from his namesake, the celebrated Dr. Clarke, or rather from Thomas Aquinas. We might wonder at his speaking of a particle of space as existing every where and always, and yet saying that space could not exist before creation; and yet still that God upholds space as a positive existence; and still farther, that space is *nothing*;—&c. We might point out his unfortunate blunder in speaking of "the almost absolute repose which appears in the *perihelia* (aphelia) of the planetary orbits." But we have no disposition to dwell on these topics. We shall allude to only one subject more of this kind.

Dr. C. in common with some others, asserts facts respecting the superhuman discernment of Adam, for which we feel disposed to require a little more substantial proof.

To prove that he was endued with *animal* life, and *intellectual* powers, "God brought to him every beast of the field and every fowl of the air to see what he would call them." And he gave names to all—and *whatsoever* Adam "called every living creature, that was the name thereof." Gen. ii. 19, 20. Here he had the full proof of his own *intellectual* powers. He discerned the *qualities* and *habits* of the different creatures brought before him; and gave them *names* expressive of those *qualities* and *habits*. This is proved from the signification of the names of the different animals mentioned in the *Hebrew* Scriptures—the language in which Adam named those creatures. He was *חיה* *chaiyah* an *animal* like them—but he had a *נפש* *nephesh*, or *נשמת* *neshmet shaddai* an *intellectual principle*, by which he could discern their *natures* and *habits*: and gave so full a proof of his *intelligence* here, that God *ratified his nomination*, and did not *change* one of the names which he had imposed! p. 209.

We feel no disposition to deny the original abilities of Adam, or to suggest that he was at all short of full manhood in intellectual power at his first creation. But that he possessed an intuition by which to discern the very natures, qualities and habits of the endlessly variegated multitudes of animals brought before him, is quite too much for the slender prop of proof, on which the mighty fabric of this hypothesis is left to lean. Even conjecture, (though ranging in this very Eden of its fruitfulness,) does not imagine that these animals *exhibited* the indications of their respective natures in appropriate acts. The lion did not watch, and seize, and tear his prey, nor did the poisonous reptile bite or sting. All was peaceful, and harmless, and lovely, before the fall, in this immense assemblage of new made beings. How then could Adam know so exactly the natures and habits of all, and thus be the greatest zoologist that ever existed? Is it said, *by inspiration*? But this spoils the argument for his superior natural discernment. God could inspire an ordinary man thus to

give appropriate names. No; according to Dr. Clarke it was by *intuition*.

What, now, is the proof of this wonderful intelligence? Is it the naked fact which the bible affords us, that he gave names to the beasts? No; for even a child, fallen as he now is, proves expert in the art of naming, before he can articulate half his native language. The whole rests on the assumption, that the names which Adam gave, were significant of the respective natures of the animals. We call it an *assumption*,—for what is the proof? Nothing but this: a few Hebrew names of animals appear to have been significant at the time of Moses, or of Isaiah. Did Adam, then, speak Hebrew?—Or if he did, are we sure these few names remained unchanged through the lapse of so many centuries, the wreck of the deluge, and the confusion of Babel?—And if this is true, are we sure that these names were significant at the time of their imposition? Was Adam at once made master of a complete vocabulary, denoting the nicest shades of thought, before he had occasion to express those thoughts? Or, finally, take all the conjectures above alluded to, for facts; do we then know that these few Adamic names, significant as we may suppose them when first pronounced by the first man, were a correct sample and proof of the universal fact with all the names he gave?

A chain that is broken at every link, is too weak to sustain the ponderous proposition, that *Adam knew every thing*. Nor can we see how it ministers to the glory of God, or of “his covenants with man,” to use such logic. We can, however, see, (what we verily believe to be extensively a fact,) how such hypotheses lead men to blame Adam comparatively too much, and themselves too little, for the introduction and continuance of sin in our ruined world. We think it time to sift such logic, to try a little the coherence of such chains;—and this is our apology for bestowing more words on this topic than we designed, or than some may suppose it to merit.

We have now finished our remarks on the sermons of Dr. Adam Clarke. Without a single unkind feeling towards him or those who adopt his sentiments, we have freely pointed out his inconsistencies and mistakes; his misconceptions of the doctrines which he attempts to refute; and his repeated, though unconscious, concessions of almost every question in debate between himself and Calvinists at the present day. We have no hesitation in saying, that we think him a truly pious and devoted servant of Christ. His writings show that he is zealous for the salvation of souls, bold and uncompromising in his resistance of conformity to the world, and mainly anxious to promote a warm-hearted and devotional spirit in all who bear

the Christian name. As a man of intellect and learning, his friends will find that he has been greatly over-rated; and that nothing can be more injurious to their cause, than to hold him out before the public as the oracle of Methodism. His knowledge though various and extensive, is neither minute nor accurate on any subject. His principles of reasoning are remarkably unsettled. He has no great, compacted system of thought, either right or wrong; and is, therefore, in many cases most happily inconsistent—most singularly felicitous in correcting his own errors. His principal deficiency lies in the want of a clear and rectifying judgment; which might teach him the comparative value of different kinds of knowledge, might aid him in selecting the materials of sound reasoning, might guard him against the illusions of fancy, and especially of those scholastic subtleties in which he loves so greatly to indulge, and might lead him forward from premises to conclusions with a sure and steady step. His learning may throw a temporary splendor over the cause which he has espoused, but, with such a deficiency, the public will at last discover that it only “leads to bewilder, and dazzles to blind.”

ART. II.—REVIEW, OF THE MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE, TIME, AND WRITINGS OF THOMAS BOSTON.

Memoirs of the Life, Time, and Writings of the reverend and learned THOMAS BOSTON. Written by himself and addressed to his children. Edinburgh, printed 1776.

MANY have been instructed and delighted by the writings of Thomas Boston, who may know little of his private character or personal history. The “Memoirs of his Life, Time, and Writings,” on which we propose to dwell in this article, is, we believe, rarely to be found in this country. Yet we have seen few pieces of biography, which contain so many and so valuable lessons of Christian instruction. There are many among us who have read the writings of Boston with deep and delightful interest, and who will be gratified to learn, that the lessons of instruction, which he urged on the attention of others, were illustrated in the happiest manner by his own private history. The Christian truths, which he taught, were embodied in his character; and his life sheds a clear and strong lustre on his writings. No one can fail to see the important bearing of this fact on his posthumous usefulness. It gives fresh interest and increased force to all the productions of his pen. No one can listen without profit or delight, to the animated

exhortations of Richard Cecil, or Thomas Scott, as they urge on Christian ministers the duty of devoting themselves unreservedly to their official work, and of relying on God "for a supply of all their wants." But how much more are we profited and delighted when we see these men *acting* on the principles which they inculcated. How much deeper is our impression of the soundness of their doctrine on this subject, when we trace its practical bearing on their lives.

Boston had the most *exquisite tenderness of conscience*, accompanied by a *deep, lively, and humiliating sense of his personal sinfulness*. His slightest deviations from the path of duty, he was quick to discover; and the least faults which marked his course, gave him pain. He was easily touched with remorse—was alive to the gentlest rebukes of conscience. When he had sinned, he was prompt to take the side of this accuser, against himself. His sense of guilt filled him with self-loathing, and he mourned like a parent at the grave of an only child. Who that has ever stood by the side of the publican, and entered into his feelings, when he cried "God be merciful to me a sinner," will not readily sympathize with Boston, in the following expressions of his views and feelings?

Thus was my soul troubled. Sometimes I stood, sometimes sat, and sometimes walked; at length I went to my knees; and so I sat a while, but not speaking a word. At length, I broke out with that, "How long, O Lord?"—and, pausing a while again, I cried to the Lord to shew me why he contended with me. Whereupon conscience spake plain language to me,—and told me my fault of self-seeking in speaking to a man yesterday, and writing to my brother; for which I desired to humble myself before the Lord. p. 49.

I was to preach in Clackmannan, where most were for me to be their minister, and some, that had the greatest power, were against me, as it ordinarily fared with me in the places where I used to preach. On the Saturday afternoon, there comes a letter to my hand, desiring me to give the one half of the day to one J. G., whom those that were against me had an eye upon. The letter I received contentedly, granted the desire of it, and blessed the Lord for it. In these circumstances, seeing what hazard I was in of an evil eye, I committed my heart to the Lord, that I might be helped to carry evenly. I cried to the Lord for it; and got that word, "My grace shall be sufficient for thee." Sabbath morning, I found in myself a great desire to love Christ, and to be concerned solely for His glory; and prayed to that effect not without some success. He took the forenoon, for so it was desired by them. I was helped to join in prayer, and was much edified both by his lecture and sermon, and I sang with a sweet frame after sermon: yet in the time was thrice assaulted with the temptation I feared; but looking up to the Lord, found it repulsed in some measure; and found my soul desirous that people should gain good, soul good, of what was very seriously, pathetically and judiciously said to us by the godly young man. Betwixt sermons, I gained a sight of my own emptiness, and then prayed

and preached in the afternoon with very much help from the Lord. Yet, for all that, I wanted not some levity of spirit, which poison my heart sucked out of that sweet flower. pp. 58, 59.

Seldom have we seen a paragraph in the private journal of a christian minister, more interesting or instructive than the above extract. It is interesting in the light, strong and clear, which it sheds upon the christian character of Boston. It brings out fully to view his inmost heart. And what tenderness of conscience—what self-abasement do we not perceive! But we would call the attention of “divinity students” and young preachers especially to this paragraph, as being in a high degree instructive. They cannot escape the temptation in some form or other, to which Boston felt himself exposed. They must be brought to act by the side of other students and other ministers. Between them and others a comparison will be made. As the result of this comparison, some will be thought to fall below others in strength of mind; in interest and variety of attainments; in impressiveness of address; or in general excellence of character. And what is thought will be known. Some will not hesitate frankly and perhaps injudiciously, to publish their opinion of the respective merits of the different preachers whom they hear; while all will be very apt in some way, sufficiently intelligible, to manifest their decided preference of one minister to another. This cannot fail to be more or less trying and painful to those, who may find themselves thrown into the shade by their more gifted brethren. Their christian character will be brought to a severe test. And as it is a test, to which every young minister may expect to be brought, he would do well to cultivate that state of mind, which may prepare him honorably to sustain the trial.

The same state of mind, if we are not mistaken, is requisite to bear in a christian manner, both *praise* and *censure*. He who can meet the one, uninjured, need not fear the other. The trial of character, to which those, who in the highest degree, and those who, in the lowest degree, enjoy the favor of their hearers, is nearly the same. The latter will be in danger of being mortified, depressed, and soured; the former, of becoming self-complacent and elated. The source of danger in both cases is *vanity*, the most dangerous perhaps of all the temptations which beset the young preacher. In one case, the feeling of self-esteem is humored, in the other, crossed. But whether crossed or humored, it still deserves the name of vanity; and this, in all its ever varying forms, is a perpetual source of guilt and misery to those, who live under its influence. They will be tormented with continual fear,

that others will be raised above, and themselves depressed below, their appropriate place. Their own claims to public esteem, they will be apt to magnify much beyond their proper limits: while the merits of others they will be slow to see in their natural form, and to estimate according to their real value. And as the public cannot see with their eyes, they will always be in danger of feeling themselves injured in their reputation.

On the best method of eradicating this feeling of vanity from the heart, different views are entertained by different individuals. Some think it best to avoid those occasions, on which one mind is brought into comparison with another. In this way they would prevent the heart from being inflated or depressed. We have known a body of ministers, associated together for literary purposes, who made it a standing rule in their meetings, never to point out in each other's efforts what they regarded as deserving of praise. Their critical acumen they exercised only in discovering and exhibiting each other's faults. They were afraid of exciting each other's vanity; and seemed to suppose that by withholding praise they might starve out the enemy in each other's bosoms. But how is it better to be mortified than inflated? Both the one state of mind and the other are only different forms of vanity. And it is not easy to say, which most nourishes this passion, blame or praise. It might be useful to avoid all occasions of exciting vanity, if this were possible. But it can obviously be done only by avoiding all occasions of usefulness. Could Whitfield help perceiving, that the same audience which heard other preachers with listless apathy, gave him an eager and breathless attention? What, then, should Whitfield do? He must encounter temptations to the exercise of vanity, or abandon the pulpit. And the same necessity which pressed upon him, will in some form or other, and in some degree or other, reach every minister of the gospel. Let every minister of the gospel, then, early inure himself to the dangers which he must one day, and often, meet from that quarter.

Let every man, who would bear praise or blame uninjured, copy the example presented by Boston, in the paragraph which gave occasion to these remarks. He was requested to permit another young preacher like himself, to occupy the same pulpit on the same day, in the presence of a congregation, which was seeking a stated pastor. This request, he knew, proceeded from a desire to compare the two preachers respectively with each other. "Most of the people were for him to be their minister," while "some, who had the greatest power, had their eye upon" the other candi-

date. The occasion was very trying; yet Boston knew, that *he had no agency* in the request which gave birth to the temptation; that the request was lawful in itself; and he, therefore, "received it contentedly, granted it, and blessed the Lord for it." He was fully aware, however, that he "was in hazard of an evil eye." But instead of shrinking away from the danger, which in his view lay before him in the path of duty, he "committed his heart to the Lord, that he might be helped to carry evenly. He cried to the Lord; and got that word, 'My grace shall be sufficient for thee.'" Let this course be pursued by every one who is placed in similar circumstances, and he may rejoice in the same happy results. The way to root out vanity from the heart is not to stand aloof from our brethren, by whose side we may be called to labor, but in all our efforts, earnestly to "study to approve ourselves to God." A single further extract we must be permitted to make, to illustrate the exquisite tenderness of conscience and lively sense of personal sinfulness, which marked the character of Boston.

"This wish (a sinful one) came in most suddenly upon me, as lightning, and did very much confuse me, was heavy to me, and marred my confidence with the Lord. So when I came in from the kirk, I was most ugly and hell-deserving in my own eyes, and verily believed, there was none so unworthy as I. Then my heart-monsters, pride, worldly-mindedness, discontent, &c., stared me in the face, and my poor heart was overwhelmed with sorrow. In the mean time, that word, "When the poor and the needy seek water," &c., came sweetly to me, and was a little supporting, but I found it a great difficulty to believe. Being diverted, much of this wore off my spirit, and a dreadful deadness succeeded. The next morning, I got a revival; and through the day, for the most part, it was not very ill. But being to preach without in the afternoon, I went to Mr. Stark's garret betwixt sermons, and there conversed with Christ, and it was a Bethel to me. If ever I had communion with God, it was in that place. The remembrance of it melts my heart, at the writing hereof. And accordingly, my public work was sweet; for God was with me, and, as I learned afterwards, it wanted not success. God's voice was discerned in it." p. 75.

If any of our readers are disposed to fear, that a cordial, full, and steadfast belief in the "doctrines of grace," will make men careless about the state of their hearts, and the complexion of their conduct, we would earnestly invite them to study the above paragraph. "The doctrines of grace" were the foundation, on which the religious character of Thomas Boston was evidently formed. These doctrines were not only received into his understanding, but they also acted, with great energy, upon his heart. They not only had a prominent place in his creed, and in his sermons; but they were also embodied and animated, in his life. And did they "harden"

his spirit? Did they sear his conscience? Did they lead him to look, with a careless eye, upon the workings of sin, in his bosom? Surely not. Let those, who decry the "doctrines of grace," as friendly to corruption of heart, and looseness of morals, give us, from among themselves, instances of greater delicacy of conscience—of stricter watchfulness, over the movements of the "inner man"—of stronger aversion to sin—of deeper self-abasement, arising from a sense of guilt—and of more anxious, strenuous exertions, to break away from the control of sinful propensities, than is presented in the history of Boston, and of thousands like Boston, or cease to charge upon the "doctrines of grace," a licentious tendency.

What Christian minister can mark, without the liveliest interest, the pains which Boston took, to prepare himself for the labors of the pulpit. His train of thought, he seems to have arranged, with the deepest seriousness, the most intense study, and earnest prayer. But, he did not think it enough, to satisfy the demands of his office upon him, to have labored with whatever care and success, to prepare lessons of Christian instruction for "the people." Having composed his sermons, he did not think himself ready, without further effort, to speak from the pulpit. His sermons must be spread out in the presence of God, before they were addressed to men. They must be dwelt upon in the closet, before they were given to the public. Thus, the truths which he would fasten upon the minds of others, he was enabled first, deeply to impress upon his own mind. His own heart was affected by the motives, by which he would reach and move the hearts of others. He was thus enabled, himself, to feel what he had prepared, in order to produce emotion in the bosoms of his hearers. From the closet, he went to the pulpit. Thus prepared to "speak for God," he was permitted to enjoy His presence. The labors of the pulpit were performed, with delight to himself, and profit to his hearers. While he delivered the words of God, he was permitted to know, that "God's voice" was heard.

The example of Boston, in his efforts to qualify himself to give public instruction, we cannot but hold up to the imitation of other Christian ministers. Who has not been struck with the cold, lifeless, unimpressive manner, in which very valuable trains of well arranged thought, are often delivered from the pulpit? Truths, the most solemn and important, are announced without earnestness or energy. In the midst of awful descriptions, and thrilling appeals, the preacher stops to spell out the meaning of a word, or make out the sense and purport of a blindly written phrase. Thus embarrassed and perplexed, how can he enter deeply into the spirit of his sub-

ject? How can he touch and move the hearts of his hearers? The most that he can hope to effect, will be to bring them to sympathize with him, in the mortification which his embarrassment must occasion him.

The habit of passing without meditation or special prayer, from the social circle, or from the pages of some book foreign to the subject on which he is about to dwell, to the pulpit, has a very unhappy bearing upon the usefulness and happiness of a Christian preacher. He cannot but be cold and unimpressive. An air of awkwardness and formality will inevitably hang about him. He will not be at home. His countenance will be vacant, his language set, his movements, constrained. And if he touches upon a point, which begins to animate his soul, before the kindling fire has time to rise to a flame, something will occur, on the unfamiliar page before him, to extinguish it. Oh, when will a close communication be opened, and maintained, between the pulpit and the closet! When will the ministers of Christ drench their sermons in the dews of prayer! Then may they expect, in their sacred work, to exult in the smiles of a present God. Then will the voice of Jehovah be discerned in their ministrations. Then will success crown their exertions.

How entirely, cordially, and earnestly, Boston *cast himself upon Jesus Christ for forgiveness and salvation*, will appear from paragraphs like the following :

I am content to take Christ for my prophet, to be taught by him what is my duty, that I may comply with it; I am content to know what is my sin, that I may turn from it; and by grace I know something of what it is to make use of Christ as a prophet in this case; and I desire to learn of him, as the only Master, what is the will of God, and the mystery of renouncing my own wisdom, which I reckon but weakness and folly. I know and am persuaded, that I am a lost creature; that justice must be satisfied; that I am not able to satisfy it, nor any creature for me; that Christ is able, and his death and sufferings are sufficient satisfaction. On this I throw my soul with its full weight; here is my hope and only confidence. My duties, I believe, the best of them, would damn me, sink me to the lowest pit, and must needs be washed in that precious blood, and can have no acceptance with God but through his intercession. I desire to have nothing to do with an absolute God, nor to converse with God except through Christ. I am sensible, that I have nothing to commend me to God, or to Christ, that He may take my cause in hand. If He should damn me, He would do me no wrong. But the cord of love is let out, even the covenant in His blood; I accept of it, and at His command lay hold on it, and venture. This is faith in spite of devils. And my heart is pleased with the glorious desire of man's salvation through Christ, carrying all the praise to free grace, and leaving nothing of it to the creature. My soul is content of Him for my king. I know no lust, that I would not be content to part with. My will bound hand and foot, I desire to lay at His feet." pp. 243, 244.

Seldom have we seen the leading peculiarities of the christian character more clearly and forcibly expressed. What a deep conviction of his pressing need of the benefits of redeeming mercy, was wrought in the heart of Boston! How eagerly and earnestly did he lay hold on those benefits! What strong complacency did he feel in the method of salvation, proposed in the Gospel! How cordially—how joyfully did he embrace that method! And how happy was the influence of his faith upon him, in delivering him from the dominion of sin! How refreshing, to sympathize in the feelings of so vigorous and masculine a christian!

Lively and devoted christians have often derived signal benefit, from frequently renewing their covenant with God. The impression of the obligations which bind them to the Messiah's throne, they have thus been enabled to keep fresh upon their minds. They have thus been enabled to maintain an animating and most cheering hope of enjoying the benefits, which naturally flow from their peculiar relation to the Savior. In the midst of darkness, light is often reflected upon them from the memorials of joy which here and there, in renewing their covenant with God, they had set up. "I made use in that sad hour," wrote Boston, with the most touching simplicity, "of the covenant, namely, my engaging with him at Culness, Tulliallan, and under the tree in Kennet orchard. After this the language of my soul was, 'My feet had almost slipped, but thy mercy held me up.'" p. 52.

Most of our readers may be familiar with the following paragraph, taken from the pages of Robert Hall, "on the work of the Holy Spirit:" "The children of God are characterized in scripture by their being 'led by the Spirit:' *led*, evidently not impelled, nor driven forward in a headlong course, without choice or design: but, being by the constitution of their nature, rational and intelligent: and, by the influence of grace, rendered spiritual, they are disposed to obey at a touch, and to comply with the quieter insinuations of divine grace; they are ready to take that precise impression, which corresponds with the mind and purpose of the Spirit. You are aware of what consequence it is in worldly concerns to embrace opportunities, and to improve critical seasons: and thus in the things of the Spirit, there are times peculiarly favorable, moments of happy visitation, when much more may be done towards the advancement of our spiritual interest than usual. There are gales of the Spirit, unexpected influences of light and of power, which no assiduity in the means of grace can command, but which it is a great point of wisdom to improve." Of this doctrine, Boston's Memoirs furnish us with very ap-

propriate and striking illustrations. The following may be presented as a specimen :

June 22. Having been for some time in great deadness, this morning I had a kind of impulse to pray, with a willingness in my soul to go to duty; and having found by several sad experiences the dangers of delays, with all speed I embraced the motion; and the Lord revived me in so far that my heart and flesh longed for the living God, and cried out for Him, as the parched ground for rain. The Lord loosed my bands : and though I studied the sermon this day at Dause in very bad case, yet He was with me in preaching it, and the Spirit did blow on my soul, both in public and in spirit thereafter." p. 68.

Again at another time :

And now my confidence in the Lord was raised, and my soul blessed the Lord ; I am His ; let Him do what seemeth Him good with me. Catching my heart at the season when it was willing, I went to God again, and poured out my soul. p. 90.

From these and similar statements, to be found in the memoirs of Boston, let no one infer, that in performing the duties of religion, he was guided and governed by impulses. He was guided and governed by the precepts of the bible. He prayed without ceasing. Amidst temptations, when his heart was distracted and sorrowful, he hastened to the mercy-seat, to obtain grace to help him in such times of need ; rising perhaps from his bed at midnight to spend an hour in prayer. But when the gracious Comforter visited his soul, he devoted special seasons to communion with God. And those, who know the voice of the same Spirit, should be ready "to do likewise." It is our wisdom to attend to his gentlest intimations. Then may we find Him ever present with us, to prompt, to aid, and to cheer.

The *official* character of Boston was in a high degree interesting and excellent. One more deserving of the careful study of christian ministers, we have seldom seen. He shrunk away with horror from the thought of making the ministry a mere *profession*, by which he might earn his bread, and secure an honorable reputation. The following extract we cannot but regard as exceedingly instructive :

On the 19th, I preached at Dellar, where on the Saturday night it was shewn me, that some there had little liking of me, because of my severe preaching; and James Kirk, an elder, told me of Paul's catching men with guile; signifying, that some of the heritors, when desired to subscribe a commission as aforesaid, said they would hear me again before they did it; and therefore he wished they might not be angered any more, for that the elders had enough ado with them already. I told him my resolution to speak what God should give me, without fear or favor; and could not but

observe that special providence, which after this conference, ordered our singing at family worship the two last verses of Ps. xxvii. and our reading Mat. x. where in this case I was instructed, forewarned, and comforted. But thereafter I was baited with a temptation to fainting in the matter, and my courage damped.—This was a heavy exercise to me that night. I prayed, read, meditated, struggled, urged my heart with these scriptures, Mat. iv. 39; Prov. xxviii. 21; Acts xvii. 26, hard put to it, but still in hope the Lord would not leave me to “transgress for a piece of bread.” But as I was putting off my clothes for bed, my text I was to preach on came into my mind, “He came unto his own, and his own received him not.” This enlivened my heart with zeal and courage to speak without sparing in his cause. But next morning the temptation was renewed; and I had never seen my own weakness in that point so much as I saw it then. Nevertheless I was still in hope that God would not suffer me to yield, but would help me to speak the word he should give me. After all this, as I was going down to the kirk, John Blackwood, another good man, and an elder, put me in mind, to be sure to hold off from reflections as far as I could; for the which I reprimanded him. In the issue, the Lord gave me freedom to preach his word, whatever was to become of me; and my soul found cause to bless the Lord, that that temptation had not prevailed to render me unfaithful in his work. p. 54.

To feel the full force of this paragraph, it should be known, that “the cast of Boston’s temper was naturally slow, timorous, and diffident.” p. 509.

In this passage, we have striking instances of the well-meant but ill-judged kindness of that class of men, who advise ministers as much as possible to avoid “*the Cross*” in their official course. They are among the worst *tempters*, to which the christian preacher is exposed. When they can answer for his sin in shrinking from self-denying duties, then may they with more propriety urge him to be cautious and time-serving. Till then, they ought to hold their peace; or receive the reprimand, “Away ye tempters.” Matt. xvi. 23.

Those who are avowedly opposed to the distinguishing doctrines of the gospel are not the only men, who in some form or other will urge the christian minister to “prophecy unto them smooth things.” None are more anxious to be soothed in their sins than the *coldly* orthodox. A reliance for salvation on lifeless speculations, however correct, often fills the heart with the bitterest enmity to practical religion. Those, who maintain this reliance, will be eager and clamorous in their demands for what is often called highly *doctrinal* instruction. Any effort to give divine truth a practical form—to send it home to the “bosoms and business” of men, will give them offence. Now these men, the christian preacher is to resist with as much promptness and energy as the openly heterodox. To yield to their wishes would be to dishonor his Master and injure their souls. So thought Thomas Scott. His hearers were continually crying, *Give us the doctrines of*

grace. In plain, practical views of our obligations, as moral agents, we feel little interest. *Such views do not edify us.* We are no Pharisees. We make no account of our good works in our expectations of Heaven. We do not like to be urged to perform them. But in such views of truth and duty, Scott saw the workings of an "evil heart of unbelief." Such a heart, in any one, he durst not gratify. Instead of humoring his people, he did his utmost to face them. He gave them such instruction, not as they *desired*, but as they *needed*. In so doing, he calmly expected, and fearlessly met their frowns. The same trial is to be expected in many highly orthodox communities. Let it be sustained in the spirit, which animated the heart of Boston, and all will be well.

The following extracts, taken from different parts of the private writings of Boston, cannot fail, we think, to interest our readers. Our clerical readers in particular will not need our assistance in deriving from them valuable lessons of instruction.

Thereafter, meeting with Abbay above mentioned, his foolish talking afforded me heavy reflections on the unedifying course of ministers, and my own among others, *as one great cause of the unsuccessfulness of the gospel.*—A godly countryman told me, that he had not so much of that sermon to carry away as usual. *I resolved to be shorter;* and learned from these things, that however my gift seems to be plain, I have need of dependence on the Lord, *ever for plainness* in treating of gospel mysteries.——Mr. F. had given the aforesaid elder a very indifferent character of me, saying, that now they were going to call a new upstart, one that broke the thowles. This character from *that good man* was affecting to me; considering that going under such a character, I was so unholy, my corruption prevailed so much over me, and that I was really weak in comparison with others, who took a more smooth way than I durst take in my public performances: and so it convinced me of my need to live more near to God.——I was comforted by a christian woman, blessing God that ever she saw me, and shewing me that never one had read her case, as the Lord had helped me to do, in my sermons first and last.——In the morning of the Lord's day, I took some thought of my notes, the rather to keep my heart steadfast, lest by worse meditations altogether, it should not so well be held fixed, but beguile me, as sometimes before. And this I reckon was the occasion of bringing me off from that way of spending the Sabbath morning in such meditations; and in coming over from it to the other method, of thinking on my notes, I designed impressing my heart with what I was to deliver, and to get it kept in a frame for preaching.——Coming home, I saw occasion to bless the Lord for His return to me in public ordinances; and went immediately into my closet for secret prayer: the which since that time all along unto this day, *hath been my ordinary practice.*

There are many weighty thoughts and choice sayings scattered through the private writings of Boston, which are worthy of being inscribed upon the hearts of his readers.

The evening exercise on the question concerning the providence of God was sweet to me; and in converse after it, it was a pleasure to think and speak of the saint's ground of encouragement from that head under trouble, particularly, how it is their God, that guides the world; and nothing do they meet with but what comes through their Lord's direction; how he weighs their troubles to the last grain, that no more falls to their share than they need; and how they have a covenant-right to chastisements, to the Lord's dealing with them as with sons, to be rightly educated, not as servants, whom the master will not strike, but put away at the time.—Communion with God consists in the Lord's letting down the influences of his grace upon the soul, and the soul's reacting the same in the exercise of grace.—I have always observed, narrow thoughts of the doctrine of free grace, to be accompanied with narrow thoughts of the extent of the holy law.—He intimated withal, that my style would be nauseous to the polite world, and that no book had yet been written on the depraved state of man, with true spirit and elegance of expression. This did not much move me; for *I do not think that way of writing is the way the Lord hath much used to countenance for the advancing of true Christianity.*—I have oftener than once observed, the more learned men easiest to please.

It has long been our opinion, that by a diligent, systematic improvement of their time and strength, ministers in general might with much success cultivate some of the branches of sacred literature. A fair and striking illustration of this opinion, we have in the course which Boston pursued. It would not, we think, be easy to find a more active and devoted pastor and preacher. He seems with much earnestness and strong delight and great success to have "preached the word in season and out of season." He published, we know not how many sermons, on practical religion. The meetings of the presbyteries, and general assembly; and especially the communion seasons in different parts of the country demanded no small portion of his time. His health, moreover, seems to have been far from firm. His wife was often ill, and for many years was confined to the house, and to the bed. Yet thus embarrassed and engaged, he found time with very indifferent helps to prosecute the study of Hebrew literature with much success and deep delight. On a subject, difficult, subtil, ill-understood, he found time to write a volume, of no ordinary value. Of this work, J. H. Michaelis did not hesitate to say—"Adeo solerter et exquisite, circumspecte, ac solide, ex sedulo observatis naturalibus hujus doctrinæ principijs, plurimum Reverendus auctor hoc argumentum pertractavit, ut cæteros, qui a me visi aut lecti fuerunt, longe post se relinquat."* If Boston amidst his labors and embarrassments

*With such exquisite skill, ability and caution, has the reverend author examined this subject in its fundamental principles, that he has far surpassed all others whom I have read or seen.

found time and strength to accomplish so much in promoting the interests of sacred literature, what might not be accomplished in our country in advancing the same cause, if christian ministers generally were animated with his spirit. Their advantages for prosecuting with success their sacred studies, are incomparably superior to those which fell to his lot. Oh, that they would but equal him in the diligence and delight, with which he improved the talents, committed to his trust ! Amidst his severest trials, it is interesting to observe how deep and permanent a source of enjoyment he found in his sacred studies.

I have been, (he writes,) most comfortably surprised with discoveries of the Lord's mind in His word of the Hebrew text, which he has been pleased to make to me by means of its accentuation. Particularly the discovery of the true sense of that passage, Gen. xlix. 10, by that means, did *so affect, strike, and transport me*, that it did most sensibly affect my very body, and that from head to foot. And by the light into the Lord's word so given me, I have found my soul sanctified, and made to love the Lord.

The memoirs of Boston are particularly interesting to the christian, and especially the christian student and minister, on account of the full and detailed manner in which, in the various circumstances of life, he describes the state of his mind and of his heart. We have something more than the outside of things. While we see the manner in which he performed the labors and sustained the trials allotted him, we are deeply interested and much instructed. This is a capital point in biography. It is too little thought of by most of those, who write their own memoirs or the memoirs of others. They give us a list of the results without an account of the means, by which they were secured. Had we a particular account of the different states of mind, through which Jonathan Edwards passed in writing his work upon the freedom of the will, it would be worth more to the public than all the memoirs of his life that have ever been written. The hint here given, might, we think, be profitably enlarged upon, and fully illustrated. Will not the numerous authors who write biography, attend to the suggestion ?

ART. III.—REVIEW OF TYLER'S LECTURES ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

Lectures on Future Punishment. By EDWARD R. TYLER, Middletown, Conn. Printed by Parmelee and Greenfield. pp. 180. 12mo.

No question of a more serious nature can be agitated in this life than that which relates to the condition of the soul in a future and everlasting state. And as that state is to be passed under the government of the Creator, He alone is able to tell us what scenes of interest lie beyond the grave, and are to make up the destiny of immortals. Man never acts more rationally, therefore, than when, desirous to know the real truth, he takes up the book of divine revelation to inquire what God reveals concerning eternity. Though conscious of ill-desert and filled with apprehension of evil, it will do him no injury to learn the worst, and it may be of everlasting benefit to his soul. With these feelings, thousands have consulted that book, and found in it the doctrine of everlasting punishment. And thousands who have discovered the doctrine there, overwhelmed with anguish at the evil of their sin, have been heartily humbled before their offended Maker, and accepted with penitent and grateful feelings, the forgiveness offered them through Christ; and, having passed with blessed peace and composure through this life and the darkness of the grave, are now singing before the throne of God and the Lamb, the song of everlasting redemption.

Everlasting punishment is to be understood, as one of the final results attendant on the moral government of God over his creatures. It is a result which is secured, not by the act of creative omnipotence, nor by the application of moral government, but by *sin*—the voluntary transgression of beings when created and placed under such a government. Rom. vii. 13. Rightly explained, the doctrine of eternal punishment implies that God governs the rational creation by law, and that the penalty which he annexes to transgression is endless;—that under his government there are transgressors, and that those transgressors for whom no redemption is provided, and those for whom it is provided but who refuse to accept it during their appointed season of probation, experience the penalty in an everlasting punishment. The doctrine, thus understood, is of deep practical importance to mankind. To the unpardoned sinner it brings home the impressive warning, that except he repents, within the uncertain period of God's forbearance, he shall perish. To the justified believer too, it brings

home the affecting appeal, that he owes to the Savior a deliverance from endless misery. To all, it reveals the deep displeasure of God against sin, and the greatness of his forgiving mercy; and thus presents the weightiest of all possible motives in favor of repentance and holy obedience, and a preparation in this life for an everlasting state.

A truth so important to the interests of religion and the salvation of souls—a truth which on account of its alarming and disquieting nature is carefully kept out of sight by many, disbelieved by others, and by others still is openly and strenuously opposed with the counter sentiment of universal salvation—a truth like this, is one which it will never be unprofitable for the ministers of religion, acting as the spiritual guardians of their people, to bring within the sanctuary, and unfold to the conviction, and impress upon the hearts of their hearers. The efforts, too, which are made at this day by the opposers of this truth, through the medium of the pulpit and the press to propagate their dangerous sentiments among our population, are such as call for publications to defend the word of God from their sophistry, and to shield the exposed, especially our youth, from the contagion of their error.

We were gratified therefore to learn, on the appearance of the Lectures cited at the head of this article, that Mr. T. at an early period of his ministry, had not shunned to discharge that duty to his people, and was willing by publication, to perform the same office for those whom he might secure as readers. On perusing the Lectures since, we have been disposed to commend the manner in which he has discharged that duty. They may have more of a speculative cast, perhaps, than some readers would like, yet we entertain no such feeling ourselves. Mr. T. divides the subject judiciously, employs a plain and perspicuous style, and looks well in his reasonings to the forms which Universalism assumes in the preaching and publications of the day. In short, we think these Lectures well adapted to produce the conviction, that the awful doctrine of which they treat is not only contained in revelation; but is exhibited there in that variety of form and with that impressive tone of description and warning, which will not leave him that denies the truth guiltless, or allow him that disregards it any escape from its terrors.

We shall not enter into any particular criticism of these Lectures, as it is our intention rather to devote this article to the important subject of which they treat. We shall proceed immediately, therefore, to suggest a few observations, which we hope will not be without interest and benefit to our readers.

The nature and practical tendency of this truth we have already suggested. The observation which we will first offer upon the subject, respects the ample nature of the testimony given to it in the scriptures: that this testimony is *so full and explicit, as to convict him who rejects the doctrine, of willful disregard to the authority of divine revelation.*

Whatever professions the disbeliever in everlasting punishment may make of respect for the testimony of God, he will acknowledge at least the *possibility* of men's discrediting the statements of divine revelation. Or if he will not do *this*, he is at once silenced by the fact, that the bible itself contains on the face of it the charge of criminal unbelief against some men in past ages, and a solemn warning against it in all ages; and that there are multitudes of deists and infidels in the world around him, who are frank and open enough to make the direct avowal of their own unbelief. But if it is possible to discredit the testimony of revelation, what evidence, we ask, has the disbeliever in this doctrine to prove, that with reference to this particular truth, at least, *he* is not subject to so serious and overwhelming a charge? For he must be aware, that it concerns *him* alone to free himself from the liability to such a charge. For here he stands as an individual in direct contact with his Maker. The sole question for him to solve is, whether, as one who may possibly involve himself in the charge of unbelief, he can see his way positively clear in this matter; and whether he will leave his soul in the hands of God, on the stake of an everlasting punishment, in case God shall say at the last, that He intended to inculcate on men such a truth in his word? This is the sole question in matters of divine testimony: and every man who acts rationally will dispose of every doctrine of divine revelation with the soberness and sincerity of so great an obligation. With such a question as this before him, the Universalist must see that he will not be able to clear himself from the charge of unbelief before his Maker, by attempting any dexterous management with his own conscience or with the world around him; for it is his Maker that speaks, and he must implicitly believe, or stake his soul on the consequence.

Is his disbelief of this doctrine, then, we ask, a result in his own case, of a positive desire to submit implicitly to divine testimony and to clear himself of the charge of unbelief? Now we remark, that if it is possible for the Universalist who denies the doctrine to state *what* he denies, and if it is possible for believers in it to state what they believe, it was just as possible for God also to state the doctrine through His inspired messengers, if such had been His intention. Let us suppose then that it had

been the design of God to state unequivocally to mankind that his government over them would terminate in this very manner with the impenitently wicked after this life, would it not be sufficient to say explicitly of those who should refuse submission to his terms of reconciliation throughout life, that they should be punished "*forever*?" Would not such a term be the right one to convey the idea he intended? Could he possibly have used any other more explicit? And could any thing less be fairly understood by it, when it must be known by all, that he was speaking of a measure of his own unending government, and with reference to beings who are to have an everlasting existence? And would not a single declaration thus unequivocal in its meaning, come with the tone of an undeceiving veracity, and demand the unwavering credence of the world? And would he not convict any who should ever read it and disregard it, of a criminal neglect of His warning and of the interests of their own souls, if He should call them before his kingdom to face that testimony again at his judgment seat? But what has God done? He has made and reiterated the plainest declarations; as if unwilling that his solemn warnings should be misunderstood, unheeded or unfelt;—like one intent on alarming a guilty world, and persuading it by terror to flee from the wrath to come. He has told us of a world of punishment, a prison of wrath in his kingdom, of the character which exposes to it, of the certainty that multitudes will persist in their sins, and enter that world,—that the fires of that world are "not quenched," that its executioners of wrath "die not," that the immortals who enter it are punished "forever,"—that destruction and burning is their "*end*,"—that they are "cast away," "destroyed," "lost,"—that they receive their "good things in this life," and "shall *not* see life." And with these abounding declarations of his word, correspond the measures of his government. His beloved Son, who dwelt in his bosom, was not only sent to the world on an errand of redemption, to provide deliverance at the expense of his blood, but was commissioned while offering it to the acceptance of the world, to proclaim the everlasting punishment which must, notwithstanding, overtake those who refuse his grace. And the apostles whom he sent forth, took with them every where the same message of eternal vengeance on those who obey not the gospel. And successors are appointed in every age to carry the same themes of mercy and wrath to their fellow men. In all these agencies which God employs to call sinners to Himself in this life, and withdraw them from wilful ruin, He gives His own exposition to the language of His word,—that everlasting con-

cerns are deciding in this world ; that now, and now only, is the day of respite in which sinners may obtain salvation ; that they who fail of it here, fail of it forever, and must go away without hope and beyond deliverance, into the eternal prison of hell. Let the disbeliever look at the numerous, the varied, the explicit declarations of God, which testify of everlasting punishment, and then at His conduct in employing heralds of salvation to urge the guilty to an immediate reconciliation—as though the question of an everlasting character and state were in reality now pending. Let him look at God's language and God's conduct, and the conviction must flash upon his understanding and conscience, if the light of scriptural evidence can make it, that God has a prison of eternal wrath for his incorrigible enemies.

Indeed the bible gives no ampler evidence of any other truth. The evidence of heaven and its everlasting joys, is not clearer, more varied or more full than this ; that its reality and nature are repeatedly declared, the characters described who shall enter that world, the certainty proclaimed that a great "multitude which no man can number" will enter, and that God is pursuing correspondent measures to call sinners to its joys. And it would be easy to show, that most of the modes of arguing adopted by the Universalist to evade the testimony to eternal punishments, apply with equal force to the existence of a heaven of eternal happiness. For instance, the names *Ouranos* and *Ouranoi*, used by the Savior and his apostles denoted literally the open expanse of the firmament above, as *Gehenna* did a valley in Judea. The former of those terms must have referred consequently quite as much as the latter to the present state of things and to this life : For as it will not be pretended that all the unbelieving Jews who rejected Christ were literally plunged into the valley, so neither will it be said that those who believed in Christ were lifted up into the airy expanse. And when it is claimed that everlasting fire and punishment mean only that the fire in the Jewish valley and the sufferings of unbelievers endure for a long and undefinable time, so may it be said, with equal reason, that when heaven and its happiness are called eternal, the terms mean only that the expanse encircling this globe and the joys of christians, endure for a long and undefinable time. And when it is alleged that it is unjust to punish forever those who never consented to be put on trial,—who are so infinitely below God as to be incapable of doing Him any injury,—who are subjected to sin by a fatal necessity, etc.—so may it be replied that it is equally unjust and uncalled for to bestow endless *rewards* on men if they never have consented to their trial, are incapable of ren-

dering God the least favor, are holy by a controlling necessity, etc. and of course deserve not the least commendation or favor whatever in return. But the disbeliever in endless punishment may be disposed to turn upon us with the reply, that he admits all this, and that the very position he holds is that the scriptures never intend to speak of a future judgment and endless retribution of any kind, but only represent men as being rewarded or punished as they go along. If so,—not to insist on the palpable contradiction of his sentiment to be found in the existing state of the world,—we are disposed to ask him, whether God reveals any thing to us at all concerning the future and everlasting state of man? If heaven and hell, salvation and its loss, rewards and punishments, saints and sinners, are terms and distinctions designed to exhibit only present and existing states of men, and are not intended to describe two unchangeable and endless states, then it is true, that he can never gather any thing from such representations respecting the condition of men in a future world. The scriptures leave him utterly in the dark as to what will be, or whether any thing will be, beyond the grave. Let him gather what probabilities he may from reason that there is a future state, he finds no testimony to it in the language of the scriptures. And if the scriptures in all their language respecting heaven and hell, are silent as to the concerns of a future everlasting state, then how comes he by the glorious certainty of an everlasting blessedness beyond the grave? He may pretend to derive it by his reasonings from the benevolence of God, but he has not one particle of evidence for it in all that the scriptures say of heaven. And if the language of the scriptures gives no evidence of such a thing as a state of endless blessedness beyond the grave, *at all*, it cannot be pretended that it does of such a fact, as that all mankind will enter into such a state. But if he pretends to extend the descriptions of heaven beyond this life, then, as the language is entirely similar and parallel respecting hell on the other hand, he must extend that also beyond this life: and if he is disposed to extend the one without limit to eternity, then must he the other also. Thus the very doctrine he maintains of reward and punishment being meted out to men as they go along in their existence, comes to an everlasting and unchangeable retribution in happiness and woe,—for they who are in heaven, are in that case to be there forever, and they who are in hell are of course to be there forever too.

We are disposed therefore to repeat, that the scriptural evidence of eternal punishment is as clear as that of any other revealed truth, and, particularly, as that of a state of endless

happiness. And if the evidence in this case satisfies not, it is not because the bible is not as clear and decisive on this subject as on any other, but because that book of God is not allowed in this case to control the belief.

The observation which we would next make on this subject, respects the reasons for unbelief;—that these reasons are *such as cannot avail in the least to the justification of those who disbelieve.*

It has often been a matter of surprise to us, as it always is of commiseration, that any who profess themselves believers in revelation, should ever hesitate in the least, as to the truth of the doctrine we are considering. For is not this to indulge the high presumption of refusing assent to the clear and full testimony of Jehovah? And can they possibly have any reasons to allege which in the least, will avail to their justification? They disbelieve: but why? Not because God has not taken abundant pains in his word to testify to this truth, but because, no matter for what reasons, they will not allow their belief to be controlled by his testimony. But not to insist any farther on this general consideration: the particular reasons which are allowed to control their belief in this case, deserve examination. These reasons are to be traced, we apprehend, partly to false *speculative opinions*, and partly to *wrong feelings*.

Among the *opinions* allowed to control their belief, is the one, that God by his physical omnipotence can render all moral beings in the universe holy and happy, and that to the highest degree. This opinion influences their reasonings from the benevolence, mercy, and justice of God, and leads them to the conclusion that these moral attributes of his character, afford a security for universal holiness and happiness in his kingdom, which no declarations of his word can be supposed to contradict.

This opinion leads them to reason from the benevolence of God in the following manner. God as a good Being will do all the good in his power. It is acknowledged to be essential to the very nature of perfect benevolence in any being, that he be disposed to do all the good he can. But it is self-evident, say they, that the holiness and happiness of the whole moral universe advanced to the highest possible degree, is a greater good than the holiness and happiness of a part, with the holiness and happiness of the remainder subtracted, and the introduction of their everlasting sin and misery. Hence it is inferred, that since God can by his omnipotence effect either, his benevolence will choose the former result, and his power accomplish it—viz. the holiness and happiness of all, to the

highest degree. Now we might remind those who thus reason, that we have no ampler evidence that God is a benevolent being, than we have from his own declaration that a part of his kingdom will be lost ;—that the two things must in fact be consistent with each other, whether we are able to discover the method in which they harmonize or not ;—and that the argument which makes one disprove the reality of the other, must be in fact fallacious, whether we are able to discover that wherein the fallacy consists or not. Their mode of arguing in this case must be in some way fallacious, we might further say, because it contradicts the state of facts in the present world. For the same argument would undeniably lead to the conclusion, that God from the first would *never* have permitted the least degree of evil to enter his kingdom. Or if they say that the present amount of evil is designed to contribute in some way to the ends of benevolence, we would ask them why a certain amount of evil protracted in the universe *forever*, may not be necessary in some way to contribute to those very ends? For the mode of arguing now considered, is as much against the former supposition as the latter ; and if facts may prove it fallacious in the one case, they may be found in the end to prove it equally so in the other. We say that we might remind them of these proofs that their argument is, and must be, in some way fallacious. But we are not content to rest here. We would point out the fallacy. The very opinion which forms one of the main pillars of the argument itself, viz : That God by his physical omnipotence can render all moral beings in the universe holy and happy, and that to the highest degree, is asserted by them without the least shadow of evidence. The opinion is one of which they have, and can have, no proof. The very mode in which God is in fact governing the universe and securing the ultimate holiness of any of his subjects, lies wholly against the position. If they open their eyes on the light of facts, they will see that this is a government which respects intelligent and voluntary subjects, and which is carried on by moral influence, and not by mere physical and creative power. Not an instance is to be pointed out of any such being having been confirmed in holiness and bound with the strength of immoveable attachment to the will and glory of God, except through *motives*. And all we know of moral beings, moreover, goes to prove that their very natures require such an influence to be used with them to secure and strengthen their holiness : So that, in the very nature of the things concerned, everlasting confirmation in holiness is not a work of mere physical power or creative efficiency. It lies no more within the province of mere crea-

tive strength, than it does to make a thing to be and not to be at the same time, or to make a past moment and a present one cotemporaneous. And if any one will rate out that then, moral agents are independent, that they control God, that He is not omnipotent, &c. it is just as rational and as much to the purpose as if they should rate out in the same manner about all created things and all time, that these are independent, beyond divine control, &c., because God cannot make them to be and not to be, or to be what they are and not what they are, at the same time. The truth is, *moral* influence must be used to control moral beings. let creative strength be connected with that moral influence as it may. And if moral influence must be used, there is no evidence, that, in using it, God can render all moral beings holy and happy. For in using it, and using it so as to bear the most extensively and efficaciously possible, on the virtue and happiness of his kingdom, a law threatening an *endless* penalty, and the trial of all under such a law may be necessary; and the fall of some and their punishment may be unavoidably incidental to the trial. And consequently the alternative, originally presented to the choice of divine benevolence would not be the one which the Universalist pretends—whether He should render a *whole* universe, which He might create, perfectly holy and happy, or, whether He should render only a *part* of it so, and the rest miserable. But the alternative would be simply this, whether He should create a moral kingdom *at all* in which, from its very nature, evil to some extent would be unavoidable, or whether, though at the unavoidable expense of the willful rebellion of some, and their consequently deserved everlasting ruin, He should not go forward to create, and communicate that immense sum of holiness and happiness to such a kingdom, which notwithstanding was within His power. If this is the true problem of creation, the argument from divine benevolence in favor of universal salvation is demolished; and its fallacy is shown to lie in the false principle assumed by Universalists, that God by his mere omnipotence can make the whole universe holy and happy, and that to any degree.

The manner in which this opinion leads the Universalist to reason on the mercy of God, may thus be stated: The scriptures testify that God has a forgiving disposition, that he mercifully gave his Son a ransom for all, and that he delighteth not in the death of the sinner, but wills that all men should repent and be saved. Now since God has the physical strength to make all men holy, and cannot be at all dependent for advancing the holiness and happiness of the rest of the universe on any thing which he may do in this world, it is incredible that

he should sincerely desire the repentance and salvation of all, and yet not exercise His creative energy sooner or later to effect it. Were we to allow him his false opinion, his reasoning would be conclusive. But here again, the evidence bursts upon us from revelation, that he has rested his whole reasoning on a palpable error. For we ask him, whether the whole scheme of revealed mercy does not proceed in all its parts, on the very idea of the necessity of something else beside omnipotence, to secure holiness in the universe. How else for instance, can he explain the Savior's visit of mercy to the world? Universalists, most of them at this day, we believe, insist that the Savior came not to bear the expressions of the divine indignation towards the sin of this world, but for the purpose of saving his people from their sins, or of making them holy; and they are very full and strenuous in maintaining that this is all his work. But why we ask, was it necessary for him to visit the world and stoop to so many humiliations and sufferings to turn men from their sins? If physical and creative energy alone sufficed, he might have sat on his glorious throne above to subdue the nations, and have avoided all the humiliations and sufferings of his earthly visit. But if it be replied, that he came in order to make atonement or to instruct mankind and leave an example in the world, then, in either case, it is acknowledged, that God uses a *moral influence* in governing his intelligent creation, and in saving sinners from their sins; an influence which his subjects consequently may oppose, and in the best use of which, it may be impossible for Him to render His whole kingdom holy, or to rescue more than a part of the fallen from their sins.

The manner in which the same opinion leads the Universalist to reason from the justice of God, is briefly as follows: The infliction of an unnecessary evil on any being is injustice and cruelty. But since God has the physical power to render all his subjects holy and happy, there can be no moral reason for his inflicting an endless punishment in his kingdom. But here again, we meet his false position with what the scriptures say, according to his own concession, about the punishment of men, and with what must be acknowledged as true to some extent from a survey of the world—viz. that God does express his displeasure at sin by the infliction of suffering. For we ask, whether on the position which he assumes, the infliction of evil to *any* degree, is not cruel and unjust? For God can render the universe holy and happy, it is pretended, by his physical energy. And how unnecessary is it for Him then, to find fault and display vengeance and cast into hell even in that limited sense which is contended for, if

God can, without resorting to these means, do as much for the good of the individual himself and for the good of all others, by his bare energy. But if he insists that God punishes, inflicts vengeance, casts into hell, etc. either for individual discipline or for public example, then it is obvious that God resorts to a *moral* influence in governing his intelligent creation. And it does not appear that in every case of discipline his subjects *will* receive correction, or that they who refuse correction must not necessarily be sacrificed, as a public example for the moral benefit of the creation. Since he admits a moral reason for penalty, we say he has no evidence from the bare omnipotence of God, but that, in making the best use of penalty in his kingdom, it may be *impossible* for God to avoid the infliction of one that is endless, on some of his subjects.

Another opinion allowed to control the belief of Universalists is, that punishment always contemplates as one of its ends, the correction of the offender and his ultimate benefit. Hence it is inferred by them, that if punishment always consults the benefit of the criminal, and God always so designs it, then it would be inconsistent with its very object for Him to sacrifice the everlasting happiness of any being. God must, they say, from the very nature of His punishments, obtain their end in all cases, and then cease their infliction.

The opinion on which this argument rests, however, is not barely unfounded, but is at direct war with the grand and only design of all penalty: viz. to enforce by authority the just demands of law. Penalty always presupposes a law exacting of voluntary beings the conduct which they have the power to perform, and which in its own nature is essential to their happiness, and consequently obligatory on the conscience. In a society of such beings therefore, the individual who refuses such conduct arrays himself and his influence against the law, which is established to guard and protect the interests of virtue. His conduct is, consequently, not merely a dereliction of right conduct and virtue, but it is a wilful invasion on the authority which upholds and enforces law, and which seeks the protection and advancement of the general interests of holiness and virtue. The transgressor by his disobedience, therefore, not only injures his own happiness in his wrong conduct itself; but he must sacrifice just so much more as flows from his being made a public example of the regard the ruler pays to the general interests of virtue, in the use of his authority. Now God in his kingdom, the Universalist must acknowledge, is seeking the interests of holiness, by the use of his law and authority. There is no other explanation which, if he allows God to be benevolent, he can

possibly give of the fact that God has established a law over it, and demands on his throne the entire and unceasing obedience of all. And besides, the law of God itself demands holiness : Its contents prove therefore that he established it for the very purpose of promoting and protecting holiness in his kingdom. But if his law is used to promote the holiness and consequent happiness of his creatures, and if it is a necessary means to this end, then it is just as necessary for the same end that the law be enforced by his authority. He is as much bound as a wise and good ruler, to enforce the law on all his subjects by penal sanctions, as he is to seek the holiness and happiness of his kingdom of which his law is the necessary means. The necessity of a penalty therefore resolves itself simply into the necessity of supporting law. For what binding force has any direction which Jehovah may give his creatures, if He manifests an indifference whether they observe it or not, and is alike complacent to those who obey, and those who transgress? To support law, He must annex penal sanctions to his requirements, and inflict the evil threatened on those who transgress.

The end which God is to promote by punishment therefore is, to give the weight of His own authority to the law—to convince his intelligent kingdom that He will not relax his requirements, nor suffer them to be violated with impunity.

The end which is to be promoted by punishment, therefore, is totally distinct from the happiness of the sinner. It is an end which cannot be obtained except by sacrificing his happiness and inflicting evil, just so far as the punishment extends. It requires God, the Ruler of all, to exercise, in the punishment, nothing towards the sinner but “displeasure,” “indignation,” “wrath,” for his having assailed the foundation on which the happiness of the entire kingdom rests.

But if this only end of punishment requires the sacrifice of the happiness of the sinner to any degree or extent, it may, for aught that can be shown to the contrary, require the sacrifice of his entire happiness. The supposition is not without its parallel. It is not a thing unknown in human government that the good of civil society requires an offender to be cut off from all its privileges forever; and all his happiness in that society is considered as nothing in comparison with the public good, to which he has placed it in opposition.

But we venture to go still farther and assert, that this only end of punishment in the divine kingdom does require the entire sacrifice of the sinner. For God does not gain the end of punishment, i. e. sustain the authority of his own will over his kingdom, unless he shows that his will in commanding his

creatures as to their duty, and punishing them for its violation, is founded on principle, and a sincere regard for the interests of holiness in His kingdom. He must treat his law as the necessary means of the good of his kingdom, and as being in every instance of its application invested with that high importance. In other words, in every instance in which his command is broken, his authority over his whole kingdom is assailed, and it is put at stake on the manner in which he shall treat the offence. For he is now called to express in punishment his own valuation of his law. And unless this valuation is correspondent to the interests concerned, unless it involves a willingness to sacrifice a less good to a greater, or unless it proves that he bears on his heart a sincere regard to the interests of his kingdom, his will ceases to have its binding force and authority on the consciences of his subjects. Though the *conduct* enjoined in his law would be in its own nature binding on the conscience, yet the *will* itself,—the *law* of the Lawgiver,—if not proceeding from benevolent principle on his part, would not be entitled to respect; and his punishments, though they might be dreaded as evils, could not be respected in the consciences of the punished or others, as proceeding from any benevolent principle on his part. To sustain the binding authority of his will in case of punishment, therefore, he is called to feel and express at the first contempt of his authority and law, and every subsequent one, an indignation commensurate with the interests which that authority is set to guard. And when the sinner by his wilful rebellion has trampled on that authority before the kingdom, it now becomes a practical question whether God shall choose the entire sacrifice of the sinner, or the entire sacrifice of His authority. We say the question must come to this. For if He determines to inflict only temporary evil on sin, it must be either because such evil will express the whole extent of regard which He has for His authority and the good of His kingdom, or else that He is unwilling to express that regard at the expense of the sinner. But it cannot be that any such limited punishment is at all adequate to express the just regard He feels for His authority which the sinner would prostrate, and for the interests of holiness which that authority is set to guard. And if He limits His punishment, it must be because He is unwilling, from any principle of regard to His authority, to give up the everlasting happiness of the sinner. And if we suppose Him to decide on such limited penalties and punishments in His kingdom, and for such a reason,—the only reason which can be alleged in the case,—then His moral government over His kingdom comes to this: God feels more for the happiness of a being

who sins, than He does for the interests of virtue in His kingdom, or the support of His authority. Sinners may trample on His law and authority as they please, but after all He must confer on them an everlasting happiness. He feels more for their happiness than He does for His broken law and insulted authority, and the kingdom itself, which He is to protect by His punishments. Their souls are too great in value to be sacrificed for any extent of rebellion to which they may possibly go. For as God *begins*, he must and will *proceed*. If unwilling to express a just regard to the value and importance of his station as Universal Ruler, and a just regard to the importance of holiness in his kingdom at the *first* instance of rebellion, he never will be willing. Here then the ultimate barriers which the breast of God and his arm might oppose to sin, are withdrawn from the universe. No voice of thunderings and lightnings proceeds from the Lord of all to awe any of his creatures into respect and reverence. No decisive principle controls the movements of his heart to inspire any with confidence and trust. The bond between God and his intelligent creatures is broken. And when sin begins in His creation, *that* also proceeds. There is no voice to speak with power and call those elements of discord and variance which exist in private interest and feeling, into submission and order. Let sin proceed and invade every rank in heaven, and throughout the whole universe, still the God who was unwilling to honor His station and authority as Lord of all and sacrifice the contemning sinner at *the first*, must witness the progress of desolation and sin without the ability to arrest it, or bind any to His throne with respect and reverence. Where then is the authority of the insulted Father of the Universe on this supposition? It is gone! And with it the holiness of His kingdom is gone, and greater fires are burning throughout all the wrecks of His creation, than will ever arise from the prison of wrath. Is not this in reality to sacrifice a greater good than to come before His kingdom at the first and throw around it the bond of an everlasting penalty; to guard and protect it from the inroads of sin, by the fires of hell and the smoke of the pit: and to bind by veneration and fear to His laws and throne the hearts of His holy subjects forever?

The view now taken not only detects the fallacy of the opinion that punishment is designed for correction,—it shows the folly and misconception of those representations about the joy of the holy at the misery of sinners, by which the Universalist blasphemously ridicules the language of the scriptures and the doctrine of future punishment. The good which arises to the kingdom of God from punishment is not

that of joy at the misery of others. The natural evil endured is in itself distressing, and is a sacrifice unpleasant in itself to the heart of God and His holy subjects. But considered as evil inflicted for sin, viewed as punishment, it is a testimony to the universe of the feelings of their King, and of the unwavering and unyielding determination of His heart to protect His kingdom at the greatest necessary sacrifices. They see God adorned with the righteousness that vigilantly guards, the holiness that steadfastly prefers, the love that ardently seeks, the true interests of holiness in His dominions : and bound to His throne with a deeper veneration and fear, they cannot but forever say of His conduct towards His incorrigible enemies : " Just and true are thy judgments ! "

We intended to have noticed other speculative opinions adopted by Universalists which have an influence in leading them to reject the ample testimony of revelation to the endless punishment of the wicked. But such as we intended to notice, are in part shown to be false positions by the remarks already made ; and we wish to pass on to the other consideration we suggested : viz. that Universalists are influenced to reject the testimony to everlasting punishment by *wrong feelings*.

The allegation that Universalists are influenced by wrong feelings to reject the scriptural testimony to eternal punishment, deserves their very serious consideration. We will suggest a few things to shew that this must be true. Now they must acknowledge that in some things belief is not so purely an intellectual process, as not to be overruled and controlled by the feelings of the heart. They themselves are sufficiently wont, we imagine, to accuse those whom they call Limitarians, of being held and bound to their belief by fear. And if it is possible for the feelings ever to control the belief, must it not be that they do so—and wrong feelings too,—when the ample testimony of revelation is discredited, and its plain meaning perverted ? Why then, if perverted feeling is not at work, in the present case, why should the testimony of the scriptures to endless punishment be so sedulously explained away, while the language concerning heaven, its exact parallel, on the other hand is so freely admitted in its plain and obvious extent ? The subject, it is obvious, is of such a nature that men *may* be influenced by their feelings to disbelieve. For, the doctrine of universal punishment is alarming to the fears and destructive to the hopes of men who are indulging in sin, and demands their immediate renunciation of it, as their only safety. Men may be influenced to disbelieve it in order to quiet their fears. For so long as they believe

this truth, they cannot continue in sin without being subject to most distressing apprehensions. They see themselves exposed to so tremendous an evil as the everlasting displeasure of God, and all the misery it will occasion them in eternity. This is a consideration which spoils their worldly and sinful pleasures. Is it incredible, therefore, that they should desire to rid themselves of apprehensions so unpleasant and distressing, and so destructive of their sinful enjoyments? Or that they should endeavor to make out on this account some other meaning to the threatenings, and conclude, if possible, that they shall have peace though they walk in the imagination of their own hearts? If they can in any way persuade themselves that this doctrine is not true,—if they can in any way persuade themselves that notwithstanding their sins, they shall be ultimately and forever happy, what a load will be taken off from their minds! They may go on and take their sinful pleasures, and contemn God and the Savior, and yet be secure and at peace. Does not the desire of peace in their sinful pleasures plead for a doctrine like this? And is it incredible, we ask again, that such a feeling should influence and control their belief? Again: men may be influenced to disbelieve the doctrine of eternal punishment in order to cherish their hopes. There is not a rational being who can look forward to an eternal existence and not strongly desire that it should be passed in happiness. But the truth in question is entirely destructive of such a hope in impenitent men. They must see, if this be true, that they cannot expect while continuing in their sins, any happiness in the eternal world. They desire to pursue their sinful pleasures and yet enjoy the soothing expectation that all shall be well with them forever. Is it incredible that this feeling should induce them to turn the language of the divine threatenings into some other meaning than one so destructive of their sinful hopes; or that it should induce them to believe that they have succeeded, and to administer to themselves the pleasing opiate of a final salvation? Again: men may be influenced to disbelieve the divine threatenings of endless punishment in order to escape its strong demands for their immediate repentance. This doctrine brings down the concerns of an eternity to the present time, and calls upon sinners for that change of heart, without which happiness can never be obtained, immediately. But sinners love nothing so much as their sins. They are disposed to cleave to them and defer their reconciliation with God so long as they see any safety. Will not this love of sin and desire to continue in it, plead strongly with them to get over a truth which is so much in their way as this; and to embrace an opinion which will

allow them to go on in sin as far as they list and as long? We have said that from the very nature of the doctrine, men *may* be influenced to believe it by such feelings: we now proceed still farther and assert, that it must be these feelings by which they are influenced to disbelieve it.

For, either they are influenced on this subject by these selfish feelings, or by those of a contrary benevolent and holy nature. But it is certain that no truly benevolent and holy feelings could dispose them to explain away, and refuse the divine testimony to such a doctrine. For not to insist on the utter impossibility of discrediting divine testimony from any truly benevolent feelings, we will reason from the very nature of the doctrine they reject. We assert that they cannot be influenced to reject such a doctrine by any truly benevolent feelings. For as to their fellow men, they must acknowledge that their highest good lies in holy obedience to God their Savior, and in the enjoyment of His approbation. And there can consequently be no kindness felt for the impenitent, in wishing any less influence to come upon them in their sins, to urge them to enter immediately upon that course in which their highest happiness lies, than what arises from the existence of an endless penalty. Nor can any kindness be felt for the penitent and pious on earth, in wishing any less influence to come upon them to bind them firmly and immoveably to their Savior, than what arises from the threatening of an endless penalty in case they apostatize. The desire of Universalists cannot be to have any motives addressed to men for carrying on the work of reformation on earth, higher and stronger than what arise from the doctrine they reject. This cannot be. But as the work of reformation involves the highest good of their fellow men, there cannot possibly be any real kindness towards men which could influence them to disbelieve this doctrine; no real wish to favor their highest welfare. And as to God, they must acknowledge that He regards the holiness of His subjects as involving their highest good; and that He is pursuing this object in the demands and threatenings of His government. Consequently there can be no kindness and respect felt for His character, in wishing any motive lessened which is to secure the obedience and veneration of His subjects. No love and respect for Him would dictate the wish that it should be any easier or lighter than this doctrine makes it, for any of His holy subjects in heaven to trample on His authority and break away from His service; or that it should be any easier and lighter than this doctrine makes it, for His rebellious creatures on earth, to refuse submission and go on contemning both His authority and grace. So far as motives are con-

cerned, therefore, in promoting the highest good of men and the honor which God is to receive from His creatures, it can be no regard to these ends that induces any to give up the doctrine of eternal punishment and lessen those motives. And it is no answer to this to say that they prove their benevolent regard to these ends by still maintaining limited punishment. For the thing asserted, is, that giving up the doctrine of endless punishment and substituting a limited one in its stead is lessening the motives; and that this act of preferring a limited to an endless penalty, cannot be dictated by the desire to promote these ends. And if they should reply that they desire and expect God to employ His almighty power to make His creatures holy, and to secure their respect, notwithstanding, this would not prove that they gave up the doctrine of eternal punishment from any desire on their own part to promote these ends. And if they are willing to have the motives in favor of the holiness of man and the honor of God exceedingly impaired, it cannot be pretended, with any show of consistency, that even their desire that God should thus introduce His power, flows from any really benevolent desire to have those ends promoted. But be this as it may, a willingness to have the motives to holiness in the divine kingdom lessened, cannot itself flow from a really benevolent regard to that kingdom and its Lord. And if no holy and benevolent feelings can induce any to wish that God should not threaten an endless penalty, they cannot induce any to wish that God should not execute that threatening upon those who break away from His service or who refuse His offered grace. For it is through their sufferings that God establishes His own veracity in the threatening, and expresses the real displeasure at sin He feels; and which He uses as the motive to sustain His authority and bind the holy universe forever to His service by the fear of sin. And to wish Him not to inflict it, is to wish Him to withdraw from His kingdom all the motive to holiness arising from the penalty. It is preferring that God should lie, and give up His regard for the holiness of His creatures, and His displeasure at their sin, and that the highest motives to holiness, should be withdrawn from His creation, rather than that those who have trampled on His authority, and obstinately refused His grace, should suffer the just consequences: and this can be no truly holy and benevolent feeling. Or, let them apply the reasoning we have employed respecting God and their fellow-beings, to themselves. Can they desire the doctrine of endless punishment to be false out of any serious regard to their own highest welfare, or to the promotion of their own holiness? If they acknowledge themselves now to be im-

penitent sinners,—to say nothing of the impossibility of any holy feelings in such a state,—do they wish the doctrine of eternal punishment to be false in order that they may be induced more speedily and effectually to break off from their sins, to do their duty to God the Savior, and walk in the paths of holiness and peace? In giving up the doctrine, it is certain that they destroy that most powerful of all appeals in behalf of immediate and thorough reformation, which arises from the fear of losing the soul to all eternity. And in dispelling the dreaded apprehension of eternal wrath, can they think to aid themselves in checking and subduing their love of sin any more speedily and effectually? No such feeling as this,—it is impossible,—can be the one which induces the rejection of the doctrine. Or if they pretend to be already real christians, obedient in heart to their Lord, can they pretend to consult in themselves a more thorough steadfastness and unvaried obedience, by lessening the dread of sin, and considering it infinitely less offensive to God than is indicated by an endless penalty? If, therefore, they cannot give up this doctrine from any real regard to the promotion of holiness in themselves or their fellow-men, or from regard to the promotion of the honor of God, no benevolent and holy feelings, it is certain, can lie at the foundation of their disbelief. They may say that they are truly benevolent and holy persons if they please, or that they act in a holy and benevolent manner about other things, but it is certain that no such feelings lie at the foundation of their rejection of this doctrine.

We offer another observation on this subject: that no real good can be designed by those who reject the doctrine of endless punishment, *in publicly advocating the doctrine of universal salvation*. What they may profess, or what they may believe, is not our concern here: our object is to exhibit the truth in regard to their efforts to inculcate and spread abroad in the community their error. We take the unqualified assertion we have laid down above, and we put the question to the public advocates of Universalism and the community around them who are exposed to their influence, Is it not true?

We are not to be told here of the courtesies and civilities of these men in common life; of their respectable talents and attainments, or commendable qualities of heart; that they teach a great many truths and inculcate a great many duties; that they desire the love of God and man to reign in every heart: These, and a thousand other things which might be brought forward, are not to take off our eyes one moment from the single fact, that they are sedulously inculcating upon their

fellow creatures, involved in sin and urged to immediate reformation by the fear of an endless penalty, the sentiment, that, do as they will in this life, they shall be blessed to all eternity. In this one thing, do they design any good?

We will try the question, by adverting to those ends which the teachers of religion ought ever to have in view in their instructions. We shall not be disputed, then, when we say that the object of all religious instruction should be to teach men the true nature of religion, and to promote its progress in the world.

In regard to the nature of religion, it is not its truths, but its duties which are concerned in the present case. And with respect to these, the inculcation of universal salvation has the effect to strike off from the list, the fear of God and concern for the salvation of souls. This effect is indisputable: It is the boast of Universalists themselves that they inculcate a love to God that is without fear, and a love to man that is without (what they stigmatize as a compound of pride and unfeelingness, but which is understood by all the world who look beyond the terms to mean) a concern for the salvation of souls. Is it then, we ask, a real service to religion to strike off these feelings from the list of its duties, and openly to condemn them as false and hated appendages? What! not to have the fear of God before our eyes; not to fear Him who can destroy both body and soul in hell! Is this a description of the humble child of God? By what terms then, can we describe the presumptuous and heaven-daring sinner? Universalists, indeed, pretend that fear in this case, is simply the apprehension of pain and suffering, and that love consequently must become a forced homage rendered barely to avoid pain and secure happiness. But no! It is the fear of God, not the bare fear of suffering. It is a fear of displeasing and offending this good and glorious Being. And the just effect of the doctrine of eternal penalties and of their execution upon obstinate sinners, is, to show how deeply he is displeased and offended with all sin, and to heighten intensely the fear of displeasing and offending Him. And does not love itself towards so pure and benevolent a being, require that we should fear to displease and offend him? What attachment in a child towards a worthy father would that be, which cared not to wound his feelings, to trample on his authority and excite his just displeasure? Surely, it is essential to true and genuine love towards God, that he be respected and his authority revered. And nothing else will cast out that fear of suffering which hath torment, from the breast of a child of God, but that holy fear of offending God, which watches over the purity

of the spirit and ripens its graces to a state of moral perfection. The Universalist, then, in removing the fear of God from religion, destroys what is essential to its nature : and inculcating his sentiments on those around him, designs to do that which is a real injury to religion.

Is it, we ask again, any service to the cause of religion to banish from the list of its duties, concern for the salvation of souls? The Universalist may pretend that he inculcates the duty of seeking the holiness of others : but by what bonds? What interests are at stake on his representations? Not the soul. Not an everlasting state of happiness. There is no room or occasion for any one to seek and desire the salvation of souls. And is this doing God service? What! to withdraw men from all sympathy with that Savior who came down from the throne of heaven, and labored and suffered and wept and died out of compassion to souls! To call upon a world in apostacy,—where God is offering a reconciliation for acceptance and all are looking forward and hastening to an untried eternity,—to shut up their hearts with frigid indifference over the conduct and fates of their fellow men? What strength of regard will any one have for holiness in his brother, if concern for souls must not pour into the breast its deep compassion, its tender and ardent and undying love;—if all are to freeze up the fountains of compassion with the belief that, let us do as we will, the interests of all sinners around us are safe? The Universalist, in inculcating his sentiments then, weakens the bonds of love between man and man, and designs to do that which is a real injury to religion and morality.

We have said that besides exhibiting the true nature of religion, religious teachers should aim to advance its progress in the world. Do Universalists, then, by inculcating their doctrine, design to further the progress of vital godliness and morality? It is obvious from the remarks we have already made, that they impair the strength of those motives which the plain language of the scriptures and the great body of religious teachers around them are addressing to the world in favor of godliness. And do they think that any possible good can come, from loosening the bonds of religion and morality in any degree? Has it been ascertained by them that there is already too much of motive and influence in the world in favor of godliness, chastity, temperance, sobriety, and other virtues, and that there is too much of restraint put upon impiety, and blasphemy, and cruelty, and pride, and intemperance, and lust; so that it has become their duty, and an offering of benevolence to the community that they should take pains to set the world at right, and withdraw from it the needless excess of motives

and restraints? And do they really know that in this they are taking the right measure to deepen a sense of religion in the mind of the community: as they must know, in order really and positively to design any good? Do they know that sinners will more speedily and thoroughly repent of their sins, if told that sin is not a very great evil, that it gives God little or no offence, that if they delay repentance they may still have their hopes and cast away their fears about eternity? Do they know that this is to accelerate and promote the work of repentance in this guilty world? Or, do they know that christians will be rendered holy—more humble and prayerful, more watchful against temptations and sins, or more active in promoting holiness in the world, by being persuaded, if possible, to believe that sin in themselves gives God little or no offence, and that the souls of others are in no hazard? Do they know that the community will be more virtuous and happy, that vice will make less progress, that civil government and laws will be more firmly established, if the great body can possibly be persuaded to believe, that there is no future judgment and no endless retributions? Or that the gospel will be more effectually and speedily published in all the world and all christians enter more fully into the dying wish of the Savior, if they can by any means be made to think that the gospel offers a deliverance to those whose souls are in no real danger?

Now if they do not know all this, it cannot be reckoned any good design on their part to inculcate such a sentiment. For it is not enough to say that they think their sentiment true, and thus try to cast themselves under the shelter of revelation, and make the scriptures answerable for the consequences. They may in such a case affirm to the world: 'We are doing a work that is dark and inexplicable to us, and that in our view appears to hinder vital godliness, but we are set to this task simply and solely by the authority of God, and we trust that He Himself will take care of the interests of religion.' But if they affirmed this, it would be to tell all the people to whom they preach, and all their fellow-citizens for whom they prepare and to whom they send their publications, and the whole surrounding world, that there was no possible good which they could see to arise to any from their inculcating such a sentiment rather the contrary, but on the other hand much harm; but that they did it solely through their fear and reverence for the authority of the Most High. If the matter comes to this, then must they pretend that they know their doctrine to be so plainly and convincingly revealed by God as not to leave the least shadow of doubt in their mind; and that they fear so much

to offend God, and so greatly love to do His will, that in the very face apparently of all the interests of religion and virtue they must go forward, like Abraham to the sacrifice of his son, and publish the word which makes religion weep and mourn, and sin and sinners triumph. If this be the task imposed on their conscience which they are endeavoring to discharge, if they are called of God, against their feelings and wishes, to immolate the interests of religion and virtue, they deserve the greatest commiseration of all men living. But no—it is impossible. No rational mind can ever be convinced of this: that God has ever given any revelation to His creatures which is contradictory to holiness. And no one that pretended it, if himself a real friend to holiness, could longer have respect enough for God to have any agency in publishing it abroad to the world. Indeed so obvious is it that no good can come from inculcating such a sentiment, that Origen, the first in the christian church who is known to have embraced it, and who is justly reputed the father of it, was frank enough to avow, that “the sentiment ought to be kept secret among such as may be fit to receive it, and not publicly exposed.”

We say therefore to all these men who are occupying the pulpit and employing the press, that they are designing no real good to the cause of religion and holiness. They are doing an injury the extent of which eternity will reveal. And as those who are set to guard the interests of religion, and who wish well to the everlasting interests of their souls, we would address to them our monitory caution, and say: Beware! If false speculations or perverted feelings have led you really to believe such a doctrine, you can at least be silent. You are not compelled to draw others with you into the same delusion. You need not contract so solemn and fearful a reckoning with your Maker. And does it not become you seriously to inquire whether you have not an interest in these words of your Creator and Judge? “Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy unto you; they make you vain; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord. *They say still unto them that despise me, the Lord hath said ye shall have peace; and they say unto every one that walketh after the imagination of his own heart, No evil shall come upon you.* I have not sent these prophets, yet they ran: I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied. *But if they had stood in my counsel and had caused my people to hear my words, then they should have turned them from their evil ways and from the evil of their doings.*”

Another observation which we present on this weighty sub-

ject is this : That they who give up the doctrine of future punishment and admit the error of universal salvation, *hazard the eternal loss of their souls for no possible advantage.*

The dictates of prudence in matters of mere temporal interest, it is acknowledged, are not unworthy of the attention of the wise : but in a case where the everlasting blessedness of the soul is at stake, there is no language which can describe the folly of him who will not keep on the side of safety.

We know that they who pretend to have discovered evidence that universal salvation is true and to be convinced of its truth to their own satisfaction, affect to despise a consideration like this, which, say they, is addressed to their fears. And if they are come to the solid conviction that there is no danger to the souls of any, if they know that in passing forward through the untried scenes of an eternal state no fires of remorse and despair shall be enkindled by the breath of the Almighty, but that the paths of all shall be pleasantness and peace ; and if they are so firmly assured as to be entirely willing to risk their everlasting state upon the belief, then indeed are they beyond fear. The flattering delusion which they have admitted and cherished is so firmly bound to their souls, that for any considerations their fellow-men can address to them, they must go forward as they are, to learn the result at the judgment seat of Christ. To such, we pretend not to bring the present appeal. We bring it to those who as yet admit the doctrine of everlasting punishment, but who may be inclined to receive the contrary sentiment. And we address it to them to fortify them against listening to the flattering suggestions of error. We address it to them because we see that while they are convinced by the declarations of God on the one hand, that the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment, they are assailed on the other by the allurements of worldly and sinful pleasures within their reach in this life, and by the artifices and sophistry of those who have already run into disbelief and fatal error, and are urged to renounce their belief. We call upon them to remain where they are, on the only side which promises safety. We warn them by the interests of an eternity, that they surrender not themselves to the delusions of the adversary.

For, we would ask those who are thus circumstanced, what will you gain,—allowing even that there were an uncertainty which of the two opinions is true—what will you gain by a change? Stop, and make the calculations of prudence, before you think of unsettling the foundations of your faith. If the sentiment of universal salvation should in the end prove true, you are as safe and happy in your present belief, as you

could be by the change. The same salvation awaits you in eternity, not hindered at all by your erroneous belief. As to this life, you may enjoy the world no less by being restrained from those sinful excesses which mar all its enjoyments. And by applying with penitence to Christ for the remission of your offences, may enjoy surely as solid and satisfactory a hope of eternal life to cheer you amid present trials and the pangs of death, as you could by applying to yourselves the flatteries of an inevitable salvation. The latter might cost you many misgivings of conscience amid the bitter necessities of earthly trials and of death, to detract greatly from its worth ; while the former would be placed on a foundation corresponding to the demands of the natural conscience, and acknowledged by all to be as firm as the promise and oath of God. Nothing is gained by a change in your belief then, if the sentiment of universal salvation is true. But if on the other hand it is false, you do, by the change, hazard every thing. For then, to say nothing of going to the bar of God with the guilt of denying His testimony, you throw off from your souls the burden of the motives which urge you to repentance in the present life, on which eternal salvation depends. And in whose case, think you, are the probabilities of a timely repentance the greatest? His, who sees in the indulgence of sinful pleasure no danger, little or no offence given to the Creator, and the security of eternal blessedness? Or his, who sees, in the everlasting punishments to come, the great evil of sin against his neighbor and God ; the great compassion of God the Savior in dying to offer salvation, and the necessity of immediately resorting in penitence to His mercy for forgiveness? To whose heart will the Spirit of grace have the readiest access? That Spirit, speaking through Solomon, has already answered the question. "A prudent man foreseeth the evil and hideth himself ; but the simple pass on and are punished." The man who describes the coming wrath, resorts to the Savior as his strong tower of defence in the day of judgment ; but he who indulges his own heart in this life, regardless of the consequences, finds no shelter in that day from the consuming fires of divine vengeance.

While, then, you cannot possibly gain any thing by the change, you hazard by it the loss of the soul. You have but one soul, and will you thus foolishly hazard all its happiness?

And now, as we close our observations on this subject, we would say to those who believe in the doctrine of future punishment, that *the weightiest motives are arrayed before their minds, which can be presented by their Creator, to induce them to make sure their preparation for an everlasting state.*

For, the greatest of all questions is pending with each of you in this life, on your own concession: and that is, whether that immortal spirit with which the Creator has endowed you, shall in the end prove to you the greatest of curses or the richest of blessings. The question is really *pending*. For, though you believe a curse has proceeded from the lips of God to reach every sinner in the universe, and fill with the pangs of endless remorse and despair the breasts of all who are unprovided with the shelter of a consistent redemption, yet not like the lost angels, are you left to inevitable woe. Though conscious of sin and exposure to the sentence of heavenly wrath, yet you have read the story of Him who dwelt in the bosom of the Eternal Father; how the yearnings of His compassion over a lost world moved Him to exchange the throne for a partnership with our sorrows, in order that He might carry our nature with Him to the cross; and bearing for us the indignation, might obtain for us the right to sit upon that throne as our Saving Prince and Judge, and send abroad through the earth to the penitent, the proclamation of forgiveness. "Whither He has gone ye know, and the way ye know," to reach that mansion of holiness and peace. The question then is fairly presented to you, by Him who is to be your final Judge,—and it is one on which you must act,—the question whether you will remain subject to the curse of your Maker, or accept and make sure the offered redemption?

And it is a question of no less importance than whether you shall render that immortal spirit of yours, the greatest of curses or the richest of blessings. For, look now beyond these circumstances of possible redemption in which you are living, and see what joys and sorrows there are in this universe, one or the other of which must settle down on that spirit forever. Look up to the joys provided for holy intelligences. There is a God glorious in might, and wisdom, and love, and worthy to be praised for all His doings, whom the spirit may fear and reverence. There is a Savior bearing the image of His Father's glory and the impress of our sympathies, whom the spirit may adore and love. There is a kingdom of holy and blessed beings, shielded and guarded by the government of God, in whose elevated society the spirit may forever partake. There are works of the Creator abroad, on which the spirit may muse with delight, and to which it may constantly repair for joy, as to fountains of living water. And in this heavenly banquet there are no ingredients of sorrow, but all tears are forever wiped away. And with all these joys offered to your acceptance, will it not, think you, if you secure redemption, be an unspeakable privilege to you that you *have a*

soul? And when it goes up to those sources of blessedness,—when the heavenly crown is put upon it, and when arrayed in white, it waves the palm of victory before God for the dangers past and an immortality secured, will you not have reason to bless your Creator, that he ever endowed you with *capacities* for joys so exalted and ennobling?

Look again, down to the sorrows of perdition. There is a world in exile from all the joys which are in God's presence and God's gift, where the desolate spirit must prey upon itself forever. There the fires of unbridled malice in surrounding companions, distract the never-dying spirit with terrors. There the recollection of happier days—the days of offered redemption wasted—fills the spirit with unavailing regret and remorse. There the prospect of unmitigated and unending sorrows, gathers on the spirit the blackness, and darkness of despair. And if you neglect offered redemption, and plunge your spirit into these torments, will you not mourn forever that you *have a soul*? Will not the heaviest curse that shall ever settle on your spirit be, that you have *capacities* which all the fires of that world *cannot* extinguish, which *must* exist and take in, at each moment of bursting agony, all the horrors that are past and are to come?

This question of everlasting interest is to be decided by you, in this short and uncertain life. You believe that as you accept or refuse redemption here—as you love your Savior or neglect him here—your state will be fixed forever. And is this life on which eternity depends, at all too long to devote to the great purpose of making your salvation sure? Can sinners be too early engaged in entering on their duty, or christians too vigilant in performing theirs? Is there any time which can be profitably withdrawn from the pursuit of an eternal calling, to be lavished on schemes of worldly ambition, or consumed in dreams of worldly pleasure? Remember, the hour is coming which is to try all hearts. We shall soon pass through the agonies of laying off this clothing of flesh and blood. And in that hour when we are on the farthest verge of life, conscience will try us; and the stirring question will meet us in our solitude, whether our eternal salvation is sure. We shall soon hear the trump of the archangel and be summoned before the Son of Man. And in that hour when no other probation can be granted, He who knoweth all things will try us; and the question be decided before a universe, whether we are to have any part in an eternal salvation.

“Wherefore, having received” the offer of an inheritance in “a kingdom which never can be moved, let us have grace whereby we may serve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear. For our God is a consuming fire.”

ART. IV.—THE FELLENBERG INSTITUTION AT HOFWYL.

[The following letter is from an American gentleman, who during a tour of a number of years on the continent of Europe for the purpose of visiting the most celebrated institutions of learning, has resided more than a year at the establishment of Mon. Fellenberg, in order to acquaint himself perfectly with the system of instruction there. In a future number we hope to present our readers with a detailed statement from the same source, of the whole course of regimen and instruction in that institution, which is generally admitted to be the most perfect of its kind on the continent of Europe.]

HOFWYL, 1829.

My Dear Friend,

I cannot better introduce you to this celebrated place of education, than by some account of the motives and views which actuated its founder.

Destined by his patrician birth to take part in the government of his native Canton, towards the end of the last century, Fellenberg's attention was early excited by the misery and vice which he observed around him; and he resolved to devote himself to the moral and intellectual reformation of his country.

The laboring classes he saw in a state of ignorance, which rendered them habitually indifferent to every thing but their animal necessities and enjoyments; yet capable of being excited and misled—equally fitted to become the instruments of licentious anarchy, or the slaves of despotism. He traced the origin of this state of things to the absence of all rational means of intellectual education, the exclusive attention paid to reading and writing as mechanical acquisitions—to the universally indifferent or technical manner in which moral and religious instruction was communicated, and the utter neglect of all efforts to cultivate moral habits, and to bring principles into action. It required but a glance at the higher schools and universities, to see how little was to be expected for the superior classes. A feeble body—a perverted understanding—a false and generally corrupted taste—much ambition with some qualifications for shining in the world,—these were the common results of the existing course of education; and rarely was it possible to discover any traces of a salutary or ennobling influence on the character and life. No hope could be entertained, that the higher classes, who alone possessed the means and the ability, would make any effort to redeem those on whose ignorance they considered their supremacy as reposing. Both high and low, in the view of Fellenberg, seemed destined to sink together. At a later period,

the illusive promises of philosophy were proclaimed and broken; and its influence in Switzerland went to inundate it with a flood of new errors and vices.

Fellenberg was convinced that every improvement must commence with the germ of society; that it was only in acting on the rising generation by improving the means of education that any hope could be cherished of improving its condition. He believed that the efforts made for this purpose must be directed, at the same time, towards the two extremities of the social body; and that it would be in vain to reform those who are destined to labor and obey, without improving the character of those who consume and govern. He believed that no attempt should be made to disturb the order of the community, by confounding classes of men whose lot a wise Providence had so widely separated; and for whose separate existence the various physical and intellectual qualities which He has bestowed, and the necessities of physical and social life, seem to form a permanent basis.

While he would anxiously endeavor to elevate those whose talents rendered them capable of it, to stations in which society could enjoy the utmost benefit from their efforts, he believed that with the mass of the laboring classes, the only rational course was to prepare them for the situation in which Providence had placed them, and to render them happy in it by raising them to their proper rank as *rational* and *moral beings*.

It was also of the first importance to establish new relations between the different classes of society. The poor must be led by a rational and religious education, not only to be content with their own station, but to receive the order of Providence which has assigned; and to see how unworthy of the understanding, as well as the heart that envy and jealousy is, which the lower classes are so ready to indulge towards the more favored. The rich must be taught to estimate the worth of industry, to feel how dependant they are upon the laboring classes, and to observe and revere the dignity of moral character which is often found among them.

An object of not less importance in the view of Fellenberg, was to correct that unchristian idea of the great world, that to provide for the present and eternal welfare of immortal beings by education, is an occupation beneath the dignity of the more favored classes. It was necessary, therefore, first to create an interest in the object, by showing how much good may be effected, how much happiness produced, and how much real enjoyment secured to him who becomes the instrument of such improvement. Practical demonstration was to be given of the importance of this to the higher classes, in pro-

viding them with more skilful overseers, and more honest and obedient servants; and in giving to the State more dutiful and useful subjects.

To attain these ends, no means were more likely to be successful in the view of Fellenberg, than to establish an institution for both classes, in which they should be so separated as to prevent all confusion, and yet so connected that each might observe the other, and that occasion might be given to establish on a christian basis, the character of each, as well as those relations which must afterwards exist in society. "To this object" he observed ten years since, "I have devoted my life and all that I possess, for twenty years;—to this I still devote them, and am resolved to devote them to my last breath."

He believed that agriculture, which in the order of Providence was the primitive, and must ever be the principal occupation of mankind in the social state, is best adapted to develop physical and intellectual powers in their proper harmony. He was persuaded that an agricultural establishment and the employments necessarily connected with it, should form the basis of the contemplated institution. With these views he purchased Hofwyl, at the close of the last century—at that time a private country seat, but now forming a little village, containing three hundred inhabitants, exclusively on his property and under his control. It comprises a farm, including recent additions in the neighborhood, of about 600 acres; workshops for the fabrication and improvement of agricultural implements, and of clothing for the inhabitants; a lithographic establishment in which music and other things useful to the institution are printed; a Literary Institution for the education of the higher classes; a Practical Institution for those who are destined to trade, or whose circumstances do not permit a more complete education; and an Agricultural Institution for the education of the laboring classes.

Hofwyl is about six miles from Berne, the capital of the Canton of the same name, and the chief town of German Switzerland; and about a mile from the great road which traverses Switzerland from S. W. to N. E. The approach from Berne is through a wood, which presents no traces of cultivation. In issuing from it, you come almost immediately in view of the large buildings and luxuriant fields of the establishment. It is situated on a gentle elevation in the midst of an ampitheatre of hills. On the north, the view is bounded by the Jura Mountains, and on the south by the Bernese Alps, whose tops are covered with perpetual snow. It is surrounded by a valley about eighty feet in depth, which separates it entirely from

the neighboring farms and villages. In this valley are two small lakes, and the surrounding scenery is still farther diversified by the villages and hamlets on the opposite hills. The isolation of Hofwyl, in the midst of villages and at no great distance from a large town, and the combination in its neighborhood, of some of the grandest with some of the most beautiful objects of Swiss scenery, were circumstances of no small weight in the view of Fellenberg, in reference to his great object.

On entering Hofwyl from Berne, the traveller finds himself in an extensive court or play ground, surrounded on three sides by the buildings devoted to the Literary Institution, and sheltered on the west by a little wood composed of a variety of trees, which serve at once as a place for botanical observations, and as a retreat during the heat of summer. In pleasant weather the lessons are not unfrequently given here, in arbors furnished with seats for this purpose.

The principal building on the east of this court is inhabited by eighty pupils, under the constant superintendence of Fellenberg, and four of his children. The basement story is occupied by the kitchen and store-rooms. The first floor is divided into four sections by halls, which traverse the building in its length and breadth. One of these sections is occupied by the superintendants, another by the dining hall and music room, a third and fourth by the chapel and three large and lofty rooms for study. The second floor is devoted to the class rooms, the library, and the collection of casts. The third and attic stories contain the dormitories for the pupils, and chambers for the superintendants. The size, airiness and neatness of every part of the building are very striking; and a well arranged system of stoves on the Russian plan, maintains a mild and uniform temperature during the winter, which is not to be found in climates far less severe, where the methods of employing fuel are less perfect. In this institution Fellenberg proposes to give a complete education preparatory to professional studies. Between twenty and thirty instructors are employed in this establishment, most of whom reside in another building, and have no connection with the pupils except during the hours of instruction. Two small buildings which shelter the court on the north and south, contain a large warm bath for winter, the store-room for the gardening tools of the pupils, a cabinet-maker's shop, in which those who have the disposition are taught this art, the book bindery of the institution, and several rooms which are devoted to exercises in instrumental music, fencing and dancing.

which would interfere with the tranquillity necessary in the principal building.

Beyond the Literary Institution is a second court, furnished like the first with frames and poles for gymnastic exercises.

On the east side of this court are garden spots, assigned to the pupils as a means of amusement and exercise; and at a little distance on the side of the hill, a circular cold bath of hewn stone ninety feet in diameter and ten feet deep, in which they are taught to swim—with a neat bathing house in the Gothic style.

On the west side of this court is the *Chateau* or family mansion, in which Mrs. Fellenberg resides with her younger children. It also contains the *bureau* of the establishment, in which strangers are received, and the business of the institution transacted by a person devoted to this object. It likewise serves as a depot of the little articles which the pupils have need to purchase at a distance from a large town. In the garden of the *chateau* is the school for peasant girls, under the immediate direction of Mrs. Fellenberg and one of her daughters.

In the rear of the *chateau* are two buildings occupied by twenty or thirty pupils of the Practical Institution. These are lodged and fed in a more simple manner than the pupils in the Literary Institution; and are permitted to avail themselves of its lessons and to partake of the labors of the farm or the *bureau*, according to their necessities and destination.

In the rear of these buildings is a second cold bath of hewn stone, only two feet in depth, designed for the use of the younger pupils. Adjoining this is a building 150 feet long, the lower part of which forms a large sheltered arena for riding and gymnastic exercises in unpleasant weather. The upper stories are occupied by the class rooms, and dormitories of the Agricultural Institution; in which children of the laboring classes are taught the practical part of agriculture, and receive three or four hours of instruction daily in reading, writing, arithmetic, and other useful branches. One of the chambers in this building contains a small collection of minerals, and of wild and cultivated plants from the neighborhood, together with two models in clay, made by the pupils themselves, representing in relief the surface of Switzerland.

A number of the pupils of this school are prepared by theoretical instruction and practical essays in the inferior classes, under the direction of the superintendant, to become teachers. No regular course of agricultural instruction is given; but several of those who frequent the institution as boarders, in order to make themselves acquainted with the system of agri-

culture adopted at Hofwyl, attend a course of lectures, which are given by Fellenberg himself to the older pupils of all the institutions.

On the north of the buildings which we have described, is an extensive irregular range, containing the farm house in which the pupils of the agricultural school take their meals, the various workshops, the laundry, dairy, barns, and stables. The stables contain fifty cows, and a number of oxen, which excite the admiration of strangers by their size, and the neatness with which they are kept.

At a little distance from the principal group of buildings, on the eastern descent of the hill, is the house occupied by the professors, in which the parents of the pupils are also lodged during their visits to their children. It contains a reading room in which some of the principal political and literary journals are received for the use of the professors. In this building is the chemical laboratory, and a collection of the most necessary philosophical instruments.

An interesting branch of the Institution of Hofwyl, is the colony of Meykirk at the distance of five or six miles. It consists of eight or ten poor boys, who were placed under the direction of a teacher on a spot of uncultivated ground, from which they were expected to obtain the means of subsistence. It is designed as an experiment on the practicability of providing for the support and education of friendless children, without any farther expense than that of the soil which they cultivate. It resembles in effect, an establishment in one of our new settlements, except that several hours are devoted daily to intellectual and religious instruction, and thus the children advance in cultivation and knowledge as well as in hardihood and industry.

You will perhaps think these local details too minute, yet I believe you will perceive in them the key to many of the principles adopted by Fellenberg, and will be better prepared to understand the mode in which they are applied. In a visit of a few hours, such as is usually paid by the stranger, he can learn little more concerning Hofwyl. Should he pass the day he will be struck with the unceasing activity, combined with the greatest regularity, which reigns in every part of the establishment; and with the good order and harmony prevalent among the pupils, in the midst of the greatest freedom and gaiety. He cannot but admire the benevolence and perseverance which have led a single man, on the basis of his own private fortune, and in the face of the prejudices of those of his own rank, to create a set of institutions which furnish ample means for the thorough education of the higher classes,

and at the same time provide for the gratuitous support and education of one hundred and thirty children. It is only after a long continued residence, that he will be able to appreciate that unwearied devotedness of a large family, by which all this is accomplished,—a devotedness which not only excludes them from the pleasures and amusements usually enjoyed by rank and fortune,—but also obliges them to live for others, and to sacrifice in a great measure those social and domestic enjoyments, which are of far greater value.

I am, etc.

ART. V.—REVIEW OF DWIGHT'S TRAVELS IN THE NORTH OF GERMANY.

Travels in the North of Germany in the years 1825 and 1826. By HENRY E. DWIGHT, A. M. New-York, G. & C. & H. Carvill, 1829. pp. 453. 8vo.

THE accounts of foreign nations published by our own countrymen, we always take up with peculiar interest. Not that in diligence and exactness of observation and description, or in freedom from prepossessions and prejudices, our native travellers so far surpass the tourists of the old world, as in these respects, to have an undisputed preeminence; but as we know more of their habits of thinking and judging, and are familiar with their standards of comparison, it is much easier to make the necessary allowances for any undue bias, under which they may labor.

The travels of Mr. Dwight, besides the attraction of coming from one of our own countrymen, possess a strong additional claim upon our attention from the circumstance, that they introduce us to a country, which, at the present time, is more perhaps than any other in Europe, fertile in topics of political, literary and religious speculation. Mr. Dwight likewise, before his residence abroad, had passed through the usual collegiate course of education, and had partially completed his professional studies at one of our theological institutions. Before visiting Germany, he had spent two years in France and Italy, and in the latter country especially, had become intimately acquainted with its language and literature. With some knowledge of the German language derived from books, he soon found himself, on entering the countries north of the Rhine, to be entirely at home in his intercourse with the inhabitants; and so easily did he become *Germanized*, that, if we are correctly informed, he was sometimes not readily dis-

tinguished from a native. Mr. Dwight made full use of the advantages which he enjoyed. It is obvious on opening his book, that his observations are his own. He shows every where the requisite curiosity and inquisitiveness of a traveller, is generally happy in his selection of subjects for remark, and enlivens his descriptions by anecdotes, which are often amusing and characteristic of the people among whom he resided. We would here, however, express our regret, that he has suffered his work to appear before the public, with so little alteration from the original manuscript. No reason which we have heard assigned, or which we can easily conjecture, is sufficient to account for his publishing these travels, with apparently so little regard to their literary character. But the intelligent reader of this volume will discover, under a somewhat neglected exterior, much varied information, a copious and animated style, and uncommon powers of description; and were the work to undergo some slight pruning and correction, to which office the author is abundantly competent, we have no hesitation in saying, that the "*Travels in the North of Germany*," would in many respects be ranked among the best of their class, which have issued from the American press.

Mr. Dwight's first letter is from Strasburg. He describes the celebrated cathedral of that city, whose chief distinction is, that its spire is four hundred and ninety feet in height, rising "with almost inconceivable lightness of architecture" to a greater elevation than any other monument of art, except the pyramids of Egypt.

The traveller from France, we are told, as he approaches the Rhine, discovers his proximity to Germany, in the harsh and guttural sounds of the language, and in the heavy tread and moping walk of the inhabitants. The faces of the ladies, it is added, have more color than those of the ladies of Paris, but less expression. Strasburg was added to France by conquest, in the year 1694. At that time, according to the statement of Mr. Dwight, there were not a dozen Catholic families in the city. At present there are six Catholic and seven protestant churches. There is here a protestant seminary for educating clergymen designed to fill the vacancies in the congregations bordering on the Rhine. This school, which has from thirty to fifty students, was Lutheran in its sentiments, until within a few years, but is now inclining to Neologism.

The country near the Rhine abounds in picturesque and sublime views, and monuments of art are every where met with, which revive the most interesting historical recollections. The whole of this region is proverbially fertile: but

the wealth of the inhabitants, it seems, is by no means proportional to their natural advantages. The intercourse between the different States on the Rhine, is so much interrupted and restricted by mutual jealousies, and false views of the nature of trade, that this river, "without exception the noblest in Europe," does little to aid that commercial enterprise and activity, which it seems naturally fitted to excite and foster. Hopes were held out by the Congress of Vienna, that the vexatious restrictions on trade, which so fatally check the industry of the inhabitants on the banks of this, and of some other of the large rivers of Europe, would be soon wholly, or in part, removed; but these hopes have not yet been realized.

Through a great extent of country in the neighborhood of the Rhine, the vine is the principal article of cultivation. Mr. Dwight remarks of Hockheim, that the climate is as cold as that of Pennsylvania; the Rhine being frozen over for some weeks every year. The vine has, indeed, already been introduced into several parts of the United States, and, no doubt, may be advantageously cultivated to a great extent. An American, says Mr. Dwight, is not a little surprised to see even the lower class of society, on the continent of Europe, in countries abounding with wine, almost entirely free from our great national vice, intoxication. He adds, that during a residence of nearly two years in France and Italy, he did not observe ten persons intoxicated, with the exception of foreigners in the sea ports. At the *fetes* in Paris, soon after the coronation of Charles X, there were on two of the festival days, as was reported, more than half a million of persons within the *Champs Elysees*, the garden of the Tuilleries, and on the quays. On one of these days, Mr. Dwight mingled much with the crowd, and did not discover an individual intoxicated. He supposes, that at a single military review in the United States, more persons may be seen thus degraded, than all he has ever seen in Europe. Whence comes this difference? In the opinion of Mr. Dwight, this almost total absence of intoxication in France and Italy, is owing to one cause only, and that is, the great abundance of their wines. He refers here to the light wines of those countries, for the wines common with us, in some cases increase rather than diminish the relish for spirituous liquors.

The account of the cities on the Rhine, and in its vicinity, particularly of Cologne, Mentz, and Frankfort, with their churches, castles, antiquities, and various other objects of curiosity and interest, is lively and graphic, and deeply engages the attention of the reader; but we cannot here go into de-

tail. Mr. Dwight left Frankfort in company of between twenty and thirty Germans, "who were packed into the Diligence, and several extra carriages which followed in its wake." He passed through Geissen and Marburg, each of which cities is the seat of a university, and arrived at Cassel, which is situated on the Fulda, a branch of the Weser. The old town is said to be one of the ugliest in Europe, while the new is one of the most beautiful. Wilhelmshe, near Cassel, is a splendid summer residence of the Elector. The picture which Mr. Dwight gives of this place is striking.

The palace, at the distance of four miles from the capital, rests on the side of a hill, or rather mountain, the summit of which is crowned by a lofty edifice, on which a colossal statue of Neptune is standing. The grounds, which are very extensive, abound with objects which recall distant ages and countries to your recollection. Now you enter the temple of Apollo or of Mercury, or stop at Socrates' hermitage or Plato's hall; again a feudal castle in perfect preservation, (for it is not yet half a century old) breaks upon your view. Here an Egyptian pyramid, there a Chinese village or saloon, remind you of any thing but Germany; while at the next turn a lofty aqueduct, whose shattered arches are hanging over an abyss, makes you for a moment feel, that you are approaching the Campagna. The Devil's Bridge, spanning a profound ravine, reminds you of your Alpine rambles; while the Giant's Castle crowning a lofty eminence, recalls Ortillo to your recollection, and you almost listen to hear the horn of Astolfo. Waterfalls, cascades, fountains, lakes, and basins are every where scattered amid these mementos of remote countries, and distant ages; enlivening the solitude with the brilliancy of their reflected light, and with their animating roar.

It was from Cassel, that the Hessian troops marched to embark from Bremen for America, in the war of our independence. Mr. Dwight says that Hesse is one of the most protestant countries on the continent. In a population of nearly six hundred thousand, there are but ninety thousand Catholics.

We next find Mr. Dwight at the far famed university of Göttingen. This university is within the territory of Hanover, and was founded in the year 1734* by George II, of England. It bears the name of *Georgia Augusta*. Munchhausen, the Hanoverian Minister of George II, was the original patron of this seminary; and to his enlarged views on the subject of education, and his thorough knowledge of the means of promoting it, is principally attributed the rapid rise of this institution. In a few years from its foundation, it

*We give this date from Mr. Dwight; but the first half century celebration of the University, was held in 1787, which would make its origin later.

equalled or surpassed in fame, all similar establishments in Germany. No expense, we are told, was spared in its erection ; and the most distinguished *scavans* of the country were invited to the professorial chairs. Among the names of its professors, are found those of Müller, Michaelis, Gessner, Heyne, Meyer, Mosheim, and Eichhorn.

As Mr. Dwight has given a fuller account of the German universities, than we have met with in any other writer, it may be of use, and will certainly not be unacceptable to many of our readers, to furnish a sketch of what a German university is, as described in different parts of these travels. Mr. Dwight, in his account of the university of Berlin, informs us, that "in the universities of this country, no buildings are erected, but those which are necessary to contain the *materiel* of literature." At Göttingen, "two academical buildings" only are found necessary for this purpose—"the library and the lying-in-hospital." The resources of the institution, instead of being expended in "the mere outside of literature, in the form of brick, stone and mortar," that is, if we understand Mr. Dwight, wasted in buildings for the accommodation of students, as is common in the United States, are appropriated as above mentioned to furnishing these necessary buildings, that is, the library and the lying-in-hospital, with cabinets, museums, books, and generally with the appropriate *materiel* of these edifices. We are unable, however, entirely to reconcile this representation with what we find in other authors. Heyne, in his oration before the university on the completion of the first half century from its establishment, seems to imply the existence of other buildings ;* and Mr. Dwight himself speaks in one place of a university prison. But this latter convenience, or necessary fabric, may be a mere appendage to one of the other two. Mr. Dwight mentions also the *hippodrome* "a long edifice," which we cannot so easily dispose of. There was originally a chapel of the university ; at least, Heyne mentions a "templum academicum," in which, occasionally, some kind of religious worship was held ; but we have somewhere read, that as it ceased to be frequented by both professors and students, this chapel was thought no longer necessary, and was accordingly devoted to other purposes. It was

*"Imprimis autem rei medicæ consultum est : nam *Collegium clinicum*, primo privata opera a VOGELIO institutum, mox publicis suppetiis sustentatum, ad publicas utilitates satis lætos auctus habuit. Etiam *Nosocomium* publice chirurgicis imprimis usibus destinatum. *Laboratorium Chemicum* extractum suaeque suppellectili est instructum, et nunc *arti obstetriciæ* quanta parantur præsidia, obstetricantium studiis *hospitio*, ex regis ordinumque provincialium munificentia, designato."

probably united to one of the other buildings, which are regarded as indispensable, and from the flourishing state of the establishment, it was no doubt soon filled.

A well furnished library is considered essential in a university; and all acknowledge, as Mr. Dwight observes, that the library of Göttingen is the most valuable in Germany. Munchhausen, during his administration, constantly fostered the library of this institution, and spared no expense in procuring all those valuable works in every language, which the resources of Hanover could purchase. It is less than a century since the first volume of this library was bought, and at the present time, there are three hundred thousand of "the brightest productions of the human mind." The arrangement of the library, Mr. Dwight thinks superior to that of any other he has seen in Europe, and every desirable facility is offered to the students for the consultation of books.

In the German universities, as in many others in Europe, there are four faculties or departments,—the faculty of Theology, the faculty of Law, the faculty of Medicine, and the faculty of Philosophy. This last department is very extensive, and comprehends, indeed, whatever is not included in the other three. There are two classes of professors, ordinary and extraordinary. Both classes receive salaries from the government, the extraordinary professors, however, less than the ordinary; but in neither class do all receive the same sum, but are "paid in proportion to their reputation." Besides their salaries, which are barely sufficient for their support, and, in the case of the extraordinary professors, insufficient to support them, "even in celibacy," they receive a *Frederic d'or* from every student who attends a course of their private lectures. There is a third class of instructors called lecturers or teachers. These are students who have completed their course, and aiming at a professor's chair, remain several years at the university, pursuing some particular department of literature or science, and who, on application to the government, are permitted to deliver a course of lectures. The number of professors and lecturers in Göttingen in 1825, was eighty-nine. Each department, therefore, has several professors and teachers, who deliver lectures on subjects so nearly similar, that a constant rivalry is produced. The progress of instruction in the German universities, under this organization, is thus described:—

The teachers, who are paid nothing by the government, but are only permitted to deliver lectures, receive a *Frederic d'or* from each of their pupils, and are almost always stimulated by necessity. Besides this, they feel all the ardor of youth, and the consequent longing for reputation. To

acquire subsistence and fame, they make unwearied exertions. Before them they see the extraordinary professors, whose title in the eyes of the students, gives them a prior claim; and to overtake them in the road, they strain every nerve. The extraordinary professors see below them a number of young men putting forth all their energy, while above them they behold the ordinary professors, who have reached the highest point of ascent. This class is placed under the influence of two powerful stimulants, the fear of being overtaken by the teachers, and the desire of surpassing the ordinary professors. The ordinary professors see below them two classes, at different distances, rapidly rising towards them, often almost treading upon their heels, and not unfrequently taking the lead in the number of their auditors, as well as in reputation. Under such a stimulus, they very rarely fall asleep, or relax their efforts, until age or debility arrives. This continued strife has the happiest effect on the literature of this country; and, in this respect, the German Universities are better organized than any others in Europe.

It is obvious from this representation, that in the German universities, there is a violent struggle among the professors and teachers, who shall acquire the most fame and the most money. As the students attend on as many or as few lecturers as they please, or if the whim so takes them, on none at all, each professor and teacher makes it his constant study, how he may adapt his instructions most entirely to the taste and fancy of his auditors. The more hearers, the more money and reputation; and as the fame of a professor increases, the number of his pupils, and of course of *Frederic d'ors*, increases likewise. Here is action and reaction. Fame draws students and money, students and money produce fame. This subject, it seems, is perfectly well understood by these gentlemen, as well, says Mr. Dwight, as by "the stage and steamboat proprietors of our country." Avarice and ambition, therefore, are the mainsprings, which keep the whole machinery of a German university in motion; and so entirely persuaded is Mr. Dwight, that these powerful passions ought to have full sway in a literary institution, that he adds, "it is *folly* to suppose, that the mere influence of principle will induce most professors, who do not feel great enthusiasm in their departments, to make the necessary efforts to arrive at excellence."

There are two other establishments connected with the university of Göttingen. The first, is the *hippodrome*, where are two professors, "one of whom gives lectures on the government of horses, the other on the anatomy and physiology of that animal, as well as of all others, which are made use of in agriculture." This department is attended by those students, who intend entering the army. The other establishment is the *fencing school*, and "is very much patronized, not only by those students who intend entering the army, but by most of those who expect to be under the necessity of fight-

ing a duel. The duellists make this school the principal place of resort, and here perfect themselves in the use of the broad sword."

Such, in the outline, are the German universities, as we find them described in the travels of Mr. Dwight. There are many other particulars, which serve to illustrate or modify, the general principles of these establishments, some of the most important of which, we may have occasion to notice as we proceed. Mr. Dwight has occasionally introduced comparisons between the German universities, and those of his own country, much to the advantage of the former: displaying in this respect, the talent of a skilful artist, who is not satisfied to place a favourite object in the strongest light, but endeavors to give it additional relief, by a deep contiguous shade. As he touches here upon topics which are nearer home, and about which we claim to know something from our own observation, we shall examine freely, both the opinions and facts of the case; a privilege, which there is no doubt, the author, from the frankness of his character, will be as ready to concede to others, as he has been free in using it himself.

We wish it here to be understood, that we have no desire to decry or conceal the value and deserved reputation of foreign seats of learning, or to exalt unreasonably the merits of our own; and are, we believe, duly conscious of our inability to effect either of these objects, if we were ever so much inclined. Our colleges undoubtedly have their defects, and, in some particulars, fall far below the universities of the old world. Imperfection in our literary institutions from various causes, chiefly such, however, as are to be found in the peculiar circumstances of the country, ought to be expected. We are not obliged to suppose any very culpable negligence or absolute want of talents, in the great body of those, who have had the direction and control of these establishments, to account for this phenomenon. It is wholly unnecessary for this purpose to stultify either ourselves or our ancestors. A fair exhibition of facts, we think, would show, that if much remains to be done, much also has been accomplished: and that if labor has sometimes been misplaced or lost in attempts to advance our literature, our colleges form no exception, in this respect to many other of our institutions. A system of liberal education adapted in every particular, to the circumstances of a people unlike all others, is not so easy a thing to devise, as some seem to imagine; or if devised, it is not the work of a day or of a year, to bring it into full operation.

As perfection, therefore, is not claimed to be an attribute of any of our colleges, we should look for the means of their

improvement; and here, as in other departments of life, where we wish to better our condition, it is the part of wisdom to turn our attention first to the experience of others. It is on this ground, that we feel under great obligation to those who have had opportunities of visiting foreign universities, and have published the result of their inquiries. The details in Mr. Dwight's book, in this point of view, are of high value; and it is hoped, that the facts he has disclosed, and the various considerations he has suggested on so important a subject as the best mode of communicating instruction, and of exciting an ardent literary zeal among the students in our higher seminaries, may be duly weighed. But before we administer a remedy, it is proper to inquire, in what respect it is needed; as a patient may be injured by improper treatment, as well as by neglect. We will inquire, then, how far the evils under which, according to Mr. Dwight's representations, our universities and colleges are laboring, have a real existence; that we may the better judge of the correctives to be applied.

The first great defect of our literary institutions, upon which Mr. Dwight comments at large, is the smallness of their libraries. In this respect, our highest seminaries, when brought into comparison with those of Europe, certainly appear to great disadvantage. The number of volumes in the library of Göttingen is three hundred thousand; of Leipsic, one hundred thousand; of Dresden, two hundred and sixty thousand; and the four libraries of Vienna exhibit an aggregate of five hundred and ninety thousand. Mr. Dwight enumerates thirty-one libraries, which may be easily visited in a circuit through Germany, which contain together from three to four million volumes. He supposes, that two hundred and fifty thousand volumes are not contained in the thirty-one largest libraries of the United States. We agree with Mr. Dwight as to the importance of books in an institution where the arts and sciences are to be taught on a liberal scale; and have, perhaps, had occasion to lament, hardly less frequently than himself, the deficiencies of the libraries to which we have had access. But allowing our great inferiority in the number of books, we see no reason for believing, that we are of course inferior, in the same proportion, in every other respect. For acquiring that knowledge which is the most valuable in an education, a library of three hundred thousand volumes is not exactly three times as useful as one of a hundred thousand; nor a library of one hundred thousand volumes just twice as useful as one of fifty thousand. The number of books necessary to exhibit the great facts and principles of human knowledge,—the

chief object in the early stages of education,—is not great. Books in the languages of nations which have made but little advances in literature, are, to the great body of our students, mere matters of curiosity. The same is true of a vast number of the books which swell the amount of the great libraries in question. We have no wish to depreciate the just value of these great masses of human knowledge, human wisdom, and human folly; we would only suggest such qualifications as the case obviously demands. It is readily admitted, that for literary research in its largest extent, and to qualify instructors to act with the greatest advantage in their respective departments, well furnished libraries are indispensable; and here we are not disposed to place limits.

Mr. Dwight shows no backwardness to do full justice to foreign universities, in respect to their libraries, but in his references to the libraries of the institutions of his own country, we think he hardly allows them their due. This is at least the case so far as our own knowledge extends. "Almost one hundred and fifty years ago," says Mr. Dwight, "the library of Yale College was founded: there are now eight thousand volumes." Yale College library has not yet been founded one hundred and thirty years, and the number of volumes it contains is nearer nine thousand than eight; but these mistakes are not very important. It is, however, necessary to a correct statement of the case to have it understood, that what is called appropriately the College library, is only one among several. The number of volumes in all the libraries accessible at Yale College, is more than twenty thousand; a number certainly small, yet large enough, we should think, to make the following language appear too strong even to Mr. Dwight himself. "There is here [Germany] none of that thirsting after knowledge, which every student feels in our country, without discerning *any thing* to allay the fever of desire." He may, indeed, say—

"Magno de flumine malle,
Quam ex hoc fonticulo, tantundem sumere,"

yet we see not, why even in the United States he might not be kept from absolute famishing.

We would here ask, how is it, that the large libraries in Germany have been obtained? Mr. Dwight has informed us. Munchhausen employed the "resources of Hanover" in purchasing the library of Göttingen; and the other libraries owe their existence to kings, princes, dukes and electors. He adds, that Hanover is poor in proportion to its population, when compared with Connecticut; and yet, that the govern-

ment of Connecticut has not added two thousand volumes to the library of Yale College. He might have said, if we are correctly informed, that the government of Connecticut has never added a volume. That some part of a grant made nearly forty years ago to that college by the State, for general purposes, was appropriated by the corporation to the purchase of books, is, we believe, true; but that any specific grant was ever made by the State for enlarging the library, we never heard. We do not suppose, that any legislature Connecticut ever had, could have been induced to adopt such a measure. As individuals, a majority, perhaps, of every legislature would admit, that the enlargement of that library would be a public benefit; but in their legislative capacity they would refuse to act for the purpose. The real state of the question, the community do not, and we fear cannot, understand; and the legislature of Connecticut, like legislatures in many others of our free republics, has given, in this respect, a fair expression of the public will. There is no doubt that the legislature of Connecticut, in its disposition to foster Yale College, has been at all times, in advance of those it represented.

Mr. Dwight takes frequent opportunities to manifest his dislike of the political institutions of Europe, and to proclaim his unmeasured approbation of those of his own country. The very name of a king, or of a noble, seems often greatly to disturb his equanimity, and nothing satisfies him in politics, but absolute equality and unlimited freedom. Now to us it appears, that this backwardness to patronize the higher literary institutions, is of the very essence of that which Mr. Dwight so much admires;—and he must look to governments, which are his soul's abomination, for that munificence, which he so highly extols. A traveller in Germany, he says, finds it difficult to proceed a day's journey, in any direction north of the Mayne, without discovering something to remind him, in the small cities through which he passes, "that intellectual cultivation is an object of great importance to the respective governments." The libraries at Weimar and at Jena proclaim, he says, the "princely spirit of the dukes" of the little territory in which they are found. Mr. Dwight would probably say, and say truly, that great evils often have their accompanying benefits, and that our highest enjoyments are not without alloy. Now, we would ask, if every man, or nearly every man, of the age of twenty-one years, in the electorate of Hanover, had had a voice for the last century, in making all grants of money from the public treasury,—how many volumes would there now be in the library of Göttingen? We hazard nothing in saying, that there would not be three hun-

dred thousand;—we doubt whether there would be more than in the library of Yale College. Our literary institutions, especially that to which Mr. Dwight so often refers, must look to other sources for the supply of books, than to the public bounty. But so far as we understand the case, hard as it is, there is still no reason absolutely to despair. Libraries generally through the country, are gradually increasing in extent and value, if less rapidly than could be wished, or in other circumstances might be expected, complaints are useless.

But it seems our libraries are not only small, but not sufficiently accessible. "The libraries of our colleges," says Mr. Dwight, "one would believe, are collected principally for the use of the professors. So far as my knowledge extends, there is not one of them often open for consultation; the chief benefit to be derived from a great collection of books." If this is true, it is an evil, which ought to be remedied; but so far as we are acquainted with facts, no such state of things exists in the United States. We will take as an illustration, the library of Yale College; as it is this library, if any, which Mr. Dwight must have had particularly in view. Here, as we are informed, at the commencement of each collegiate term, such books in the theological department as are necessary for frequent reference, are placed in the lecture room, where every student has access to them at any time. The theological students have likewise a valuable library under their own direction, and as to the college library, they are accommodated with access to it at most periods of the day, to their entire satisfaction. In the law department, the very large and well selected library belonging to the gentlemen, who are concerned in legal instruction, is accessible, we understand, at any hour of the day. The same liberality exists in the medical department, where the library, in addition to much besides that is valuable, is enriched by most or all of the books collected by the late Dr. Smith.

The undergraduates have access every day to the society libraries, which contain highly valuable selections of English literature. They are, indeed, permitted to take books from the college library but once a week; but this we learn has not been an inconvenient or injurious restriction. Undergraduates call at the college library for such books only, as cannot easily be procured in other places; and so seldom is there a necessity for such a call, that no complaint, so far as we have been able to ascertain, is made of the present regulations of the library in this respect. Besides, we have it from good authority, that the instructors in Yale College entertain the opinion, that miscellaneous reading among undergradu-

ates is not much to be encouraged. They go even so far as to say, that according to their experience, the knowledge of this class of students is generally in an inverse ratio to the number of volumes which they take from the library ;—with the exception of a very limited number of books, connected immediately with the course of their studies. They suppose, that undergraduates seldom find occasions where an extensive examination of books would be of any benefit ; and if such cases occur, that it is better to grant a special indulgence, than to allow a general liberty, which with most would lead to an idle habit of looking over a variety of authors, without method and without object. They believe, that students may see the backs of many books without knowing much of their contents, and read title-pages through their whole course without increasing their wisdom. But however this may be, the complaint of illiberality in the management of our public libraries, so far as Yale College is concerned, is wholly unsupported by facts ; and we have reason to believe, that Mr. Dwight has as little ground for his unfavorable representations, in respect to other similar establishments of the country.

But from Mr. Dwight's account, not only have our colleges few books, and those locked up from inspection, but the professors, whose business it is to instruct, are singularly inefficient, and seem liable to premature old age and death. He says, " American professors are usually stationary from forty-five to fifty years of age, until their decease ; or to indulge the utmost charity, they advance very little after that period." " They usually," he says, " write but one course of lectures, which is delivered from year to year, until, it loses even with themselves, half its interest from its monotony ;" and intimates that they " often find bad weather in winter, and real or imaginary debility the rest of the year, an excuse for relaxation or indolence." Our own impressions, we acknowledge, before reading this statement, were very different from those of Mr. Dwight ; and since reading it, and making such inquiries as were naturally suggested, we have seen no reason for altering our original opinion,—we have even been confirmed in it.

As this is a question of fact, it must be decided by a reference to particular instances. Among those American professors, who, in the discharge of their official duties, passed the grand climacteric of fifty, and continued to lecture till death, the first who occurs to our recollection is the late President of Yale College, who was also professor of divinity. So far was he from declining in vigor and zeal at the time specified, that he prepared all the sermons or lectures, which are comprised

in his "Theology," at least in the form in which they have been published, after he had passed the age of *fifty-three*. The late Dr. Smith commenced lecturing in Yale College, after he was fifty years old. No one at that time supposed he was superannuated. His lectures, which were commonly if not always extemporaneous, were probably at no period of his life, more fraught with various knowledge, and with the results of recent observation and reading, than from the time he removed to New-Haven till his death. These are the only professors of Yale College who have lectured from the age of fifty till their decease, within the last thirty years. But these probably are cases where Mr. Dwight would "indulge the utmost charity," and admit that a "very little" was accomplished. In turning to other institutions, with which we are less perfectly acquainted, we do not remember a single original of the full length portrait drawn by Mr. Dwight; much less are we able to furnish such a list of names falling under his censure, as to justify the character he has given of the whole fraternity of American professors.

Mr. Dwight likewise seems to suppose, that American professors are unusually short-lived. This is clearly implied in his account of a *fête* at Göttingen, where congratulations were offered by the students to Professor Blumenbach, who had just finished the fiftieth year of his professorship, and the hundredth course of his lectures. Mr. Dwight alludes to this subject apparently as matter of reproach—"would our professors only live long enough," etc.! Now bent as these gentlemen seem to be on dying prematurely, there is one thing at least to console us under their loss. If they are actually destitute of knowledge and zeal in their departments, and do little or nothing after the age of forty-five or fifty, lying as dead weights on their respective institutions, their early removal, in our humble judgment, should be considered a merciful dispensation. But as to the fact alledged we wholly disagree with Mr. Dwight. The inquiry whether the professors and lecturers in our country are more short lived than those of Europe, is not, indeed, of much importance. But as the subject is frequently alluded to, and what is here stated is often taken for granted, as it is by Mr. Dwight in the present instance, we will look at it for a moment. It should here be recollected that few of our colleges are old enough to furnish many examples applicable to this case; and those institutions whose age is the greatest, have had but a small number of professors in comparison with those of Germany. But what facts there are, if we are not greatly mistaken, furnish no support to the opinion in question.

The university at Cambridge had no professors till as late

as the year 1721. Since that time the first professor Wigglesworth, and Professor Winthrop, were each of them in office from forty to fifty years, and both of them died at an advanced age. Henry Flynt discharged the duties of a tutor nearly or quite half a century, and died at the age of eighty-five. Samuel Williams, the historian of Vermont, though he resigned his professorship, lived to be very old; showing clearly that his constitution was not fatally affected by his residence at the university. The same is true of Stephen Sewall. If we look at the present state of that institution, we can discover nothing in the ages of the professors, or in their state of health, which would lead us to suspect a *malaria* in that region.

If we turn to Yale College, the first professor, the Rev. Dr. Daggett, was inducted into office as professor of divinity in the year 1756, and died in the year 1780. Besides discharging the duties of a professor of divinity, he performed, during eleven years, the additional service of President of the College; and we have often heard the late President Dwight, who was educated at the College, and was also six years a tutor while Dr. Daggett officiated as President, bear the fullest attestation to his ability and integrity as an instructor and governor of the institution. His life was not terminated in the ordinary course of nature. When New-Haven was invaded by a detachment of the British forces in the summer of the year 1779, Dr. Daggett voluntarily entered the ranks as a common soldier, in defence of the town; and from the fatigue of that day, and the wounds he received, he never wholly recovered. Here is no proof, that the business of an American professor necessarily induces mental imbecility; it certainly, in this instance, did not destroy the attribute of courage. Nehemiah Strong, the first professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy in Yale College, entered on the duties of his office in the year 1770. At the close of the revolutionary war, the funds of the College were so far exhausted, that the corporation, as appears from their votes on this subject, were no longer able to pay him his salary. As the professor was not proof against starvation, from a very proper regard to his own life, he resigned; continuing, however, to instruct in mathematics as a private teacher, till near the time of his death, which happened in the year 1807, at the good old age of eighty. The stamina of his constitution seem not to have been weakened by his residence at the College. The late Dr. Munson, though his connection with the College was nominal only, yet through a great part of his life, actually performed the duties of a medical professor; and a large number of able physicians was educated under his superintendence. He died ninety-two

years old, and we have never heard it suggested, that his life was abridged, or his vigor lessened, by any blight on his faculties, either bodily or mental, from his employment as a teacher. Since the year 1795, thirty-four years, the full time allowed to a generation, six deaths only, and one of these by shipwreck, have occurred among the faculty of the college in all the departments; which considering the number of individuals in that body, proves any thing rather than a continual pestilence in the seminary.

If we look to other colleges, we discover nothing to alter the view of the case here presented. The first professor Smith of Dartmouth College entered on his office soon after the establishment of that institution, and continued in his place, as we understand, till his death, which took place only a few years since. The late Dr. Peter Wilson of Columbia College in New-York, was an active professor we believe more than fifty years. From the peculiar situation of this country, and the want of professional departments in our colleges, some gentlemen in their private capacities have given instruction as professors, without the name. Such was the late judge Reeve of Litchfield in this State. Though he was for many years in full practice as a lawyer, and was afterwards elevated to the bench of the superior court, yet he found time to prepare a course of law lectures, which from the ability and learning they displayed, procured him very great and deserved celebrity. He lived to the advanced age of eighty, and discontinued lecturing a short time only before his death. Many similar instances might be mentioned among the clergy of the country, before the establishment of theological schools. Examples of this kind we have in Dr. Bellamy of Bethlem in this State, who died at the age of seventy-two: in Dr. Lathrop of West Springfield, Massachusetts, who died at the age of ninety, and in Dr. West of Stockbridge, Massachusetts, who lived about as long. These clergymen were laborious parish ministers, and acted through a large part of their lives in the no less laborious vocation of theological professors. We will refer to one instance more of this kind only. Dr. Emmons of Franklin, Massachusetts, is well known to have been for a long period, an instructor of theological students. In metaphysical acuteness, we should not hesitate to oppose him to Kant, Fichte, Jacobi or Schelling. Dr. Emmons has been for some years a vigorous *octogenarian*. In the theological seminaries of our country, most of the original professors remain. In the institution at Andover, which is the oldest of those which have been established independently of the colleges, though it has been in full ope-

ration more than twenty years, yet we have heard of no removal from office "by reason of death." Mr. Dwight has furnished some speculations on the great diversity which he supposes to exist between the lengths of the lives of the professors and lecturers in Germany and at home, and is strongly inclined to believe that the cause of this fact thus taken for granted is to be found in the different manner in which houses are warmed during winter in the two countries; the stove being used more generally in Germany. We are persuaded, that this diversity of age is chiefly imaginary; and though we think the stove a very good thing, yet as respects this subject, we would dispose of it as Mr. Dwight himself does of meat-breakfasts and meat-suppers,—that is, leave it wholly out of the question.* The number of merely literary men is immensely greater in Germany than in the United States; there being eighty-nine professors and lecturers at Göttingen alone. Such a university with its full complement of professors ordinary and extraordinary, besides teachers, is to be found in many of the large cities. The professors of Göttingen alone far outnumber all who have borne the same name, or have been engaged as private lecturers, in the northern states since the establishment of our colleges. That there should be old men among them ought not to excite surprise. From the facts above stated, and considering that most of our colleges are of recent date, and that their professors have not had time to grow old, which is no fault of theirs, the balance is not greatly in favor of the Germans; we are inclined to believe, that a rigid examination and comparison would throw it on our side.

Mr. Dwight, in the course of his volume, has introduced many other remarks respecting American colleges, the incapacity of the teachers, the defective modes of instruction, and generally, the low state of literature in the country. On these we have no space to animadvert particularly. After what we have said above, we will add only, that some of his descriptions are just, some are neutralized by his own statements in other places, more of them are to be classed with those caricatures, which bear a remote resemblance only to their object, and not a few, so far as we know, are without a proto-

* The opinions of travellers, as to the salubrity of the German stove, are probably influenced not a little by their state of health. One of consumptive habits, and who is in constant fear of sudden changes of temperature, might easily believe, that in the stove he has found the true panacea, and give up, as superfluous, all further inquiry into the causes of longevity; but another who is asthmatic, when placed near a stove, and enveloped in stagnant air and the fumes of tobacco, might as easily wonder, that one among a thousand of the Germans ever reached the common age of man.

type. A single specimen will show, that we do not speak at random. He says, that of all literary nations, ours is the least respectable, the countries south of us on this continent excepted,—that we are perfectly satisfied if our sons receive an education similar to that of their fathers,—that the strong prejudice universal among us against the literature of other nations is equivalent to the Catholic *Index expurgatorius*, and that literary custom reigns in our country with a despotic sway, unequalled in its power by any thing he has seen in Europe except religious superstition. He declares, however, with singular inconsistency, what Europeans would certainly pronounce characteristically American,—“that as a nation, we are the most intelligent on earth.”

We return, then, to the universities of Germany. We have a few doubts to express, as to the general expediency of the system of instruction there adopted; and as to the probability, that this system, if ever so well suited to that country, would succeed, at least at present, if introduced, as its advocates appear to wish, without any modifications, into the United States. Our first objection to the German system of instruction is, that it holds out the strongest inducements to the professors and teachers, not so much to ascertain the truth in any case, as to find out something new, something paradoxical, something which will strongly impress the minds of their scholars and the public with the idea of the lecturer's ingenuity, depth of research, and independence of all previous speculations or opinions. Avarice and ambition are left uncontrolled; and whatever can dazzle and confound, draw students to the lecture rooms, call forth their applauses and secure their *Frederic d'ors*, is for the time being, the supreme good. Now it appears to us, shackled as we are by many old-fashioned prejudices, and living under the restraints of the American *Index expurgatorius*, that truth must fare badly in such a strife as this. If it be granted, that all reliance on principle, by which we understand integrity, as the ground of a professor's faithfulness is folly, it should not excite wonder, if professors themselves should discard this same thing called principle, likewise, in their communications with their pupils; and that truth, decency, and even shame should soon become obsolete. Instead of instruction whose basis is truth, honesty, and sincerity, we ought to expect a succession of brilliant theories, rising like exhalations, glittering and sparkling for the moment, but altogether unsubstantial and transitory. Avarice and ambition must have the same effect, wherever they are predominant; nor does their influence stop within the limits which at first confined them. They pervade every portion of

the community. No matter whether their influence begins in the government, in the body of a nation, or in the schools of instruction; it soon extends to the other departments of society; and the only difference is, that corruption in public teachers is nearer the fountain of life, and its deleterious effects are sooner perceived in every limb, bone and muscle of the body politic.

As an illustration of these remarks, we need go no farther than to northern Germany, and to that country as described by Mr. Dwight. He has left us no reason to doubt either as to cause or effect. We would not be understood, however, to deny, that in the violent effervescence, into which the universities of Germany have been thrown for the last seventy years, many things which are valuable, have come to light, and that some men have been found, at all times, in the professorial chairs, who have looked beyond their own personal aggrandizement. All this we are both willing and desirous fully and distinctly to concede; we speak only of what is general and obviously characteristic. In matters of mere criticism, the German writers, following the excellent examples early set them, are for the most part able and satisfactory. But beyond this point, we know of no class of authors who need to be more cautiously watched at every step, by any one who prefers truth to paradox. Their general merits have been greatly overrated. Extravagant and indiscriminate praise has sometimes taken the place of sober inquiry and careful pondering of facts and arguments. What Cicero says of the Greek rhetoricians, may be applied, as we think, with no little propriety to most German professors, that they are "*homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis*;" and the best way of proceeding on the appearance from a German university, of some new and startling theory, supported by deep learning and laborious research, is to wait six months or a year, when it will certainly be as learnedly and laboriously refuted.

It is plain likewise, as it appears to us, that in universities arranged after the German system, every thing like discipline must be abandoned. As the students are scattered throughout the towns in which the universities are situated, their conduct can be very little controlled, except while they are in the lecture-rooms. The professors and teachers are themselves rivals, and it makes no inconsiderable part of their plan of proceeding to draw off students from each other. In this state of things, co-operation in any efficient scheme of discipline, is out of the question. The most that can be hoped for, is, not abstinence from internal jealousies, for these must exist; but, that the professors themselves will not be engaged in open

quarrels. Discipline must be left to the ordinary police of the city; and licentiousness in its most revolting forms will become predominant. One of the most obvious vices in the German universities is duelling. "To have passed two or three years," says Mr. Dwight, "at one of these institutions and not to have fought as many duels, is a rare example of moderation." Many of these duels are on the most trifling provocations, and are constantly occurring. Mr. Dwight supposes, that more than two hundred of these duels were fought during the term he was at Göttingen. The students fight with swords, and many of them are "horribly hacked, and not a small number of them carry on their faces the scars of many a duel." The university of Göttingen is not more distinguished, we are told, in this respect, than other similar institutions situated in the small towns. The conduct of the students in other respects, is marked by unrestrained licentiousness. Mr. Dwight himself supposes a lying-in-hospital to be a necessary university building at Göttingen. Whoever wishes to see more on this subject, is referred to Russel's tour in Germany. As to the comparative morality of the students in theology, Mr. Dwight adds, "From what the Germans themselves say, I am convinced that the theological students are less immoral than others, though there is certainly no great difference between many of them and their companions in other professions."—Now, for the explanation of all this. "Every State is proud of its university, and is very desirous of increasing as much as possible the number of its students. The professors, who receive the greater part of their incomes from their private lectures, are of course dependent in a measure on the number of students who resort to the university. Their literary fame is, in some measure, connected with the number of their auditors." If duelling should be suppressed in any one university, "the number of students would be very greatly diminished; and the professors as well as the state, would find their *incomes* much lessened." The same reason applies no doubt against controlling the conduct of the students generally. We are told, moreover, that there is little or no religious influence in the German universities, that the professors are generally sceptics, and make no secret of their infidelity. They admit, indeed, that the instructions of Christ contain a beautiful system of morality; but worthy of our observation so far only, as they appear to correspond with the dictates of reason, and to have a tendency to promote the happiness of society. The Old Testament is studied more as a monument of ancient history and literature, than as a spiritual guide through life. As to the New Testament, a majority of the professors in eve-

ry department unite in disbelieving it. The Sabbath is almost universally considered as not obligatory on christians. Its influence on the students is exceedingly limited, and this is peculiarly the day for hunting, riding, shooting, and fighting duels. Probably "no day in the week beholds so much iniquity as this."

After this, we are not surprised to hear, that Kant, "by the novelty of his sentiments, the force of his logic, and the boldness of his opinions, delighted the Germans,"—the clergy as well as others,—and that they thought him "possessed of more acuteness of intellect, than Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle." Kant modestly "thought, that his system was much superior to that of Christ, and he speaks of it as such in his works. From the wonderful success which attended his opinions, he as well as his followers believed, that his new system of morals would become universal, and supplant christianity." Another "luminary," however, arose in the person of Fichte, and shone its day. The fundamental doctrine of Fichte's philosophy is, that "every thing which exists, is the creation of the mind of each individual,"—which, in our poor apprehension, is absolute nonsense. Then came Jacobi, who "rejects the idea of an external revelation, but admits an internal one, that is, conscience." We are not disappointed to find, that Jacobi has met with a formidable rival in Schelling, who "admits no spiritual God, but maintains a full and extended pantheism, embracing animate and inanimate existence." Mr. Dwight supposes that the protestants of Germany would unite, at least the majority of them, in a creed consisting of a single article, asserting the existence of God; and they would *perhaps*, admit another, declaring that the morality of Jesus Christ is purer than that of any other code of morals ever presented to man. Nevertheless, to a creed containing only these articles, a few would certainly be found hostile. The modern school of *Pantheists* would oppose such a creed from their "peculiar opinions respecting the nature of the deity." To us all parts of this system appear intimately related to each other. It begins in exciting the most powerful passions, stifling the sense of duty, branding principle as folly, perverting the intellect, corrupting morals, and ends in general scepticism, and blank atheism. It is not the design of these remarks to attribute the rapid declension of the Germans from the faith of their ancestors, and the prevalence of so many absurd notions solely to the organization of their universities. Other powerful causes have existed, co-operating with this to produce the same general effect. That in the universities, however, the disposition to extravagant speculation and manifest licentious-

ness both in principle and practice, has found its most congenial atmosphere: that in these seminaries, in union with many productions of acknowledged worth and permanent usefulness, there has come forth a spurious brood of "all monstrous, all prodigious things;" and that in the contest of opposing principles, what is bad has gained a frightful superiority over what is good, will probably be allowed by most persons who mark the progress of events, in connection with those illustrations to be derived from the known propensities of human nature. Those who consider the result advantageous, would certainly not be backward, if called upon to assign the degrees of merit among the different agents in this great work, to adjudge to the universities the first rank.

We would not, however, be understood to maintain or even to insinuate, that from the plan of instruction pursued in the German universities, no important suggestions can be derived for improving our own literary institutions. The course of study and the mode of teaching in our colleges were originally adapted to the means and exigences of the country in its infant state. The English universities were of course the models from which our fathers copied. They venerated the establishments of the parent country; highly valued experience in devising and settling their new institutions; and deviated from the paths they had before trod only as necessity and the most obvious expediency dictated the course. As the circumstances of the community varied, as wealth increased, and as employments in which literature might be of use were multiplied, the system of liberal education received corresponding modifications, which were generally, though not universally, conformed to the original scheme. That our ancestors might in some instances, have selected better precedents, if their knowledge of European universities had been more extensive, we see no occasion to deny. We have been accustomed, however, to think that they paid a proper regard to the wants of those for whom they were providing the means of education; and we see, as we believe, much more occasion to admire their sagacity and prudence, than to reproach them with ignorance and prejudice. But as we have a wider field of observation, it ought not to be a matter of great wonder, if some errors in their work should be detected, and some real improvements should be devised.

But admitting, as we do distinctly, that the plan of instruction in our colleges is a proper subject of discussion and amendment, we hesitate about letting go at once every hold to which time has given its sanction, among us, and shaping the whole system to the demands of what is so often and so

emphatically called the spirit of the age. The demands of this spirit, indeed, are so numerous and discordant, that it is no easy matter to ascertain them distinctly, and any endeavors to meet them all must necessarily prove ineffectual. Projectors spring up in every quarter; each one is confident he is right; and it requires no little discretion and firmness to choose among the schemes proposed for adoption. Any choice which can be made, would be condemned by some; and the clamor of a few might still be thought the voice of the same spirit, whose wishes it was before the object to gratify. The danger is, that in times of general excitement, the greatest noise will be mistaken for the voice of the greatest number; or the noise of the ignorant, the self-confident and the vain, for the voice of those best qualified to judge of the subject in debate. In the haste to satisfy all, much that is valuable, as well as much that is useless or hurtful, may be rejected; and thus the chance of ultimate advantage is diminished.

With this view of the uncertainties of the case, we will inquire as to the necessity of some few of the changes in our colleges, which are urged upon them most frequently and earnestly by those who set up for thorough reformers. It is said, that too little instruction is given in our courses of education, by lecture, and that too much is done by the student by way of recitation. But to remedy this evil, if there is one, by abolishing all recitations, and substituting lectures as the exclusive mode of teaching, seems to be a measure of doubtful expediency. It is at least, worth our while to inquire, whether the circumstances of our colleges are so analagous to those of the German institutions, that there is no danger of mistake in reasoning in this particular case, from the one to the other. Mr. Dwight remarks, that in speaking of the universities of Germany, he wishes not to be understood as speaking of institutions, which are the same as our own. They correspond, he says, only to the professional departments in our colleges; and the students before they enter the universities, receive in the gymnasia of the country, an education in the classics superior, and in mathematics and physical science, one that is equal, to that acquired in most of the colleges of the United States. To form a correct comparison, then, between the institutions of the two countries, it is necessary to leave out of the account all our undergraduates. In the year 1825, more than three fourths of the 4816 students in the six Prussian universities were pursuing theology, law and medicine. The remainder were studying some one or more branches of the philosophical department,—many of them with the intention of devoting themselves to science or belles-lettres,

while others were hoping to obtain places under government, or to lead a life of ease on their estates. The German students then, are much more advanced in literary acquirements, and it should seem in age likewise, than our own, when they are removed to the universities; from which circumstance arises an important and obvious distinction, which should be kept fully in view in all discussions of this subject. To a great extent, it appears they immediately engage in professional studies; and on this account, should be compared with our professional students, rather than with the undergraduates of our colleges. In this country as well as in Germany, students in theology, law and medicine, are extensively taught by lectures; and the experience, therefore of the two countries has in both, where the grounds of judging are alike, led to the same result. But because students of one degree of advancement in knowledge and age are best taught by formal discourses from their instructors; to infer that students much younger, whose acquirements are inferior, and whose habits of study and attention are less confined, should be instructed in the same way, is not warranted by the premises. It does not appear, that lecturing, as a mode of instruction, is used to any considerable extent in the German gymnasia. Students in these seminaries have regular tasks to perform and lessons to recite. If our undergraduates resemble the students of the German gymnasia, and Germany is to be the standard, and if we are to be guided by things and not by names, then the course actually pursued in part in our colleges, is the proper one. If it should be said, that our colleges are so far in advance of the German gymnasia, that the two methods of instruction by lecturing and by recitation should be united,—the lectures being given with the recitations or at different times, as should be judged best adapted to the wants of the students, and their capacity of improvement,—the reply is, that this is now done extensively, if not universally, in our colleges. If it be farther urged, that students should not be admitted into our colleges, till they are older, and till their literary acquisitions are greater,—this may be true; but for this purpose, the change must be effected slowly. The circumstances of the country, in the view of those, who are accustomed to look at this subject in detail, are obviously such as to oppose very powerful obstacles to any sudden improvement in this respect.

But it is said farther, that our colleges have adopted a very absurd rule, by which all students are required to pursue the same course of education, whatever may be the difference of their talents, their inclinations and their prospect in life; and

the example of the German universities is held up for imitation, where the wishes of no one are crossed, and the utmost freedom in the choice of studies exists. But here again, the analogy which is urged, entirely fails on a nearer view. We have already seen from Mr. Dwight's statement, that the students of the German universities correspond in age and acquisitions generally, with the professional students in our colleges, and not with the undergraduates. The German students according to his representation, while at the gymnasia, receive an education, in some respects superior, and in all respects equal, to what students with us receive by the time of their graduation. With us, students after finishing the undergraduate course, enter upon professional studies at their option. In Germany they do the same after leaving the gymnasia. In both countries, a classical and scientific education is considered necessary for all; and the general plan therefore pursued in the two countries is not so very unlike; though the execution may be different. If a competent knowledge of the classics and of the sciences could be acquired in our preparatory schools, a greater licence in the choice of studies could be granted to undergraduates in our colleges; but so long as such knowledge cannot be gained in these schools, our colleges, so far as has yet been shown, ought to remain substantially as they are, or we must retrograde in learning instead of advancing. Whenever our preparatory schools can be so improved as to be on the same foundation as the German gymnasia, the organization of our colleges can with propriety be changed. There is at present, an option among the students in most or all of our colleges, as to some of their studies during a part of their course. In some colleges this variety is greater and in some less. The greatest departure from the general rule, which we have heard of in any of our colleges, is in one only—not however in New-England,—where theology, law, and medicine are professedly studied by undergraduates. How this is done, and a competent knowledge of those branches, which have heretofore been considered essential to a liberal education, is secured, we are unable to understand.

But the German students, it is here said, show much more zeal in their studies than our own, aim at higher attainments, and instead of flagging in their course, are actuated by a never ceasing passion for literature. Subjects of deep research are their proper element; it is here they find the highest gratification, and are stimulated to the most extraordinary exertions. In the German universities, the ideas of time and country appear to be lost; antiquity has no less interest than

the present moment, or if there is any difference, the number of centuries which have intervened since an event, gives additional importance to any inquiry respecting it, which may arise. That there is much truth in this representation, cannot be denied. If any doubt could here exist, there are many circumstances to confirm the universal report of those who have witnessed the ardor and diligence of German students. The productions of the German press are of themselves sufficient to prove the depth of the national erudition. Learning is evidently with the students of that country, not a topic of momentary attention, or a subject which is thought proper to occupy the mind at a particular age only;—but begun in youth, it is prosecuted to the latest period of life. We are authorised, however, by Mr. Dwight to say, that this literary enthusiasm in the German universities, though general, is not universal. In his account of Göttingen he says, “The noisy, fighting *Burschen*, whose numbers are from one hundred and fifty to two hundred, form a body quite distinct from the great majority of the students.” They are not, therefore, to be believed very ardent in their studies. There are likewise, we are informed, young men of fortune, who come here and spend two or three years, because no gentleman is thought to have completed his education, who has not remained several years at a university. They are not very studious, but are thought to derive not a little benefit from a residence in a literary atmosphere. We doubt whether the number of those in any of our professional schools, who are “not very studious,” is as great in proportion, as it seems to be here. But we will not question the fact, that German scholars, if we view them through their whole course, and in all departments of study, and especially in the several stages of life, are superior to our own in literary zeal. The causes of this difference, from the importance of the subject, may justify a few moments consideration. There are those, and Mr. Dwight is obviously of the number, who suppose, that much, if not all of this difference is to be attributed to the state of instruction in the two countries. They appear to think, that if our libraries were greatly increased, and our colleges were furnished with able and diligent lecturers, the desired object would be soon accomplished. Literary enthusiasm, it is anticipated, would succeed to literary indifference, and that we should soon be as distinguished in learning, as we are in agricultural, manufacturing or commercial enterprize.

Among the causes, which in Germany give distinction to learning, and by obvious consequence to the means of communicating and acquiring it, is to be classed the very im-

portant fact, that the avenues to public favor in that country are few. There are no legislative assemblies where questions of individual and national interest are publicly discussed, to fix the attention of all classes of the community; no elections, which by their frequency, create a constant ferment and feverish solicitude in the minds of a great majority of the people, and no open courts of justice to enlist the passions of multitudes in their proceedings. The universities are the only places where there is freedom of thought united with public oral discussion, to any extent deserving notice. It is not wonderful, then, that they should excite an unusual share of regard. Those strong feelings, which among us find vent in public journals of every form and name, have no place in Germany for their indulgence so convenient and safe as the universities. There, if the professors cannot speak of the character of the living, they can talk of the dead; if they find it dangerous to discuss with openness and with truth, the politics of Prussia and Austria, they can give utterance to their feelings in treating of the politics of antiquity. If they dare not bring into question the numerous absurd restrictions on trade between the German states, they can say what they please of the commerce of the Carthaginians, and of their treaties on this great national concern with the Romans. That the speculative and literary part of a nation so situated should exhibit on topics remote in time and place, a zeal and enthusiasm which we are accustomed to see in action only where immediate interests are at stake, is what may be considered a matter of course. Another cause not less powerful than the preceding, in giving to Germany its peculiar character for erudition, may be found in the fact, that in that country, eminence in literature is one of the most ready passports to numerous employments. It introduces those who reach it, to the church, to the army, and to stations about the court; whereas in the United States the case is widely different. Deep and varied learning is not necessary to understand most of the arts of popular intrigue; and it may sometimes prove even an obstacle to advancement. But there can be no mystery in the subject to any one who will examine it with moderate care. The sum of the whole matter is this,—in Germany, the ardor and zeal of the nation necessarily show themselves to a great extent in literature, as this is one of the few departments where freedom of speculation is allowed; and moreover literary distinction has a near and visible connection with success in life.

As a further illustration of this subject we would add, that in a late publication by an eminent professor in one of our principal theological seminaries, we find the following decla-

ration. "There is not time [in the seminary] to study Hebrew *ab initio*, and make such progress in it as to answer any really important purpose. If the study is not begun earlier, it may as well, nay better, be wholly omitted. Twenty years' experiment has fully satisfied us here of this." We are not disposed to take these words in their literal meaning. In view of all the circumstances of the case, we conclude that no more was intended than to express strongly the comparatively low state of Hebrew literature in the country. We think we could show, and the professor would probably agree with us, that enough has been effected within the last twenty years in promoting a knowledge of the Hebrew scriptures, to compensate for all the efforts which have been made for this purpose; though undoubtedly less has been done, than could be wished, or under other circumstances, might be expected. With this explanation, we will look at the subject a moment as it bears on the point before us.

The students at that seminary are almost exclusively graduates of our colleges, are engaged in preparing themselves for professional life, have entered upon their course of study voluntarily, and may be compared in all these respects with students at the German universities. It will not be pretended that their instruction has not been of the very best kind, that their books have not been written after the German models, that there has been any undue bias towards old modes of teaching, or that there has not been full liberty to instruct by lectures, or recitation, or both, according as it should be thought from time to time expedient, or that there has not been every disposition to make use of these advantages to their utmost extent. Yet we have it from an unquestionable source, that the study of Hebrew continued for twenty years under these circumstances, has, in its effects, fallen short, at least, of just expectation. This result is ascribed to want of time. In our view the difficulty lies deeper. Every thing in this country connected with education, has a strong tendency to immediate and popular effect. The final judges of the merits of a preacher are a popular audience. We are not complaining that it is so; we only mention the fact. This state of things, theological students perfectly well understand; and their principal efforts will be directed accordingly. They may be convinced, that a knowledge of oriental literature will enable them better to understand and interpret the scriptures; but they see that this consequence, in actual life, as it affects those whom they address, and upon whom they are dependent, is remote, circuitous, and indirect. In Germany, where clergymen are introduced into their parishes

in most cases, without any consultation of the congregations to which they are to minister, and where *literary attainments* are the only subject of inquiry in determining their qualifications, the case is widely different. There the tendency is in another direction, and no complaint exists, that Hebrew is not learned and loved; some might even suppose that it occupies a disproportionate share of attention. We are willing to admit, that some little advantage might possibly be derived from commencing the study of Hebrew earlier in this country; and are altogether inclined to favor such a course; but the advantage we are satisfied, would be very little indeed. If every theological student on joining the seminary in question were well versed in the elements of the Hebrew language, we believe, that the professor, great and meritorious as are his exertions in the department of oriental literature, might still, at the end of a second twenty years, take up the same lamentation, with which he has concluded the first twenty,—and that it would be then as true as it is now, that to buy a Hebrew grammar, lexicon, or bible at the cheapest rate, application should be made to one who has been a few years from a theological school. We consider this experiment reported on such authority as deserving the particular attention of all those, who place so high an estimate on the manner of teaching.

Those, therefore, who ascribe the uncommon industry of German students in their pursuits, wholly or chiefly to the mode of instruction in the universities, appear to us not only to fix upon a cause altogether inadequate to the effect, but to overlook other causes entirely sufficient to explain the phenomenon; and which should seem to be obvious at the first glance. The philosophy which they here apply, is not much unlike that, which should infer, because a fluid rises in a tube by the operation of a forcing pump, that the tube is the cause of the ascent, and should expect water to run up hill, when left to the ordinary action of gravity. To illustrate our own views, we will make a supposition. If the political state of Germany were changed, and popular institutions were substituted for those which had their origin in despotism; the consequent enlargement of the scenes of action, enterprise, and discussion, would produce in the universities one of the first and most considerable effects. It requires not the spirit of prophecy to foretel, that such a revolution would place the universities in a relation to other objects of general interest altogether different from that which they now hold, and, that their character, in comparatively a short time, would be essentially altered. We will make one more supposition. If some one of our colleges, we will say Yale College, were at

once metamorphosed into a German university, and its "mere outside of literature, in the form of brick, stone, and mortar," were so far reduced as to afford such buildings only as are "necessary to contain the *materiel* of literature," that is, buildings for a library and a lying-in-hospital, and that, in addition, eighty-nine of the ablest professors and lecturers, who should be at least equal to any now in Germany were introduced to lecture on eighty-nine different subjects, each one in pursuit of money and fame, endeavoring to draw off students from every other, the effects in this case would be no less striking than in the former. One of the effects to be looked for is, the desertion, or withdrawal by parents, of a large proportion of the students; or if against the strongest probability, the present number of students, or even a greater should be secured, the consequences of the entire relaxation of discipline, and of general licentiousness in principle and conduct, would be most disastrous. It must be well known to those who are conversant with the history of Yale College, that for the first fifteen or sixteen years of its existence, it had none of the "outside of literature," and was in a migratory state. During these sojournings, it was once its hard fortune to be "warned out of town" by the inhabitants of the place where it then was; on the grave charge, that attention to the students occupied too much of the time of their minister. We should not be surprised if in the case supposed, this occurrence should be brought up as a precedent; and if a "warning" should prove ineffectual, we cannot but believe, that the legislature of the State, from a regard to the public welfare, would endeavor by some extraordinary measures to abate the nuisance.

As we maintain, that the advantages of the German university system would be counteracted among us by the peculiar circumstances of the country, so we are ready to admit, that the evils of this system would not be immediately apparent in their full extent. We should not at first have so many duels; and some of the grosser vices might be less open and obtrusive. The progress of things would be, however, constantly towards a worse state; and we might expect to be soon the rivals of foreign institutions in corruption of manners, without the alleviating circumstance of having elevated our literature. We are told by Mr. Dwight, that German students go home from the universities, and become peaceable subjects of their respective governments. This, in a country like Germany, of fixed habits and governed by absolute power, may be true; but in the United States the same change could hardly be expected. Our community opposes less resistance to innovation. In a republic like ours, where men of superior

education will necessarily have a commanding influence, too great care cannot be taken to guard the youth of our public institutions from that deep depravity, for which no literary attainments can compensate, and which cannot but affect the community in its vital interests.

We would by no means be understood to censure Mr. Dwight for writing freely on the subject of our literary institutions. We have no disposition to enlarge the American *Index Expurgatorius*. We are glad, that, in describing foreign seats of learning, Mr. Dwight has added his views respecting our own. Our colleges are no doubt susceptible of gradual improvement, and we would rather invite than repress discussion on a topic so nearly connected with the great interests of the community, as the best mode by which such improvements may be effected. In considering the views of others, we claim only the equal privilege of expressing our own opinions; especially would we choose not to be silent as to matters of fact, since the foundation of all our conclusions must rest here.

From Göttingen Mr. Dwight repaired to Berlin, of which he has given a full and animated description. This city contains nearly two hundred thousand inhabitants, the streets are wide and airy, and cross each other at right angles like those of Philadelphia. A part of the town shows a recent origin, and there is a striking resemblance, in many respects, between the Prussian capital and the cities of our own country. One of the first things in the manners of the Prussians, which seems to have fixed the attention of Mr. Dwight, was the great external respect shown on all occasions to the king, his family, and the nobility generally. According to his account, the Prussians are idolaters of royalty. To them nothing is so pure, so elevated, so worthy of reverence as the monarch and those who are nearly allied to him. This external respect has no reference, it seems, to the character of the sovereign; it is shown to the rank and station, rather than to the individual who chances to receive their homage. When Napoleon passed through Berlin, he was received in the same manner as the sovereign of the country; not because he was a favorite of the nation, but because he was an emperor. "There is something in this feeling," says Mr. Dwight, "incomprehensible to an American, accustomed as he is to see talent and worth the passport to success or to fame."

We think travellers rather too apt to express surprise and astonishment at foreign customs, and too little disposed to make that allowance for difference of circumstances, which a just philosophy would require. The people of the United States

have had frequent opportunities to witness this infirmity in travellers among themselves. Our peculiar political institutions, to say nothing of the newness of our country and the diversities of character in its population, have led to a general deportment in the intercourse of our citizens, and given a cast of manners among all classes of society, which would suffer by being brought to a foreign standard. The German Duke who lately visited the United States, has gained not a little credit by falling in so readily with our habits, and by judging of them not according to preconceived notions from the artificial structure of society in Europe, but as the obvious result of our novel situation. Considering the length of time Germany has been under the government of dukes and electors, of kings and emperors, and the great privileges enjoyed by the nobility, the universal deference paid to rank and station, need surprise no one. If a contrary state of things existed in Berlin, and no external respect was shown to the king and royal family, beyond that manifested to ordinary citizens, especially as the Prussians are "born monarchists," this, as appears, to us would be the incomprehensible part of the subject. We hope Mr. Dwight will continue to see in his own country "talent and worth the passport to success;" but we fear that he will be obliged to witness many exceptions to what he now considers the ordinary course of events. We have been accustomed to believe, that the validity of such a passport was never universally recognized out of Utopia.

Berlin is almost exclusively a protestant city. Of thirty-six churches, only one is catholic; and this a small edifice for that denomination. The most eloquent preachers in Berlin, Mr. Dwight does not think superior in thought and manner, to the ablest in our own country, or to many whom he heard in France and Italy. The people of Berlin call them eloquent; but they have not that glow of feeling, and that animation of gesture, which justly entitle them to be so considered. This deficiency, Mr. Dwight ascribes very properly to the institutions of the country. There is no legislature, no public courts, not a single place where a German may address his fellow-men, unless he is a clergyman, a professor in a university, or a player. The advantages which the young men of the United States enjoy over those of Germany, for acquiring an easy and interesting manner of conveying their thoughts both in conversation and in public speaking, is obvious.

The press in Prussia is under very severe restrictions; and "every subject connected with the political rights of man" is excluded from public discussion. On such topics no one writes, unless now and then to prove, "that the actual state of

things is the best which could possibly exist." Politics are equally dangerous in conversation, and no one is sure that he is safe, unless when conversing with an intimate friend. Every Prussian is aware, that he is subjected to the *espionage* of the government, and that a single bold censure on its measures might be the occasion of transferring him to the fortress of Koepnic or Spandau. Theology as a subject of conversation "is entirely banished from society," and exclusively confined to the theological professors and students of the universities, or to small circles, and then "it is usually soon succeeded by others." Mr. Dwight, however, spoke boldly on subjects of political interest, and could not persuade himself to "put *fetters* on his *mouth*"—which, as it appears to us, judging as we do without any experience in this way, would in truth, have been a troublesome alternative.

English literature is now much cultivated in Germany, and the admiration of Shakspeare, it would seem, is unbounded. "Probably no writer," says Mr. Dwight, "except those of Greece and Rome, has had a greater influence over the literature of a foreign country, than Shakspeare over that of Germany." Since the peace of 1814 English books are introduced by every arrival at Hamburg from London, and most works of merit appear in the original, or in a translation. Mr. Dwight remarks very justly, that the German language is admirably adapted to present the thoughts of foreign poets in a dress little, if at all inferior to the original. It is rich in the number of its words, and affords uncommon facilities for forming new combinations. The flexibility of the language is hardly inferior to its copiousness. A German, therefore, who thoroughly understands a foreign language, and enters into the feelings of his author, is admirably fitted to become a translator of poetry. Accordingly there are few celebrated poems in other languages, which are not within the reach of every German. "The songs of Hafiz," says Mr. Dwight, "and of the other poets of Persia, the poetry of Arabia, of Palestine, and of ancient and modern Europe, all appear in the language of this country, and often with a beauty little inferior to that of the original." Some of the Germans, it appears, are as warm admirers of English literature, as their fathers were fifty years ago of that of France; and the English language is now spoken to some extent in every part of Germany.

Mr. Dwight has furnished some very interesting notices of the elementary schools of Prussia. From the representation he has made of these establishments, we know not the country where the system of common education is so perfect, as in

the Prussian states, governed as they are, notwithstanding, by an absolute monarch. In the whole kingdom there are more than twenty thousand common schools, of which seventeen thousand are in the villages. The instructors in these schools are all educated for their employment, and one or more seminaries for the purpose are supported by the government in every province. Instruction is thus rendered uniform throughout the kingdom, and persons destitute of the proper qualifications, are excluded from teaching. Every clergyman is required to visit the school or schools of his parish, and to ascertain whether the teachers fulfil their duties. The clergyman of each parish makes an annual report to the superintendent of the district, who in his turn makes a general report to the minister of public instruction. Committees appointed by the government, examine the schools, to ascertain whether the reports of the clergy are correct, as well as to form a general view of the state of education.

Every parent is required to send his children to school, as soon as they have reached the age of six years; and it is the duty of the clergyman to ascertain, whether the people of his parish comply with this regulation. Parents, who refuse to send their children to school are punished by fine. All books for the schools, are selected by the consistory, and no books can be introduced without the permission of this body. The bible is universally read by the children, and is thus the foundation of education for the youth of Prussia. Every morning and afternoon the instructor is required to open his school with singing and prayer, and to close it with singing a hymn, in which such of his pupils unite, as have the necessary qualifications. The Prussian schoolmaster confines himself almost exclusively to his profession. The school house is erected at the expense of the parish, and is sufficiently large to accommodate the scholars and the family of the instructor, who has the use of it gratis, as likewise of a small garden, and sometimes of a few acres of land, so long as he retains his place. Every parish pays the teacher of its school from seventy to eighty dollars a year. In addition to this sum, about six cents a month is paid by every parent for the instruction of each of his children. The instructor receives in some cases also, a small quantity of butter and flax. His whole income exclusive of the rent of the school house and the ground connected with it, rarely amounts, if he teaches in one of the villages, to more than one hundred Spanish dollars; about one hundred and fifty dollars are received by instructors in the towns. The lowness of this compensation is obviously to be attributed to the number who seek employment, and to

the low price of the necessaries of life. From this statement it appears, that the king of Prussia has done much for the people. No one, says Mr. Dwight, can help respecting Frederic William for the wisdom he has exhibited, in thus improving the character of his subjects. Prussia, he adds, is one of the most enlightened countries in the world; and a broad foundation is laid for its future prosperity.

Mr. Dwight supposes, that great benefit might be derived from the establishment of seminaries for the education of instructors in our own country. In the United States the business of instruction in common schools is, to a great extent, a secondary employment. Were such seminaries established among us, and the compensation of instructors increased, teaching in common schools would become a distinct profession; and many young men of respectable talents and acquirements, would look to it as an occupation for life. All this must be admitted, but we fear there are great obstacles in the way of a speedy change in the old system.

Mr. Dwight observes, that there is a great difference between catholic and protestant countries in Europe, in the means of education; and that this difference is no where more visible than in Germany. In the protestant states of the north, most of the peasantry can read and write; while in Austria and Bavaria, the proportion of those who have this elementary education, is very small. Travel through Saxony, he says, and you will not discover a child of ten years old, who has not acquired the rudiments of learning; but cross the Bohemian boundary, and you will soon perceive, that the peasantry are comparatively ignorant. In France, after minute inquiries, he learned, that of the adults among the catholic peasantry, a large proportion could neither read nor write; while among the protestants, almost every child was instructed.

This difference in instruction proceeds from the different principles of catholics and protestants. The reformers saw that ignorance was the foundation of most of the errors and superstitions which they opposed; that the only mode of securing to the people their proper character, was by providing adequate means of knowledge; and that without knowledge, the victory which they had gained would soon be lost.

We next find Mr. Dwight in Wittemberg, which lies about a quarter of a mile north east of the Elbe, and is one of the weakest fortresses of Prussia. To the protestant, Wittemberg will long remain a hallowed spot, as it was once the scene of the labors, and now contains the ashes of two of the greatest reformers, Luther and Melancthon. It was in the convent of Wittemberg that Luther studied, that he thundered against

the iniquities and oppression of the catholic hierarchy, and roused the animosity of the pope, of kings and emperors. The convent in which Luther resided is still remaining ; and the traveller is showed the room which he occupied, the chair in which he was accustomed to sit, and the table on which he wrote. In his study is a portrait of the reformer, as well as of Frederic the Wise and of his brother John the Stedfast, the two Saxon electors who protected him against imperial and papal power. In the *Stadt Kirche*, where Luther was accustomed to preach to the inhabitants of Wittemberg, the brass baptismal font, from which he baptised the children of the parish, is still standing. Mr. Dwight mentions several old paintings in this church, one of which represents the harvest of the world, in which Luther is the prominent figure, and is placed "in a much more conspicuous situation than the angels who are laboring with him." The university of Wittemberg, founded by Frederic the Wise, and formerly so much distinguished by the talents and force of Luther and Melancthon, was united in the year 1815 to the university of Halle, and its funds transferred to that institution. There is now at Wittemberg a Theological Seminary only, where it is the object of the government to qualify young clergymen for the practical part of their profession, as well as to give them an opportunity to pursue their studies still farther than is usually done at the universities. "They are here taught every thing relating to the ceremonial duties of the clergy, and perform them until they are perfectly acquainted with all those devolving upon a pastor." Here Mr. D. became acquainted with professor Haubner, "who is reputed to be one of the most eloquent preachers of this country," and with professor Schleusner, "the celebrated author of the Lexicon of the New Testament." The latter was then sixty-seven years of age, is represented as ardent in his feelings, expressing himself with all the animation of youth, exhibiting enlarged views, and as a great admirer of the institutions of the United States.

From Wittemberg, Mr. Dwight repaired to Halle, which is the seat of a university "at present more distinguished for talent and the number of its students and instructors, than any other in Prussia, that of Berlin excepted." Halle is represented as the "strong hold of rationalism,"—and from the attacks of the professors of this institution, revelation has suffered more than from those of any other. It is considered in Germany the first theological school of Europe, having between seven hundred and fifty and eight hundred students belonging to that department. This is the only university in Germany, where theology appears more prominent, than the

other branches of education. Knappe, who died a few weeks before Mr. Dwight arrived at Halle, was reputed orthodox "as the word is now understood." Professor Tholuck of Berlin succeeded him, and he is expected to defend the cause he has espoused, with even more talent than his predecessor.

We will now proceed to give a few notices of the present state of religion in Germany, which we have collected from the volume under review. In Prussia there are five sects; the Jews, the Mennonites, the Catholics, the Lutherans and the members of the Reformed church. In the year 1822, the number of Jews was nearly 150,000. They reside mostly in Prussian Poland, though they are found in small numbers in all the large towns. Their creed is almost exclusively rabbinical. The Mennonites, or the followers of Simon Meno, who in the sixteenth century assembled the Anabaptists into congregations, and introduced a severe discipline into his churches, were in the same year about fifteen thousand. The number of Catholics at the same time was 4,422,873, and of the Protestants exclusive of the Mennonites, 7,100,000. The Catholics reside principally in the Rhine provinces, in Silesia, and in Prussian Poland; and are considered more enlightened than their brethren of southern Germany. The Reformed church consisting of those who acknowledge the Heidelberg catechism and the decrees of the synod of Dort, as the symbols of their faith, numbers among its adherents less than three hundred thousand; so that a very large proportion of the protestant church is Lutheran. The king of Prussia has made an effort to unite the Lutheran and Reformed churches, of his kingdom, and has given to the new body the name of the *Evangelical church*. The principal obstacle to the union is found in the doctrine of consubstantiation as held by the Lutherans.

According to Mr. Dwight, the theological students at the universities usually select their profession, from love for the tranquillity of a clergyman's life; or from its presenting more flattering prospects than any other. It is not thought, it seems, necessary for them, before they enter the desk, to be scrupulously moral. They may occasionally fight a duel; and an instance or two of intoxication, would not be a sufficient ground in the eyes of the consistory to exclude them from the ministry. To obtain a license to preach, they must produce a certificate that they have attended the necessary lectures at a university for three years. The theological candidate is examined by the consistory in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, grammatically and exegetically, in church history, dogmatical theology, etc. He must preach before the consistory on a

text given him by that body. He is required likewise, at this time, to read a dogmatical and exegetical treatise ; and if he is found "intellectually qualified," he receives a license to preach. Formerly it was necessary for him to state his belief in the inspiration of the old and new testaments, but this affirmation is not now required. "The consistory could not with justice require a belief in revelation, for not one in five of the members of those bodies in Germany believes in the inspiration of the old testament, and not a small number reject that of the new." If a student is not "intellectually qualified" he is required to study longer, or is advised to abandon all thoughts of preaching. Mr. Dwight thinks, that there is still a law in existence, requiring the consistory to see, that the student embraces his profession from the dictates of conscience, and that he has proper religious impressions of its duties. But "as that body interpret for themselves, the want of belief in revelation is not considered as incompatible with the law."

After a candidate has been licensed for a year, if he has been invited to take the charge of any particular parish, he presents himself before the consistory, to be examined *pro ministerio*. Besides exhibiting two sermons, one of which he pronounces before some of the members of that body, he is examined in the German language, in Greek and Hebrew exegesis, in Latin, to ascertain whether he can speak and write it correctly, in the history of dogmatical theology, in ecclesiastical history, philosophy, theological literature, the mode of catechising children, in the composition and delivery of a sermon, etc. This examination is much more severe than the first. If his knowledge is such as to satisfy the examiners, he may be immediately ordained. A third examination sometimes takes place, which is confined to subjects exclusively theological.

As to the introduction of a clergyman in Prussia into a parish, about one third of the parishes in the kingdom are in the gift of the king ; the remaining two thirds are at the disposal of the corporations of cities, of the nobility, of the consistories, and, in a very few instances, congregations have the right of choosing their own ministers. The evils resulting from this system of patronage are very great ; as few of the parishes have a clergyman to whom they are much attached. Clergymen, also, who hold their places as in Prussia, till death, misconduct, or voluntary removal separates them from their people, will in most instances be much less faithful in discharging their duties, than when they hold them at the will of their parishioners. The evils resulting from this system,

Mr. Dwight supposes much smaller in Prussia, than they are in England; for the obvious reason that the salaries of the Prussian clergy are less, and non-residence is unknown.

The government of the church is vested in a minister of ecclesiastical affairs, in consistories, and superintendants. A consistory is composed of clergymen and laymen, from seven to nine in number, with a president who is always appointed by the king. They hold their sessions several times a week in the capitals of the departments, and are maintained by the government. The internal concerns of the church are discussed by this body; and they examine theological candidates, as well as young men who wish to instruct in the higher schools. The superintendants are clergymen appointed by the consistories to discharge certain duties in a diocese. They examine all the schools, and hear all the clergymen preach within their jurisdiction. If the clergy or instructors are deficient in their duty, he informs a general superintendant, who informs the consistory. There are other arrangements in the ecclesiastical government, which it is unnecessary to particularize.

In almost all the Lutheran churches, a picture is placed over the altar, the subject of which is some one of the great events of our Savior's life, or of one of the apostles. A crucifix and two wax candles are also placed on the altar of every church. Every child must be confirmed. It is illegal, however, to confirm them before fourteen years of age. As a preparation for confirmation, they are taught by the clergyman two hours every week, in the doctrines of the church for a year before the rite is performed, except for six weeks previous to their confirmation, when they are instructed four hours a week. The Lord's supper is administered to all those, who, after they have been confirmed, express a wish to partake of it. The ordinance of baptism is administered at any time the parents may desire, during the first six weeks after the birth of the child. The parents are represented by sponsors. In the Lutheran church there are numerous festivals, the three greatest of which are Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide. There is little intercourse between the clergy and the great majority of their parishioners; the practice of making pastoral visits being unknown. "They perform the duties prescribed by law, but they are not the shepherds of their flocks."

The sermons of the Neologistic clergy treat principally of the duties of morality. "They are often written in a fine style and exhibit much compass of thought." The Orthodox rarely preach in a manner to alarm their hearers, "believing

that it is much the wiser course to allure men to truth and holiness by exhibitions of the mercy of God." Of metaphysical preaching Mr. Dwight heard none in Germany; it being there regarded "as injurious, and as not only doing the hearer no good, but as also tending to harden the speaker's heart." We have no space for comment.

In closing our remarks on the religious state of Germany, we shall advert to but one topic more. Injustice has been done to Mr. Dwight in consequence of a brief statement in his twenty-third letter, respecting the prevalent opinions in Germany on the subject of endless punishment. Universalists in this country have appealed with triumph to his work, as giving a support and sanction to their latitudinarian sentiments. But nothing could be farther from his intention. In addressing his familiar friends, who were perfectly acquainted with his religious principles, he obviously thought it unnecessary to mingle his own views of the subject, with the statement of facts contained in his letters. Peculiar circumstances, as he informs us, led to the publication of those letters, at a subsequent period, with very slight changes from their original state. Hence, as the event has proved, his statements are less guarded from misconstruction on this point, than might be desired.

But it will be said, that whatever Mr. Dwight's own opinions may be on these subjects, he clearly identifies the Orthodox of Germany with the sect of Universalists as it exists among us. The term Orthodox, as applied to the divines of that country, has a somewhat vague and indefinite meaning. Multitudes are included under that term, to whom it would be universally denied in this country. Sunk as the theology of Germany has been in the lowest depths of scepticism, those who resisted to a moderate extent the prevailing sentiments, and adhered even partially to the cardinal doctrines of the Reformation, have been denominated Orthodox. Yet, even if we take the term in this extended sense, there are few, we believe, who can properly be called Universalists. Universalism inculcates in *positive* terms, and as a well established fact, that all mankind will ultimately be saved. This fact Universalists assert is *revealed* in the scriptures, and made demonstrably *certain* by the moral character of God. Many of them too, maintain that there is no punishment whatever in the future world. Now these opinions, we believe, are very rarely to be found even among the most lax of those who are called Orthodox in Germany. The latter sentiment especially, if we are rightly informed, scarcely exists in that country. And as to the *scriptural* evidence to the eternity of future punishment,

the Neologists themselves have made but little effort to set it aside. Kuinoel, who exerts all his ingenuity to explain away some of the most obvious miracles recorded in the New Testament, expressly states that the passage Mark ix. 44, "where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched," has an undoubted reference to the sufferings of the wicked after death. By the "fire" and the "worm," he says, the Jews were accustomed to express the extremest tortures in a future state of punishment. Nor does he make the slightest attempt to set aside the declaration of Christ, that the fire shall not be quenched nor the worm die, i. e. that the sufferings described shall be literally endless. On the contrary, in commenting on Matthew xxv. 46, "these shall go away into everlasting punishment," he cites passages from Josephus and other writers to prove, that the Jews, in the time of Christ, understood and maintained that this punishment would *never end*. Thus he leads us to the inevitable conclusion, that as the persons addressed by Christ *could not* with their views of the subject, have put any other construction than that of *endless* punishment on his words, our Savior designedly led them into error, if the punishment he spoke of has any termination. Storr says, "The final punishment of the wicked will, indeed, not begin until the awful day of judgment; but their punishment in general begins immediately at their departure from this life, *and will never terminate through all eternity*." Theol. § 58. Rheinhard says, "As far as relates to the sacred scriptures, these expressly teach that future punishment will be *eternal*." Epit. § 196. Similar statements are made by the most distinguished Orthodox divines of Germany, down to Hahn who expresses the same sentiment in 1828.

What then are the views to which Mr. Dwight has alluded in so brief a manner, as to lead many to imagine that the Orthodox of Germany are in general Universalists? In answering this question, we may refer to the opinions of Doedelein, who is extremely loose on many points, and who on this subject has gone much farther than Storr or Rheinhard. Doedelein states expressly, that the scriptures give no evidence that the wicked will ever repent or reform in the future world (Inst. Theol. Christ. II. 188,) and that their punishment must literally endure forever without such repentance and reformation (do. 191.) But he maintains, on the other hand, that as they still retain all the powers of moral agents, their repentance is not impossible in the nature of the case; and that although there is no scriptural *evidence* of the fact, he would not exclude the hope that in some instances it may

take place. In such instances, if they exist, he thinks their punishment will be mitigated, until it shall finally cease. Even in that case, however, "*effectus tristes et noxii semper adhærent homini*," the sad and injurious effects will *always* adhere to the man." do. 198. Erroneous as these views of a *possible* purgatory are, they do not identify Doederlein with the Universalists; who make the *positive* affirmation that we are taught both by reason and scripture, that all men will ultimately be saved. This he totally denies, affirming that there is no positive evidence of the salvation of a single individual who dies impenitent. He merely maintains *negatively*, that there is no absolute certainty that some individuals may not repent in the future world. Into these views he seems to have been led, in common with many German divines, by assuming that the chief object of punishment is the reformation of the offender, not the vindication and support of the divine character and government.* Thus a philosophical dogma has been suffered to throw doubt and uncertainty over the plainest declarations of the word of God. In no country in Europe has this been the case so much as in Germany. Rich beyond every other people, in the materials of scriptural interpretation—the investigation of the text, the structure of the Greek and Oriental languages, the minutest shades of difference in forms of construction, the geography, antiquities, and peculiar modes of thinking in ancient times—the Germans, as biblical critics, have in most cases so mingled their philosophy with their philology, as to make themselves, in the emphatic language of another, "the gazing-stock of Christendom." Returning as many of them now are to an earlier and purer faith, it is not perhaps surprising that erroneous systems of philosophy, should still continue to exert a powerful influence over their minds. We account in this manner for the extraordinary declaration made by one of this class to Mr. Dwight, respecting the doctrine of endless punishment, "that this doctrine evidently appears in the New Testament, but that his heart could not receive it, unless he were to change his views of the character of God." It might have been well for him to ask, whether Jesus Christ who thus "evidently" revealed that doctrine, was not equally qualified with himself to form just "views of the divine character." To what extent there exists in Germany this backwardness to receive what is acknowledged to be the testimony of the New Testament on this subject, we cannot say. Among those with whom Mr. Dwight con-

* See this subject examined in our present number, page 608.

versed, it seems to have been prevalent. But we are able to state, that another American gentleman, who resided at Göttingen in the year 1827, was present at a society of clergymen and students in that university, when the question was proposed in form to each individual, "is the punishment of the wicked endless," and that all but one unequivocally replied in the affirmative. That one expressed some slight doubts of the kind alluded to above.

Mr. Dwight went from Halle to Leipsic. This city is much celebrated for its fairs; but it is not more distinguished for its commercial, than for its literary reputation. Its university was founded in 1409, and until the rise of Göttingen, was without a rival in the north of Germany. "Its influence on the world," says Mr. Dwight, "has probably been greater than that of any other institution on the continent, with the exception of the university of Paris." In classical literature it has always been pre-eminent. Dresden, where we next find Mr. Dwight, is described as the favorite summer residence with all the Germans, who are attracted by the charms of polished society. This city is the residence of many of the German literati. "Here are more distinguished poets than in any other city, as well as scores of rhymers." The gallery presents a splendid collection of paintings; and its library is one of the most valuable in Germany. At the accession of Frederic Augustus in the year 1763, this library contained but seventy thousand volumes. The monarch soon added to the library, by purchase, more than a hundred thousand volumes, and has since augmented it by "liberal appropriations," so that the whole number of volumes is now about two hundred and forty thousand. Mr. Dwight next visited Weimar, where the grand duke has given a constitution to his subjects, and a parliament holds its regular sessions. "The inhabitants appear to care very little about their constitution, as the administration of the grand duke has been so equitable, that they have never been desirous of an extension of their freedom."

We should be pleased to notice more particularly the progress of Mr. Dwight through the large cities of Germany, but our limits forbid. We can assure those who shall take up this volume, that they will find much to amuse and instruct them on the government, manners, arts, and social condition of that country; and numerous topics to excite deep reflection and anxious foreboding, not only as respects Germany, but all Europe. We have confined ourselves chiefly to the parts of these travels, which relate to the two important subjects of education and religion, as coming more directly within the scope of our work; and we have not found these topics, as

exhibited by Mr. D., noticed in the literary journals of the day with that particularity, which they appeared to us to deserve. We have supposed that these travels contained some mistakes which ought to be corrected, and some opinions, which ought not to stand before the public without examination. We doubt whether Europe is the best place in which to study the government, manners, state of improvement, and general condition of the people of the United States. If ever there was a nation to be judged of independently of all others, we are that nation. However this may be, we have remarked on Mr. Dwight's book without any disposition to find fault,—with entire regard for the author, and with the utmost willingness to be set right, if we have ourselves fallen into error.

VI.—REVIEW OF DANA'S POEM.

A Poem delivered before the Porter Rhetorical Society, in the Theological Seminary, Andover, September 22, 1829. By RICHARD H. DANA.
Boston, Perkins and Marvin.

THERE is a species of poetry which derives all its interest from a peculiar felicity of execution. The scenes which it describes and the feeling which it portrays, are familiar to every mind; and the *poetry* consists in the superior degree of vividness and strength, with which those scenes and feelings are presented to our view. The productions of Goldsmith may be taken as a representative of this class. His Traveller and Deserted village are little else than a series of exquisite *pictures*, on which we dwell with the same kind of pleasure which is awakened by the rich landscapes of Claude at sun-set, or the highly finished productions of the Flemish school of painting. Poetry of this kind, however, demands no creative power of genius, no depth of imagination, no uncommon energy of emotion or thought. It may be highly popular for a time, and may awaken a lively interest in common minds; but on those of a superior order, it has no strong or lasting hold.

There is another kind of poetry which is simply the expression of intense feeling, or of deep and long cherished sentiment. It is not to produce a poem, but to relieve his mind from the pressure of struggling emotions, that a writer of this class embodies his glowing thoughts in language. In his view, imagery, versification and rythmus—the liveliest pictures of external objects, and the most graphic delineations of life and manners, are of no other value, than as they give a

more complete and satisfactory expression to the workings of the soul within. Mr. Dana is a poet of this class. With a mind of exquisite sensibility and deep moral feeling, his sole object is to awaken in the minds of others, those strong conceptions of moral and religious truth, which he has long been revolving in his own. In doing this he is always bold and picturesque; but often abrupt, and for that reason sometimes obscure. Rarely have we seen a more perfect contrast to the ordinary style among us, of close and studied imitation. His thoughts are instinct with life and originality; his versification is free and varied; his imagery is in most cases uncommonly distinct and vivid; and his subject rises in some places into genuine and impressive sublimity.

Mr. Dana has entitled his poem, "Thoughts on the Soul." His leading object is to illustrate the position, that external objects derive their influence upon us from the character of the mind within. They are what we make them to be, as sources of enjoyment or suffering—as instruments of good or evil. In the language of Milton,

"The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven."

Mr. Dana's poem opens in the following manner:

It is the Soul's prerogative, its fate,
To change all outward things to its own state:
If right itself, then, all without is well;
If wrong, it makes of all around a hell.
So multiplies the Soul its joys or pain,
Gives out itself, itself takes back again.
Transformed by thee, the world hath but one face.—
Look there, my soul! there thine own features trace!
And all through time, and down eternity,
Where'er thou goest, that face shall look on thee.

He next passes to a consideration of the various outward circumstances of life—sickness and health—poverty and affluence—domestic comfort and deprivation, as affected by the state of our feelings. In illustrating the variety of these circumstances, and the impossibility of deciding from them as to our real condition, Mr. Dana has the following striking passage:

Ocean and land, the living clouds that run
Above, or stand before the setting sun,
Taking and giving glory in his light,
Live in a change too subtle for thy sight.
The lot of human kind's more varied still
By ceaseless acts of sense, and mind, and will.
Yet couldst thou count up all material things,
All outward difference each condition brings,

Perhaps thou'd'st say, "Good Sir, lo, here, the whole!"
 —The whole?—One thing thou hast forgot—THE SOUL!

In the following beautiful comparison, Mr. Dana shows himself possessed of uncommon powers of picturesque description. We rarely find in any poet, more vivid painting of external objects. The flight of the bird seems almost passing before our eyes.

Yes, man reduplicates himself. You see,
 In yonder lake, reflected rock and tree.
 Each leaf at rest, or quivering in the air,
 Now rests, now stirs as if a breeze were there
 Sweeping the crystal depths. How perfect all!
 And see those slender top boughs rise and fall;
 The double strips of silvery sand unite
 Above, below, each grain distinct and bright.
 —Thou bird, that seek'st thy food upon that bough,
 Peck not alone; that bird below, as thou,
 Is busy after food, and happy, too.
 —They're gone! *Both* pleased, away together flew.

The world, O man, is like that flood to thee:
 Turn where thou wilt, thyself in all things see
 Reflected back.

From this illustration of his position, the poet next turns back upon himself, with the solemn reflection which arises from this view of the subject.

Soul! fearful is thy power, which thus transforms
 All things into its likeness; heaves in storms
 The strong, proud sea, or lays it down to rest,
 Like the hushed infant on its mother's breast—
 Which gives each outward circumstance its hue,
 And shapes all others' acts and thoughts anew,
 That so, they joy, or love, or hate, impart,
 As joy, love, hate, holds rule within the heart.

Then, dread thy very power; for, works it wrong,
 It gives to all without a power as strong
 As is its own—a power it can't recall:—
 Such as thy strength, e'en so will be thy thrall.
 The fiercer are thy struggles, wrath, and throes,
 Thou slave of sin, the mystic chain so grows
 Closer and heavier on thee. Thus, thy strength
 Makes thee the weaker, verier slave, at length,
 Working, at thine own forge, the chain to bind,
 And wear, and fret thy restless, fevered mind.

The following picture of the hopeless efforts of the suicide, to escape from the torture of his own evil passions, has uncommon power.

Blinded by passion, man gives up his breath,
 Uncalled by God. We look, and name it death.

Mad wretch ! the Soul hath no last sleep ; the strife
To end itself, but wakes intenser life
In the self-torturing spirit. Fool, give o'er !
Hast thou once been, yet think'st to be no more ?
What ! life destroy itself ? O, idlest dream
Shaped in that emptiest thing—a doubter's scheme.
Think'st in an Universal Soul will merge
Thy soul, as rain-drops mingle with the surge ?
Or, no less sceptic, sin will have an end,
And thy purged spirit with the holy blend
In joys as holy ? Why a sinner now ?
As falls the tree, so lies it. So shalt thou.
God's Book, thou doubter, holds the plain record ;
Dar'st talk of hopes and doubts against that Word ?
Dar'st palter with it in a quibbling sense ?
That Book shalt judge thee when thou passest hence.
Then, with thy spirit from the body freed,
Thou'lt know, thou'lt see, thou'lt feel what's life, indeed.

Bursting to life, thy dominant desire
Will upward flame, like a fierce forest fire ;
Then, like a sea of fire, heave, roar, and dash—
Roll up its lowest depths in waves, and flash
A wild disaster round, like its own wo—
Each wave cry, "Wo forever !" in its flow,
And, then, pass on ;—from far adown its path
Send back commingling sounds of wo and wrath—
Th' indomitable *Will* then know no sway :—
God calls—Man, hear Him ; quit that fearful way !

Mr. Dana now directs us to the only true source of consolation, for a soul polluted with sin.

Blest are the pure in heart. Would'st thou be blest ?
He'll cleanse thy spotted soul. Would'st thou find rest ?
Around thy toils and cares he'll breathe a calm,
And to thy wounded spirit lay a balm,
From fear draw love ; and teach thee where to seek
Lost strength and grandeur—with the bowed and meek.

Come lowly ; He will help thee. Lay aside
That subtle, first of evils—human pride.
Know God, and, so, thyself ; and be afraid
To call aught poor or low that He has made.
Fear nought but sin ; love all but sin ; and learn
How that in all things else thou may'st discern
His forming, His creating power—how bind
Earth, self and brother to th' Eternal Mind.

To thee the falling leaf but fades to bear
Its hues and odors to some fresher air ;
Some passing sound floats by to yonder sphere,
That softly answers to thy listening ear.
In one eternal round they go and come ;
And where they travel, there hast thou a home

For thy far-reaching thoughts.—O, Power Divine,
 Has this poor worm a spirit so like Thine?
 Unwrap its folds, and clear its wings to go!
 Would I could quit earth, sin, and care, and wo!
 Nay, rather let me use the world aright:
 Thus make me ready for my upward flight.

The following apostrophe, in view of the endless progress of the renewed soul in holiness and joy, has great force—

Infinite Father! shall thy creature dare
 Look forth, and say, "Eternity I share
 With Him who made me?" May he forward send
 His thoughts, and say, "Like God, I know no end?"
 Stretch onward, age on age, till mind grows dim,
 Yet, conscious, cry, "There still am I with Him?"
 —Worm of the dust!—thought almost blasphemy!--
 Dread glory!—I, like God, shall ever *be*!

The poem concludes in the following strain of genuine sublimity.

Creature all grandeur, son of truth and light,
 Up from the dust! the last, great day is bright—
 Bright on the Holy Mountain, round the Throne,
 Bright where in borrowed light the far stars shone.
 Look down! the depths are bright! And hear them cry,
 "Light! light!"—Look up! 'tis rushing down from high!
 Regions on regions—far away they shine:
 'Tis light ineffable, 'tis light divine!
 "Immortal light, and life forevermore!"
 Off through the deeps is heard from shore to shore
 Of rolling worlds!—Man, wake thee from the sod—
 Wake thee from death—awake!—and live with God!

We have given these extracts rather as a specimen of Mr. Dana's poem, than as a full exhibition of its varied beauty and excellence. There are many other passages of equal power, which our limits will not permit us to quote. These extracts however, we hope will induce many of our readers to peruse the whole of a production, which bears the impress of talents which ought to place the author among the first poets of this country.

VII.—REVIEW OF WILSON'S EDITION OF WILBERFORCE'S PRACTICAL VIEW.

A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Professed Christians, in the higher and middle classes in this country, contrasted with Real Christianity. By William Wilberforce, Esq. With an Introductory Essay. By Rev. DANIEL WILSON, A. M. Vicar of Islington. Boston, 1829. Crocker and Brewster. pp. 328, 12mo.

It is now more than thirty years since the first publication of this admirable work. Evangelical religion in the church of England, was then at a low ebb. Individuals there were, indeed, of that communion, remote from each other and frowned upon by the world, who, like the seven thousand of Israel in the days of Ahab, were mourning over the desolations of an ancient and decayed church. But her prelates, we believe, without a single exception, and the great body of her ten thousand inferior clergy, were sunk together in spiritual coldness, and decent conformity to the world. Those among the higher and middle classes, who retained any show of respect for the institutions of religion, imitated, to a great extent, the example of their religious teachers, on a still broader scale. The lower classes, as a body, were plunged in ignorance and brutal unconcern as to their spiritual interests; except where the followers of Whitfield and Wesley had produced some partial reformation by their self-denying labors. Against these humble, and perhaps, in some instances, ill-directed exertions, the animosity of the established clergy was wrought up to the highest pitch. Cold and heartless while millions around them were perishing in sin, their zeal broke forth into open violence against those, who ventured to discharge the duties which they had themselves neglected. Nor were they satisfied with ridicule, contempt, and open denunciation. The passions of the vulgar and profane were sometimes artfully inflamed into tumult and outrage; and sometimes the arm of power was called in to crush the weak or unwary. The general odium created by the religious movements among the lower classes, was studiously transferred to all of a higher rank, who maintained the doctrines of grace. They were publicly treated with contempt or pity, as being identified by their principles with men of coarse and vulgar minds. Saints, Methodists, Canters, etc. were the terms by which they were familiarly described; and some of the purest and most enlightened christians of the British empire, were considered by the great body of the English church, both clergy and laity, as voluntary victims of a degrading and hopeless fanaticism.

It was at such a period, that Mr. Wilberforce came before the public, as the advocate of evangelical religion. A layman, and of course not called upon by his profession thus openly to vindicate his principles,—a man in public life, and therefore in imminent danger of sacrificing by this step all his hopes of political advancement,—how few are there who would not have shrunk from the trials on which he entered, in making himself the rallying point of a despised and scattered party, in the midst of a jealous and worldly minded church! But he “counted all things but loss” for the sake of Christ. While he endeavored, therefore, to strip evangelical religion of all degrading associations by the selectness of his thoughts, the elegance of his taste, and the richness and eloquence of his language, he did not suffer himself to extenuate its most humbling doctrines, or self-denying duties. “Inadequate conceptions of the corruption of human nature”—“inadequate conceptions concerning our Savior and the Holy Spirit”—“inadequate conceptions of practical christianity,” are the three great topics which he discussed with the utmost plainness, and with pointed appeals to the consciences and hearts of his readers. The immediate effect of his treatise is thus described by Mr. Wilson.

An electric shock could not be felt more vividly and instantaneously. Every one talked of it, every one was attracted by its eloquence, every one admitted the benevolence, talents, and sincerity of the writer. It was acknowledged, that whether good or bad on a few particular topics, such an important work had not appeared for a century. The great elevation of its views and principles, stamped upon it a noble singularity, which did not fail to strike the experienced observer. p. 13.

The effect of this treatise was still farther heightened by the fact, that it came from an early and intimate friend of the Prime Minister; who was generally acknowledged to be the ablest and most popular statesman which Great Britain had produced, since the days of his illustrious father the Earl of Chatham. With such recommendations, the manly and conciliatory spirit, the guarded reasonings, the warm benevolence and fervent piety of Mr. Wilberforce, had the happiest influence in obviating the general prejudice against evangelical principles, in the English church. It was no longer possible to deny, that these principles are perfectly consistent with the soundest exercise of the understanding, and with the most refined sensibility of taste and feeling. At this period also Mr. Wilberforce was leader in that noblest struggle of British humanity, the effort for the abolition of the slave trade; and the honors which afterwards gathered round him in the

hour of triumph, were reflected back on the religious sentiments which he had thus publicly espoused. The establishment of the *Christian Observer* in 1801 by his influence, in conjunction with that of Mr. Macauley, Mrs. Hannah More and others of congenial sentiments, was another important means of concentrating the scattered force of the evangelical party, and giving respectability to its character in the eyes of the public. The temperate and manly tone of discussion which characterized that work, its entire abstinence from every thing bitter, sarcastic, or unkind in feeling, its enlarged views of national policy, its catholic spirit towards those of other denominations, the chastened fervor of its piety, the warmth of its benevolence, and the purity and elegance of its language, had the happiest effect in recommending the principles of Mr. Wilberforce; and made it a model for similar publications, which it is much easier to admire, than to imitate. In the triumphant progress of the Bible and Church Missionary Societies, which has so greatly swelled the ranks of the evangelical party in the Established Church, the influence and exertions of Mr. Wilberforce have been called into the most active exercise. He has seen the respectability and strength of that party continually on the increase down to the present hour; and he may now look round in his declining years, on nearly three thousand clergymen in the English church, who are the open and devoted advocates of evangelical truth.

The "Practical View" of Mr. Wilberforce which led the way, under the divine blessing, to this propitious revolution, has passed through nearly thirty editions in England and this country; and has been translated into the principal languages of the continent. It is here presented to the public with an introduction by the Rev. Daniel Wilson; in which its influence on the promotion of evangelical piety, is traced at large. May that influence, go on to be felt for ages—in the extension of that deeply devotional, humble, affectionate, and spiritual religion, so strongly inculcated in the writings of Mr. Wilberforce, and so beautifully exemplified in his life!

But it is lamentable to observe how large a proportion of professed, and perhaps real, christians, content themselves with low aims and low attainments in this respect. They are satisfied with an observance of the ordinances, a belief in the doctrines, and an outward conformity to the duties of the gospel, while they fall short of its glorious privileges. They know but little of those lively hopes and anticipations, those holy joys and sorrows, that sensible intercourse and fellowship with God and Christ, that enrapturing communion with

the Holy Spirit, that vivid and permanent earnest and assurance of heaven, which the gospel warrants and encourages in every believer.

The religion recommended in the "Practical View" of Mr. Wilberforce, is of a higher order. It is satisfied with nothing merely external, however blameless and fair. The offering up of prayer and praise, meditation on the scriptures, attendance upon ordinances, liberality towards the poor, the utmost exactness and irreproachableness of life—these do not meet its demands, unless there is correspondent sensibility and life in the heart. There must be a feeling of the divine presence—a relishing of the divine excellence—a heart-assured persuasion of the divine favor and complacency. God must be enjoyed; or there will be disquietude of soul, as in the patriarch—"O that I knew where I might find him," and in the Psalmist, "as the hart panteth after the water-brooks so panteth my soul after thee O God." If the light of God's countenance ceases at any time to shine upon the soul, the darkness which then covers it, no outward prosperity can dispel; its sorrows nothing can alleviate. No loveliness, no excellence remains, when the heart cannot taste the excellency of the knowledge of Christ. No satisfaction is taken in the intercourse of the dearest friends, when returns of grace from the Holy Comforter are suspended. The visible world is a waste wilderness, when the world unseen is clouded or remote. There is no peace, no pleasure in life, when there is no sensible relish and delight in God and divine things.

The difference between this last kind of religion and the one alluded to above, is very apparent in examples of each. Who does not see a remarkable difference, in piety, between such men as Leighton, Baxter, Edwards, Brainard, Wilberforce, and Martyn; and the mass of those who bear, and are not supposed to dishonor, the christian name? The distinguished and excellent author of the "Book of Nature,"* said on his death bed, "I have taken what unfortunately the generality of christians too much take—I have taken the middle walk of christianity. I have endeavored to live up to its duties and doctrines, but I have lived below its privileges." The men first mentioned were not content to pursue what is here called the middle walk of christianity. Their religion was *strictly and eminently* EXPERIMENTAL AND SPIRITUAL.

It is chiefly for the sake of urging upon our readers, the habitual cultivation of such a spirit, that we have called their

* Dr. John Mason Good.

attention to the beautiful exhibition of it contained in the life and writings of Mr. Wilberforce. Such is the depravity of our nature, that even the best of men need continual incitements to spirituality of mind. And whenever this shall become the prevailing temper of the church universal—when ever the meek, affectionate, and devotional spirit of primitive times shall be carried by professed christians into their daily intercourse with the world, to how great an extent will the reproach of the cross be taken away, and how confidently may we hope for the speedy triumph of our religion throughout the world!

In pursuing this subject, we would remark in the first place, that spiritual religion is far more *rational* than any other. If the things of religion are not merely imaginary, they ought in fitness and reason to command the whole heart, and rule the whole inner and outer man. If they are real, they are comparatively the only realities: All else is shadow and illusion. If the God of the scriptures, and the objects revealed to us in eternity do indeed exist, well may the prophet pronounce the world and its affairs to be less than nothing in the comparison. Such objects, then, so transcendantly important in themselves, ought to have a correspondent influence on our character and conduct. And what is such an influence? If that Being who is the infinite fountain of all being, who made me, and sustains me every moment; who in all the glory of His infinite perfections, “compasses my path and my lying down,” and is ever with me: the Being on whom my happiness wholly depends, and from whom my last sentence is to proceed—if He has that influence on me which His character and relations to me ought to exert, shall I not always be in His fear; shall I not always dwell in love to Him; and rejoice when He smiles upon me, and be troubled when He suspends the communications of His favor? Toward such a Being, so related to me as God is, do I not express a *reasonable* affection when I exclaim, “whom have I in heaven but Thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire beside Thee.” If I have any love at all for such a personage, and one so related to me, as Christ, ought I not to be constrained by that love, as St. Paul was, to live and die to this infinite benefactor—making it my whole duty and happiness to serve and enjoy Him? And what would be the result upon my heart and life, of a reasonable operation of the gospel upon them? What manner of person should I be in all holy conversation and godliness, if my example were a just transcript of the great truths of the gospel? That religion has been thought by some to be the most enlightened and reasonable, which has least to do with the affections of

the heart; but never was there a more manifest mistake. Reasonableness in religion, is absorption of mind and heart—the whole man ruled and overborne by the transcendent importance and glory of the objects of religion. For a man to pretend to be religious, and yet be cold and backward in the concerns of religion, and contentedly uncertain whether the infinite objects which it discloses may not be adverse to his eternal happiness—this is not reason, but the supreme of inconsistency and stupidity.

In the second place, it is spiritual religion alone, in which the human mind can find *sensible and satisfying enjoyment*. True religious enjoyment consists in a heartfelt complacency in God and divine things. There is indeed a feeling of quietude arising from the regular discharge of moral duties, and the routine of religious observances, which is not spiritual joy or peace; but the fruit of predominant self-righteousness and fatal delusion. It implies a great, abiding spiritual apathy and thoughtlessness; for if sensibility were awake, and thought intelligently exercised on the person's habitual course of life, a general worldliness of spirit would be seen to pollute and vitiate the services of religion; and then these services instead of yielding hope and comfort, would conspire with other things to work fear and doubt and misery, in the heart. There is, however, a hope of heaven different from that of the self-righteous, which springs from reflection on the general tenor of our conduct, regarded as an evidence of our spiritual character and state. This probably is the hope of the mass of professed christians. We speak not against it except by lamenting, that it should be made so generally the measure of spiritual enjoyment. What is the amount of positive happiness that a hope of this kind yields? It is not the *assurance* of hope—the living, refreshing, soul-elevating, hope of the first christians. It does not preclude doubt, but only despair. It leaves its subjects uncertain of their state. They are not *sure* of their calling and election. The Spirit does not so “witness with their spirits” but that they remain halting, hesitating, trembling, in respect to their final sentence; or if not trembling, wondering that they do not, amidst their want of satisfying evidence. Such is the general feeling of professed christians, in respect to their character and prospects for eternity—and such, or worse than this, must necessarily be the feeling of all who do not cultivate and exercise a spiritual religion. Nothing but a sensible, living, joyous intercourse with God and Christ and the things of the Spirit, can wholly displace anxiety or even torment from the heart. Without this there may be self-complacency, there may be delusion,

there may be negative hope mingled with fear ; but a soul-satisfying evidence of present acceptableness in the sight of God, and of ultimate admission into the joys of His kingdom, there cannot be, without the pleasurable consciousness of the reality and excellency of heavenly things. This consciousness is a witness that cannot be resisted : it is itself the earnest and foretaste of eternal life, and can no more co-exist with doubt, than the consciousness of an outward world can co-exist with hesitation as to the reality of such a world. Let a man *feel* habitual love to God—let him feel the peace of God in his heart—let him feel the Spirit of Christ living in him—let him feel pleased and delighted with the truths and promises of the gospel, and he will then enjoy evidences of his state, which will displace every doubt, and yield him “glory begun below.” If therefore our readers would have a religion full of comforts and pleasures, a religion which will yield them solid satisfaction, let them fix their minds, not on that customary religion, which rests in periodical services and outward strictness, but on a religion of intimate, sensible, living communion and intercourse with God.

In the third place, this is the only kind of religion which *perceptibly advances the soul in the life and likeness of God*. They who sensibly commune with God, and keep their hearts alive to the excellency of divine things, from day to day, cannot but become more and more assimilated to those glorious objects. These objects operating upon susceptible and affectionate minds, must make upon them their own impression and image ; and that image must at length become too resplendent in the spirit and life, to leave it doubtful whether there has been progress and growth in grace. Men of spiritual religion, therefore, must be advancing as time passes, towards the measure of the stature of a perfect christian. In their views, feelings, and conversation, they must be rising nearer and nearer to “the just made perfect.” The beauty of holiness must be gradually brightening upon them ; and their affinity and relationship to heaven, must be becoming increasingly manifest. It must be so, by the very laws of such intercourse as they maintain with heavenly objects : and that it is so, in fact, no one can be ignorant. These men, of whatever country or age, do advance in moral worth and loveliness, as they advance in years. Time invigorates them in all the principles, and beautifies them in all the graces, of holiness. Even while “their outward man perishes”—while the animal vivacity and vigor of their earlier years decay,—“they are renewed in the inward man, day by day.” Was it not thus with all the spiritually minded, whose names we have

mentioned, or of whom we have ever read or heard? But the same cannot be truly said of men of other kinds of religion. They are, in regard to religion and holiness, little better at one time than at another. Take them when you will, in the middle of life, or in old age, they are not, as far as man can see, much improved in spirit. Their hearts do not seem to be much more in heaven; their affections do not appear to be more spiritual; their devotedness to God and His interests does not seem increased. Call to mind instances of the customary sort of religion—think of those whose religion is of this kind—and consider whether these remarks are not exemplified in their conduct. Do they present themselves to our thoughts, as christians advancing in the life of God? Are they evidently holier men now than some years ago? Do we feel more confident of their final salvation at this moment, than we did when they first professed conversion? Is it more certain now—more certain to themselves or to any others—that they will be saved, than it was then? Alas, it is well if the probability of their final salvation is not diminished. Professed christians who have not a spiritual and affectionate religion, often degenerate, but seldom improve. It is not praying, or reading, or hearing that profits the soul, but *just feeling* towards the objects with which the soul converses, or should converse, in prayer, reading, and hearing. These exercises are nothing except as *sensibility* pervades and animates them. It is by sensibility that God and our own spirits come into union and fellowship. It is by sensibility, that our souls mingle with the invisible things of the sanctifying Spirit. Two lifeless masses are not more inoperative on each other, than the unseen world on the human character, if sensibility towards that world is wanting. We may speak, and read, and think, but we shall never be made better, if we do not *feel*.

Now when we remember what the scriptures teach concerning the essential progressiveness of true grace in the heart,—that it is as the little “leaven which leaveneth the whole lump;” and join with this the fact, that professed christians who are not spiritual in their feelings, do not visibly advance in the divine life, can we rest satisfied with a religion like theirs? Is it by any means certain that their religion will save the soul?

In the fourth place, spiritual religion is far more *useful* than any other. Usefulness depends on three things, power, readiness to use it, and using it in a proper manner; and no kind of religion includes these things in so eminent a degree, as the spiritual religion of which we now speak. There is more *power* in this than in any other sort of religion. Knowledge

is power in religious concerns as well as every other; and there is no religion so favorable as this, to the acquisition of divine knowledge. Men may be led to pursue such knowledge by curiosity, ambition, and other motives; but the attainments so made will be superficial, when compared with the illumination shed down from the Holy Spirit, into the mind and heart of the spiritually discerning and inquiring christian. How sure and substantial, how deep and endearing, is the knowledge of the spiritually-minded, in comparison with their's who know every thing in speculation only! And ordinarily, their knowledge is greater as well as of a better kind. They meditate more on the scriptures, they reflect more, they pray more; and the relish for divine things which inclines them to do so, makes them quick of spiritual understanding, and thus becomes the means of a more rapid growth in divine knowledge, than would otherwise be possible. And as the religion of which we treat, joins to greater knowledge, greater grace and holiness,—which likewise is the highest kind of power,—it must, in respect to its intrinsic strength and efficiency, be incomparably superior to every other.

But not only have the men of this religion more strength, they are also more *disposed to use their strength* than others. It is a false notion of spiritual-mindedness, that it inclines men to a secluded and inactively contemplative life. It had not this tendency in Christ and his apostles, or the prophets; the influence of whose untiring labors is felt over the world to this day. Spiritual-mindedness, is nothing but a living and efficient benevolence, duly awake and active. From the secret place of the Most High in which it dwells, it looks abroad upon the sensual world with a self-sacrificing, self-devoting compassion, like that of our blessed Savior; and is ever ready to go forth in his spirit and strength, to every work of faith and love. Customary religion, and even principles of natural goodness, have led men to practise some forms of benevolence; but it is spiritual-mindedness that has cared for the bodies and souls of men on the largest scale, and has wrought miracles of mercy and love, the record of which will endure longer than the sun and the moon.

But the religion here recommended is pre-eminent, as we have already said, not only in power and in aptitude to use that power, but in the *excellence of the manner* in which it uses it. It is both in labors more abundant, and in wisdom and propriety of action more perfect. It does its work aptly, skilfully, prudently, with a spirit congenial to its ends; a spirit of meekness and love, and dependence on God. In the highest instances and sorts of benevolent labor, men of little spiritu-

ality would not find themselves in their proper element. The unsuitableness of their spirit and manner would make their work irksome, and mischief might be the result. How much out of place do such men find themselves under remarkable effusions of the Holy Spirit; when the accessions to the happiness of the universe, are as the "clouds and as when doves fly to their windows." * It is spirituality alone that can make men as "polished shafts" to the consciences of their fellow-men, at such seasons. It is only this, indeed, which can ensure a right and successful way of fulfilling any of the offices of the holiest and noblest order of well-doing. These things demonstrate the superior usefulness of the spiritual kind of religion. Observation also confirms this conclusion. One spiritual christian in a church is often more useful than an hundred ordinary professors. How many hundred christians of the common kind, would be required to make, in point of usefulness, one Baxter, or Edwards, or Martyn! These it is true were men, of powerful minds, but it was their superior spirituality that made their power the means of exalting the ages in which they lived. There were other professed christians of minds as powerful and of learning as great as theirs, who did very little towards advancing the cause of holiness in the world. If our readers then would pass their days in the most useful manner—if they would give the church and their generation the greatest reason to bless God for their existence,—let their religion be of the spiritual kind.

This kind of religion, in the fifth place, will *best sustain us under evil*. He who is accustomed to converse affectionately and delightfully with God—to lay open his heart to the influence of His "excellent glory" and of eternal objects, will acquire a capacity of enduring evil, altogether peculiar to himself. His frame of spirit, and the blessedness of that intercourse, make him in a manner invulnerable to evil. The day of evil to the man of the world is insupportable; because, besides his unholy spirit, he has no counterbalancing good in prospect. Past prosperity cannot be recalled; the future is unknown, and may be worse than the present. The unspiritual, unexercised professor of religion, too, may not be prepared for that day. The hope which now supports him, may fail him then. He will then need other evidences of the divine favor, than those on which he is accustomed to rely—evidences which may not be afforded him then, as they are not sought for now. But the spiritual christian is not thus forlorn in heart when his time of trial comes. The feeling towards God expressed by the Psalmist, "whom have I in heaven but thee, and there

is none upon earth that I desire beside thee," having been habitual with him even in the days of prosperity, he will not be desponding and heart-smitten now; for God, his chosen portion remains the same, and his delight in God is the same also. And how small a loss can befall that person, how little can he be injured by any calamity in the whole creation, whose happiness was not in the creation, but in its infinite Author. Besides, if there is a man to whom the Father of compassion will show himself *especially* gracious in the hour of need, that man, doubtless, is the spiritually minded christian. Who is an heir of the promises, if he is not? Whom, if not him, does God love and delight in? There may be room for doubt whether other sorts of professed christians—all other sorts,—may not be deceivers or deceived; but who doubts *his* piety who lives a spiritual and heavenly life? Such persons, then, are assuredly the children of God, whom God will not forsake in times of trouble. The night of their affliction shall be as the brightest and best of their prosperous days. They shall glorify God in "passing through the fire;" their end shall be peace, and they shall depart, leaving mankind impressed with the certainty, that whoever may find their hope of ultimate happiness disappointed, these men were more fit for heaven than for earth, and "have passed through the gates into the city" of God.

These are some of the considerations which show what manner of persons we all should be, who call ourselves by the name of Christ. But there is one objection which we fear will weigh more with some persons than all these considerations, however solemn and conclusive. It is this, that the religion we recommend, is not a practicable one. It may do perhaps for a very few peculiarly favored and peculiarly situated persons like clergymen, but it will not answer for the generality of mankind—it is too refined, too elevated, too difficult a religion for the mass of the people. It is not, we suppose, the import of this objection, that this is a different religion from that which the scriptures teach. Of the scriptural certificate to this religion, let all mankind judge. If there is a religion on earth that corresponds to the very religion of the bible, it is unquestionably this. What but this was the religion of Abraham and Moses, of David and Daniel, of Paul and John? Other religions may not be scriptural, but no one can doubt whether this religion is either scriptural or true. The evidences of its genuineness are like the sun's meridian beams. The conscience of the world decides that it is genuine—the religion of the bible—the religion of God—the religion which God has revealed to man as the sure way to heaven. But

has God bound his creatures to an impracticable kind of religion? Or has he prescribed a religion for all the world, which cannot be practised by more than one man in a million? If then the objector means, that the religion which, beyond all others, has the best claim to be received as the religion of the scriptures, is strictly and in plain truth, an impracticable religion to the bulk of mankind, his objection is profane and reproachful to the divine goodness and wisdom, and can hardly find a welcome lodgment in any other than an unholy breast. No! The fact that this religion is practicable by one man, proves it to be practicable by any and every other man. If any one man has ever exemplified this religion, the matter is at rest: *man* may exemplify it: it is a religion for man, and a religion which *every* man is bound to exemplify. It should be considered by those who make this objection, that they are limiting, not merely the physical capability of man, but the resources of the Holy One Himself. The question as to practicability—the true question is, not whether I, in my own strength shall succeed in practising this religion, but whether the spirit and grace of God can enable me to practise it. We are not to do any thing in reliance on our own strength, which truly would fail us, even for the exercise of 'a good thought. On the contrary we are warned against self-confidence as the certain way to be ruined, and are directed to Him for strength in whom it hath pleased the Father that "all fulness should dwell;" and certain it is that destruction awaits us, if we do not go to Him, and put our exclusive trust in the provision made for us in Him. The question is this, is there not a sufficiency for us in all the fulness of the Godhead? Can we not do all things included in this religion "through Christ strengthening us?" Is there a man on earth whom Christ cannot strengthen to live the life of a spiritual christian? Let this be demonstrated—let the arm of the Almighty be shortened—and then may it be affirmed that the religion we contend for is not a practicable religion. The truth is, that the generality of professed christians never strive for, never aim at, this kind of religion. It is not in their hearts deliberately to purpose and intend that this religion shall be theirs. They content themselves with what is customary; and this for the most part, as to religious duties, is that which expediency or personal convenience may dictate. What labors, what pains-taking do they practise, to keep themselves in the love and fear of God all the day long? What care do they exercise not to grieve the Holy Spirit? What aspirations of soul have they for eminent holiness of heart? What forgetting, do we see in them of the

things which are behind ; or what "reaching forth unto those which are before?" What mortifications of the flesh, what fastings and watchings unto prayer, do they practise? Who then are they that pronounce spiritual christianity to be impracticable, but those who have never put it to the test of experiment? It must be confessed that if professed christians will not try and intend to live spiritually, they cannot live so. Paul could not have lived so without deliberate purpose and constant effort.

Still, some will think that although spiritual religion is the best and safest kind, yet as the more common sort may suffice, they will content themselves with that. But does not this savor more of a low and calculating selfishness, than of that spirit of regeneracy which instinctively pants after entire freedom from sin, and entire conformity to the image of God? Have those persons any true holiness, who desire no more than may answer to keep them out of hell? But is it certain that the common sort of religion *will* suffice? Who feels certain of it? Have the professors of that religion an assurance of their salvation? Their hearts answer, No! Has the world any assurance of their salvation? All men stand in doubt,—and it is indeed a doubtful matter. St. Paul thought he should be a cast away, if he did not keep his body under and bring it into subjection. Do these professors of religion practice such discipline on themselves, that their souls may not be lost? Who would stand in their souls' stead? In the infinite concerns of religion, no uncertainty, no suspense of mind, ought to be tolerated, if it can possibly be prevented; and prevented it may be, by giving due diligence to that end. And what is due diligence in this case? Not more than men generally employ to secure worldly things. But shall men—shall professors of religion use more diligence to secure to themselves things that perish in the using, than to lay hold on eternal life? Are such men christians? Ought they not to tremble at the question? While thus destitute of spirituality in religion, there is no man, who, for a thousand worlds, would take their place at death or judgment.

Such are a few of the considerations—faintly and imperfectly expressed, in comparison with the energy of our feelings—by which we would urge upon our readers a life of eminent holiness and spirituality of mind. While we think a sound and consistent theology of momentous importance to the interests of the church, we consider it as literally of no value, unless it leads to a correspondent depth of feeling, and devotion of the soul to God. A union of enlarged views and

spiritual affections, of deep investigation and child-like docility of temper, of resolute action and entire dependance on divine aid, constitutes the true excellence of the christian. Such were the Edwardses, the Tennents, the Davies, the Bel-lamys, and the Brainards of other times.

Those suns are set. Oh rise some other such,
Or all that we have left is idle talk
Of old achievements, and despair of new.

ART. VIII.—ON THE MEANS OF REGENERATION.

IN concluding our remarks on the means of regeneration, we shall,

I. Briefly consider the ground which has now been gone over, with a view to obviate any objections to the statements which we have made.

We have endeavored to show, in the first place, that no acts of the sinner, previous to regeneration in the scriptural and popular sense of that term, can properly be called a using of the means of regeneration. All such acts—"the thoughts of the wicked"—"the way of the wicked"—"the sacrifice of the wicked"—are spoken of in the scriptures, as an abomination to the Lord.

We stated, in the second place, that from the nature of the human mind, an object must be seen in order to be loved. In taking God for our portion, therefore, *two* mental acts, at least, are united in the same indivisible moment of time, viz. a contemplation of His character, and a loving or choosing Him, as our supreme good. But, in the ordinary language of the scriptures and of common life, no such minute analysis is brought into view. One term embraces both—the ultimate act of choice or love, and the preliminary state of mind which results in that ultimate act. Thus the command of God, "my son give me thy heart," necessarily supposes a complex act of thought and choice, in respect to the divine character. The terms "regeneration," "conversion," etc. which describe the state of the soul in which this command is obeyed, denote therefore a *complex* state of the intellect and the affections, at the indivisible moment of the change in question. Who would doubt, if informed that another had been "*regenerated*," whether the first exercise of love in the renewed heart, was dependent on a contemplation of divine truth?" "Sanctify them through thy *truth*," are the words of our Sa-

vior Himself. The term regeneration in such cases, is used in what we have called its *comprehensive* sense; and we have shown it to be a general principle of language, that words have sometimes a wider, and sometimes a more restricted signification, according to the circumstances of the case contemplated.

We stated, in the third place, that the term regeneration would never have been used except in its popular and *comprehensive* sense, if impenitent sinners had been as candid and honest in the concerns of their salvation, as in the ordinary affairs of life. For who that interprets language according to its ordinary signification, could be expected to doubt whether the command "make you a new heart," was designed to put sinners to the immediate performance of their duty? But a reluctance to the discharge of this duty, has filled their mouths with objections and excuses. Most of these have been derived from the doctrine of man's dependence for holiness, on divine grace. "Grant that I am *able*," says the sinner,—grant that I am *bound* to love God, without a moments' delay. It is a doctrine of your creed, that I shall never in *fact* do it, unless the Holy Spirit shall interpose to secure that result. Every motive to exertion is, therefore, taken away. If I am to be saved, I shall be saved; and if I am to perish, I shall perish, do what I will." Now, it must be acknowledged, that some persons have so preached the doctrine of dependence, as to furnish ground for this objection. If there is no *tendency* in any act of the human mind, towards the change in regeneration—no one thing, on the sinner's part which makes it more *probable* than another that God will renew the soul—the objection is well-founded, and every motive to exertion is annihilated at once. Divines however, have generally maintained, that there are *means* of regeneration to be used by sinners. And in thus distinguishing between regeneration and the means of its attainment, they have used the term regeneration in a *restricted*, theological sense, to denote that ultimate act of holy choice or love, in which the use of these means terminates as their appropriate end. They seem, however, from not noticing this difference between the *restricted* and the *comprehensive* sense of the term regeneration, to have fallen into an error. They have considered the *sinful* doings of the unregenerate as a *using* of these means. If they have not in direct terms justified such a using of the means of grace, they have at least imagined that it was *necessary*, to produce the result in question. Against this doctrine we contended at large, as contradictory to sound reason by making sin the means of holiness—as sanctioning a neg-

lect of present duty, and furnishing a resting place for rebellion against God.

The question therefore arises, in the fourth place, where do *we* place the using of the means of regeneration? We answer, under regeneration *itself*, in the *comprehensive* sense of that term—in those acts of contemplating divine truth, which we have spoken of as necessarily co-existing with the act of choice or love, denominated regeneration in the restricted, theological meaning of the word. Up to that moment, the selfish principle had predominated in the soul, and no acts performed under its influence could be a using of the means of grace. But at that moment, by the influence of the divine Spirit, the selfish principle ceases to predominate in the heart. At that moment, God and divine things stand before the soul, no longer pre-occupied by supreme selfishness and love of the world. At that moment, this view of God, and divine things becomes *the means of regeneration*. A mind thus detached from the world as its supreme good, instantly chooses God for its portion, under the impulse of that inherent desire for happiness, without which, no object could ever be regarded as *good*—as either desirable or lovely. There are sometimes periods during the progress in conviction of sin, at which the selfish principle appears for a moment to be nearly suspended in its operation—and when the sinner seems almost ready to yield up all for his salvation. At such times he may be verging towards the state described; but it is only when the selfish principle *finally ceases to predominate in the soul*, that in the proper sense of the phrase, he ever uses the means of regeneration. In that moment—which is properly esteemed an *indivisible* moment—and in that only, does the sinner, so use the truth of God, that it can, according to the laws of mental action, become the means of a right act of the will or affection of the heart.* All his previous perceptions of divine objects were so obscure and inadequate, his sensibilities were so far from the requisite excitement and direction, through the counter-

*We wish here to correct an error of the press, which occurred by interlineation, on page 210. The reader is requested to transpose the sentences beginning with "A similar suspension, etc.," and with "It is in such states alone, etc." We would also remark, that we did *in form* make a distinction between that *kind* of mental acts, (vide p. 222, etc.) which when counteracted by opposite mental tendencies does not, and when uncounteracted, does constitute using the means of regeneration. We did not, however, give as much prominence to this distinction, perhaps, as might have been desirable, to prevent misapprehension. Dele also the sentence on p. 234. "In our next number, etc."

acting influence of the selfish principle—this principle itself, in the form of earthly affection, was so far from relinquishing its final hold of its object, (though it may have ceased *actively* to pursue it) that without a farther change in these respects, the heart will never yield. This farther advance in respect to the suspension of the selfish principle—in respect to the vividness of the intellectual perception—and in respect to the degree of excitement in the susceptibilities of the mind, must take place in every instance of regeneration.

It will be seen, therefore, that according to the principles here advanced, *there is no neutrality in respect to moral character, in men.* Some persons, we believe, have supposed us to maintain, that, in using the means of regeneration, there is a *protracted* period, or succession of periods, in which man is neither a saint nor a sinner—neither regenerate nor unregenerate. Against such a conclusion we expressly guarded by saying, that we affirmed *no measurable duration* between the first and last act of the process of regeneration—no such *priority* of one act to another, as renders it improper or untrue to speak of the entire series of acts as *cotemporaneous*; and as constituting *ONE ACT*, the immediate performance of which is required of the sinner.

It is surely admitted by most men, that a change of affection, or of purpose, or an act of the will, may take place in an instant, or as it is often expressed, be instantaneous. Nor had we supposed that a doubt or difficulty could be started on the ground that, an act of the will necessarily implies the perception and comparison of the objects of choice. Neither President Edwards in laying down the fundamental principle, in his Essay on the Will, viz. that "*the will is as the greatest apparent good,*" nor the orthodox divines who have admitted the principle, ever supposed that it amounted to a denial of the doctrine of *instantaneous* regeneration. If our readers will take the trouble to consult the Essay alluded to, they will see, that what we have said respecting the mental process under consideration, amounts substantially to nothing more, than the fundamental principle of that celebrated treatise.*

It may be well to remark here, that a distinction is to be made between what often takes place in fact, and what is necessary in the nature of things. Thus it may be true in fact, from the influence of causes already specified, that the *influence* of the selfish principle in prompting *to its appropriate*

*Vide Works, vol. v. pp. 17, 22.

overt acts, suffers momentary suspensions; and then again, and even instantly, resumes its wonted dominion. Or, this suspended influence of the principle may be perpetuated through some measurable duration, the thoughts be directed to divine and eternal things, and the susceptibilities of the mind be engrossed in strong and deep emotion. Or, in more common language, there may be a state of pungent conviction more or less protracted. And yet all this may be a very diverse state of mind from that which properly constitutes using the means of regeneration, and which is connected with the final act in giving God the heart. Nor do we doubt, that there is often thought enough and feeling enough expended in states of prolonged conviction, were it concentrated in one decisive effort of the soul, to secure through the grace of God, the actual submission of the heart. Nor is there any necessity in the nature of things for this delay. There is no more a necessity that God's truth should not at once secure its appropriate effects on the mind, than that any other truth should not. Accordingly, as we have before shown, if the truth of God, when presented to the mind, does not secure its proper effect, there is *blame-worthiness* on the part of the sinner. He is a moral agent, and bound to the performance of the complex act, which constitutes the required duty. He sins therefore in not *instantly* performing this complex act. If we are asked, how he can sin, when according to the supposition the selfish principle is suspended in regard to its appropriate overt acts; we answer, that *such a suspension* of that principle as we have described, is neither the *annihilation* of the principle, nor the suspension of *all its influence* on the mind. It is no more the *annihilation* of the principle, than is its suspended influence in the production of overt acts of body and mind, during profound sleep. In both cases it prompts to no such acts. It is, however, truly and properly considered as a real, unchanged state of the mind; and as the basis on which we should predicate present character. As in the one case, the principle or purpose of the man will wake up to its wonted influence in overt action, and thus evince its continued existence during sleep; so in the other, under the removal of the present causes of the suspension supposed, the principle will resume its influence, and thus show that it was not dead, though in *one respect* asleep. There is,—and so the experience of every one must testify, as in cases of highly excited fear,—this power of the mind to suspend its governing principle of action in respect to its appropriate acts; which though for the time it gives place to the mere desire of self-preser-

vation, does not involve in a moral respect, the renunciation of the selfish principle itself, nor the sinfulness of its subject.

Nor does the suspension of this principle in the production of its appropriate overt acts, imply the entire suspension of all influence from the selfish principle, on the mind. As we have shown, its influence may be still evinced in *another* form; in enfeebling the perceptions and benumbing sensibility, and thus rendering divine things too remote and unreal to draw forth the affections of the heart. In point of fact then, though it is by no means necessary that it should be so, the process of conviction may be in most instances a prolonged process, and yet in its continuance the sinner be wholly inexcusable. It may be true, that this process always will be a prolonged process, compared with what it ought to be, while sinners are taught that it *must* be so. And yet it may be equally certain, that the true process which constitutes using the means of regeneration, together with the act of the will or heart, may occupy but an indivisible moment. We therefore say, and regard it as highly important to say, that sinners, in a state of prolonged conviction, (even in that degree of it, in which the selfish principle ceases to dictate its appropriate overt acts,) only go on in sin; and that they are properly considered as *not using* the means of regeneration, until, in some indivisible moment, there is a suspension of the *entire* influence of the selfish principle; connected with that perception and estimate of the mind, which result in the right act of the will—in other words, until the moment in which the complex act of duty is done.

But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the mental process described does require what, in the strictness of philosophical statement, may be styled a measurable duration. Even in that case, our views are embarrassed with no difficulties, which do not equally pertain to the scriptural representations of the subject. The scriptures expressly teach that consideration and thoughtfulness are necessary to the regeneration of the soul. If then a measurable period of time is implied in such consideration, they either exhort men to *sinful* consideration as a means of holiness, or they admit of an interval during the time of consideration, in which the man is neither a saint nor a sinner. The former will not be maintained. If, then, a momentary interval is implied in the statements of the scriptures, how are they to be vindicated from the charge of inconsistency in maintaining, that all men are either sinners or saints? We answer; their vindication is complete, according to those principles of usage in respect to language, which we have already stated and defended.

If the *complex act*, the mental process of turning to God does require in the nature of things a measurable portion of time, then that time according to every correct principle of legislation, is *allowed* by the lawgiver; and when speaking of the sinner in respect to *moral action*, or moral character, the lawgiver cannot with propriety, and therefore does not in fact, make any account of that *interval*. To suppose otherwise, would be to suppose that he required an act to be done *sooner* than it can be done in the nature of things. This will not be pretended. Suppose a parent or master to require an act of obedience, the performance of which in the nature of things, requires some short period of measurable duration. Does it accord with common usage, with propriety or good sense, to raise the question of obedience or disobedience, the question of neutrality or allegiance, during the performance of the thing required; i. e. while the act of obedience is in process? When the sinner according to the scriptural account of the process, is *considering* or thinking of his ways, while as yet the act of turning has not taken place, is it credible that the language of such a book as the bible, should recognize the intervening moment, for the sake of deciding on the moral character of the sinner during such an interval? Is it credible that in view of such a fact, the Son of God, when deciding the general principle for popular practical purposes, should hesitate to say, 'that he that is not for me is against me,' lest some quibbling critic bidding farewell to common sense, should charge him with falsehood, in view of the known interval which is *indispensable* to a change of character?

While therefore, we think, that these principles would vindicate the sacred writers, and ourselves also, even on the supposition of a measurable duration, we wish by no means to be understood to admit such duration, as requisite to the performance of duty. The sinner with the knowledge of God and of duty, is qualified as a moral agent, and therefore is bound to give his heart to God *instantly* in supreme affection; and to fail to do it, is to disregard of course, the most distinct and solemn annunciation of duty from the Eternal King. He stands before God a sinner under just condemnation, up to the indivisible moment, in which he so uses the means of regeneration, as to give his heart immediately to God.

But a second objection from a different quarter may be urged against the view which we have taken of this subject. "Thus to narrow down the using of the means of regeneration to the *identical* moment of regeneration itself," it may be said, "is in fact to deny that there is any such thing as a us-

ing of those means at all." We answer, that we have *expressly denied this* with respect to all those acts, which impenitent sinners commonly regard as a using of the means in question. The only *use* which a man is authorized to make of divine truth, is *instantly to obey it*. A moment's delay—the act of dwelling upon it in protracted contemplation, while the heart remains unsubdued—is not a using of truth for the purpose of obedience, but of prolonged rebellion.

But some persons in urging this fact upon sinners, have gone to the opposite extreme. They have shut out and denied any connection whatever, between divine truth and a change of spiritual affections. But the scriptures assure us, that we are "*begotten through the truth*." The truth, then, is the *means* of regeneration. But it cannot become such a means, without being *present* to the mind. With reference to the object in view, it has no existence except as it is perceived. He then, who so turns his mind to the contemplation of truth as to make a new moral choice, uses that truth for the purpose designed by God—uses it as the *means* of regeneration. Any thing short of this is not a using, but an abusing of the means in question. Now we have no strong partialities for the expression "*using the means of regeneration*," as thus applied. We would contend for things, rather than for words. Views, as we said before, have extensively prevailed concerning the nature of regeneration, and the manner in which this change is produced, which either on the one hand, connect it with sinful acts, or on the other, deny all connection with any prior acts whatever. The consequence has been, either that sinners have felt themselves authorized to commit sin as the necessary means of regeneration; or to wait in total inaction, for God to interpose and effect the change. To expose and correct these errors then, we deem it of vital importance to show, that there are acts which are not sinful—and yet which *may* be done, and which *must* be done, by the man, or he will never be regenerated.

While, therefore, we have attempted to justify the phraseology of "*using the means of regeneration*," we frankly say, that we do not think we should have attempted its vindication, had it not become in some degree sanctioned by extensive theological usage. What we deem important is, that the *mental process* which we have described should in the cases, and for the purposes specified, be clearly exhibited. At the same time, we are so fully convinced of the adaptation and utility of the *comprehensive* phraseology in respect to the great end of preaching the gospel, that we do not believe

there would have been the least occasion for any analysis of the mental process in regeneration, were it not for the errors to which we have adverted. These errors however prevail to such an extent and are of such dangerous practical tendency, that their exposure imperiously calls for the labors of all who are set for the defence of the gospel. So long as the impression remains, on the minds of sinful men, that they are as likely to be regenerated without direct effort in the performance of duty as with it, the propriety of such effort will be denied; and either those sinful doings or that stupidity in sin, which alike terminate in death, will be perpetuated.

The views which we have taken, are in no degree liable to a third objection which has sometimes been suggested. It has been supposed, that to maintain the *necessity* of any acts in order to regeneration, virtually implies the propriety of exhortation to the performance of such acts; which is obviously inconsistent with the divine requirement of immediate duty. We answer, that *the necessity* of those acts, which we have called using the means of regeneration, does not imply the propriety of requiring the separate performance of them as *a duty*, or as *moral action*. On the contrary, every such exhortation is in our view, directly fitted to the purpose of self deception and ruin. Nothing can be required of the sinner as *duty*, but duty,—nothing as *a moral act*, but *a moral act*. Using these means therefore, viewed abstractly from the will or heart, is not a moral act, is not performing a duty; for as we have said, the *moral act*—the *duty*, involves both. To make any other impression on the mind of the sinner, is to make a false impression in respect to one of the most vital of all the subjects of ministerial instruction. We may indeed, be compelled by the objections of the sinner to remind him, that what we have called using the means of regeneration, is *necessary*; both as leading to the right act of the will or heart, and as part of the complex act of duty. For what moral excellence could there be in the exercise of *mere* love without a knowledge of the character which is loved; or in a simple act of choice, unattended by a consciousness of duty? These then are never to be separated in our directions to sinners. We must urge upon them the complex requirements, to repent—to love God—to give God the heart, to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. These, involving as they do, complex mental action—these, which, when subjected to a philosophical analysis, embrace the acts, which constitute using the means of regeneration, and also the act of the will or heart—are the requirements, and substantially the only requirements,

which are clothed with God's authority as a moral Governor ; and short of these, the ambassador of God may deliver no message to rebels under his government. And we ask why he should deliver any other? Do they need to know what constitutes the terms of divine mercy? Then let the divine messenger deliver his message intelligibly—let him unfold that which is to be done on their part, in its nature, its elements,—showing the very thing in its constituent parts, as “ a scribe well instructed.” Let him do this, according as the ignorance or mistakes of his hearers may demand, and what can he better do to give them the knowledge necessary to a compliance with the divine requirements? Let him do this, in respect to those who misapprehend or pervert the doctrine of their dependance on grace ; and what can he better do to correct their misapprehensions, and counteract their perversions? Let him do this, with any degree of analysis or specification which the exigency of the case may demand ; and what does he do after all, but, with God's authority, summon men to obey God's commandments? Let him do this, and he does not tell the sinner to use the means of regeneration, and stop at this point, and wait for God to convert him ; but he tells him to put himself with all his powers as an intelligent, voluntary, moral being to the performance of every part of the complex act, which constitutes his duty. And whether in a form more or less analytical, describing with greater or less speciality, the several essential parts of the moral act, and that which is involved in its performance, he only inculcates truly and wisely in an analytic form, what in other circumstances is properly and wisely inculcated in a comprehensive form. Does he, for example, urge the sinner to thoughtful consideration, he does not,—he cannot, without serious error, leave him to conclude that *thus* to consider, is all that is required. Nor can he specify any *other* mental acts, as all that are to be performed, while the act of the will or heart is not included in the requirement. The whole, and not a part, must be comprised in the exhortation. If he exhorts the sinner to “ strive to enter in at the strait gate,” he cannot without serious error, mean that the understanding and the conscience with other susceptibilities of the mind merely, are to be exercised ; and that the faculty of the will or heart is to be excused from its appropriate act. *All* the powers and properties of the soul, the understanding to see the truth, the susceptibilities to feel it, the will or heart to choose the objects presented by it, must be put into requisition by the faithful summons of God's faithful ambassador ; and each and all must be charged to perform its appropriate and necessary part in

the act of duty, on pain of eternal perdition. And thus it is, that the commands of the Most High *may* be brought, and thus they *must* be brought, whether in a comprehensive or analytic form, upon the conscience and heart of the sinner. And now, we ask, what is the difference in things,—what the difference in the subject matter of the requirement, whether it be made in the one form of phraseology or in the other? In either case, the self-same thing is required, viz. that exercise of the powers of man as a moral being, which constitutes the performance of right moral action. Who will say, that a given exercise of the intellect, conscience, etc. is not *in the order of nature* prior to the right act of the will or heart, and necessary to it? Who will say that to denominate the former the means of the latter, and yet to include the whole as the duty and instant duty of the sinner, is to change the subject matter of God's requirements? Does the love which God requires of men consist in a mere *instinctive* emotion? Is regeneration a mere physical change, rising in the mind like bodily sensations through the efficacy of physical agents? No. It is a change wrought by God upon an intelligent being; who has, in the very change itself, some just view of the reasons for it, and some just estimate of his own high obligations to it; and who with his eye fixed on God, can say from his knowledge of all other objects of affection, "whom have I in heaven but thee, and there is none on the earth that I desire beside thee." To require of the sinner, then, such an exercise of intellect conscience, etc., together with the right act of will or affection of heart, is the very thing which God requires; and what according to our views of using the means of regeneration, must also be required by every one who speaks to his fellow sinners, in the name of God.

The last objection which we shall consider is this, that our scheme dispenses with the influences of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, if not in words, at least in fact. But how have we done this? By stating that the soul is renewed through the intervention of divine truth? This is the doctrine of the bible. "Of His own will begat He us with the *word of truth*." By affirming that man is *active* in the change in question? This is abundantly declared in the scriptures. "I thought on my ways and *turned* my feet unto thy testimonies." Nor is there any thing in such a statement, in the least contradictory to other declarations of the scriptures, which make the Holy Spirit the author of regeneration. Both statements are sometimes brought together in the same passage. "YE have *purified* your souls in *obeying* the truth through the SPIRIT." Our principle is simply that of Edwards. "God produces all

and we *act* all." When we say, therefore, that the soul in regeneration chooses God as its portion "under the impulse of its inherent desire for happiness," we are not excluding the influence of the divine Spirit. We are simply stating the great principle of Edwards, that "the will is *as* the greatest apparent good." For how could any thing appear *good* to a being, who had no capacity of happiness? It would, indeed, be wonderful if Calvinists should charge us with error, for maintaining the very principle by which Edwards overthrew Arminianism. The Arminians contended for a self-determining power, and Edwards refuted their principle by showing, that the will is always *as* the greatest apparent good. Our statements respecting the intervention of truth, and the activity of men in regeneration, were intended to oppose what we shall call, for want of a better name, the doctrine of PHYSICAL REGENERATION. This doctrine places the change in question *back* of action, in the structure or constitution of the soul itself. Such views we think equally repugnant to the scriptures and to the nature of moral agency. But in opposing them, our whole system of reasoning proceeds on the supposition, that God is the author of the change in regeneration.

II. We proceed to consider the advantages of the view, which we have given of using the means of regeneration, as it shows the consistency of exhortations to immediate duty, with the doctrine of the sinner's dependence. This it does,

1. As it shows the way, and the only way, in which the immediate performance of duty can be regarded as practicable by the sinner. By this we mean, that the sinner is authorized to regard immediate compliance with duty as an event which *may* in fact take place. It is not sufficient to urge upon the sinner the present performance of duty, on the ground that he possesses all the powers of a moral agent which qualify him instantly to perform it. It is necessary to the actual performance of duty, that the sinner believe, that it *may prove to be a fact*, that he shall perform it. The calls of the gospel in this world of hope are not converted into mockery, by the assurance, to any individual, that they will not be obeyed. True it is, that no sinner ever will enter on the mental process we have spoken of, without a divine influence on the mind; and it is equally true, that God may do more for the same sinner at one time than at another. Still, that duty may ever be done, it must be regarded by the sinner as an event, which *may in fact take place*; and this, on the ground that the grace, which will result in the performance of duty, *may* attend the present call to duty.

Never does the sinner come to the decisive effort, without this conviction. And thousands will look back, throughout eternity, with joy to the moment, when under this conviction they were induced to say,

I am resolved to try;
For if I stay away, I know,
I shall forever die.

We maintain, then, that the sinner, when required to love God, or to make him a new heart, is authorized to believe, not indeed, that he *shall*, but that it *may be the fact* that he will, instantly obey the requirement. Every command of the Most High is an unqualified claim for immediate action—an unqualified claim for present obedience. True, it is supposable, that God might enforce these claims on beings who are hopelessly lost. But then is it credible, that in a world of mercy like this where the calls and overtures of mercy are made to all, that God accompanies these calls with the assurance to any, that present obedience is to be utterly despaired of? God under an avowed economy of grace, require instant action on pain of eternal death, and then by the assurance (of its present utter impracticability,) cut the sinews of all action, annihilate every motive to action, and render it as hopeless as it would be by the annihilation of the agent! God as a Lawgiver use the language of hope to His guilty, dependent creatures, and God as the Dispenser of grace, contradict it and utter only the language of despair! Such chicanery might disgrace an earthly monarch who would tantalize his subjects in the ruin and wretchedness of guilt. But does it mar the administration of the Eternal's throne? God forbid. Under the distinct and solemn annunciation from that throne, "give me thine heart," who shall say that it meaneth not so, or that he is doomed to another moment's disobedience?

Further; Common sense decides, that if it is a known or revealed truth, that the sinner under a present call to duty will not act unless God do more than God is now doing, then let the sinner wait till God does do more. Why should he act or attempt to act, or even think of acting, though called by the summons of God to instant duty? What reason is there, why a man should act or even think of acting in a given manner, in given circumstances, when he knows or believes, that he never shall act in this manner in these circumstances? No matter, as it respects the *reasonableness* of acting, what the *ground* of the certainty is, that he shall not act, if this certainty be known or believed. That criminal *perverseness* of heart is the ground of the certainty, does indeed make a very material

difference in respect to the sinner's *obligation to act*. Still, if in this case, *he knows he shall not act*, the futility and consequent unreasonableness of acting, are as obvious as if the certainty were caused by chains of adamant.

Action too in this case would be in the most absolute sense, impossible. Man act voluntarily, with the unqualified conviction, that he shall not act? Then may he act voluntarily without motives—for what motive can secure the performance of an action, which he knows he shall not perform? Being authorized, or rather required to deny the present reality of a divine influence that will result in right action, reason says, common sense says, a world says—wait for that influence—let the sinner sleep on and sleep away the hours of probation, waiting for God to move him to right action.

We might here appeal to the whole tenor of the scriptures; we might ask why does God, by intreaties and expostulations, by warnings and threatenings, addressed to sinners, crowd the great concern of their salvation into the passing moment? Why, unless He would have them believe, that what He requires them now to do, *may* in fact now be done? We might appeal also to the nature of the subject; and ask, why should not such truth as God's truth, take instant effect on the mind of man, as well as any other truth? If the drowning man, seizes instantly the arm, proffered for his deliverance, how long must it take the sinner, with the knowledge of his guilt and condemnation, and of a Savior able and ready to save from endless death, to entrust his soul to His keeping? or, with the glories of a perfect God revealed, to love Him? Why may not that which man as a moral agent can do the next moment, without the influence of the Holy Spirit, be done the next moment, through the influence of this Divine Agent?—We have already referred to the testimony of facts, as furnished by the inspired word. We might show, that the preaching of the most successful ministers of this and of every other age, is distinguished by this grand peculiarity, impressed on their own minds, and on the minds of their hearers, viz. the conviction that what *ought now* to be done, *may in fact now* be done. Are we asked, whether this conviction will secure the conversion of the sinner? That is not the question. But the question is, will any sinner ever turn to God without this conviction? And what man or angel knows, that with this conviction, he *will not* instantly awake to his eternal interests, and set himself to the work of turning to God, and thus by the power of the Holy Ghost, actually accomplish it? Has not God proclaimed salvation to a lost world? Is He not carrying on its redemption in actual results? Are there not hundreds and thousands in our own land of devoted believers in the Lord Jesus, and fellow-heirs of his glory, who were lately going as thoughtless in the path to

endless ruin, as other thousands now are? Is there one of the multitude, who embraced the Savior without believing that he might do it, when he did it? God is on the mercy seat, proclaiming to all, that *now* is the accepted time, that *now* is the day of salvation. He commands, with the authority of a Being of infinite perfection. He invites and entreats with the tenderness and sincerity of the author of redemption. He spreads around us the scene of his wonderful working, and calls us to look upon the monuments of the grace of a present God. He speaks, and all hear;—and who is the sinner that may not *now* obey the summons of his God?

We say then, that the sinner under the call to present duty is authorized to believe in the *practicability* of present duty: and that the view we have taken of using the means of regeneration, shows the way, and the only way, in which it may prove to be a fact, that such duty will be done. According to these principles, duty never was done, it never will be done, it never can be done in any other way; in this way, it may prove to be the fact that it will be done and done now. What better, what more pressing reasons then can be addressed to the sinner for entering on its performance at once? Doing this, duty may be done, and heaven obtained. Neglecting this, duty never will be done, and the soul is lost forever. Who, under the summons of God, to duty and to life, will sleep in sin another moment? Who that comes with God's commission to the heart, shall hesitate to repeat and urge, singly and alone, the call of the Most High to immediate duty?

The view which we have given of using the means of regeneration, shows the consistency of exhortations to immediate duty, with the doctrine of dependence:

2. As it secures to this doctrine its true practical influence on the mind of the sinner. According to the principles which we have advanced, there is no ground of certainty, that the renewing grace, or the grace which secures the performance of duty, *will attend* any call to duty, addressed to any individual sinner. Here, as we shall now attempt to show, lies the practical power of the doctrine of dependence, viz. in the fearful uncertainty, which it imparts to the great question of the sinner's regeneration.

This doctrine is insisted on with great frequency, and exhibited with great prominence in the sacred volume. It was taught with great plainness, and pressed in all its pungency and all its mysteriousness, upon the wondering Nicodemus, by the Savior himself. As a constant theme in the instructions of the Apostles, it was used to impart a nothingness to themselves and to their ministry; to annihilate as it were all other power but the power of God, and thus to display His glory, as the Author of eternal salvation. It cannot we think be doubted, that such a doctrine of the sacred oracles has a

most important practical tendency, nor what this tendency is in respect to those who are yet in their sins. For how can a guilty being like man, know the truth of this doctrine and not read in it, the uncertainty of his own preparation for eternity? Is it not an alarming truth, that such a being is thus dependent on the will of that God, whom he has always provoked, and whom he still provokes, to destroy him forever? Does not every mind perceive at once, not only that the practical tendency of this doctrine is to alarm the sinner, but that this tendency results directly from the fearful uncertainty which it imparts to the great question of eternal life and death? We do not ask, as we might, whether it would be possible without this doctrine, so to alarm the sinner as to excite him to flee from the wrath to come; but we ask, would there be the same reason for alarm, which there now is? Or, were the grace on which the sinner depends *known* to be at his own disposal, always furnished and ready for his use until the hour of death; would he not take new courage to go on in his iniquity? Plainly, it is only when the event of compliance with the terms of life, is seen to depend on the unpromised and uncertain grace of an offended God, that the doctrine of dependence carries its agitating power into the guilty bosom. And why, we ask, if this be not the *designed* influence of this doctrine on the sinful mind,—why is all connection between the doings of the unregenerated and God's renewing grace, so dissolved by the frowns of His displeasure on all such doings? Why is the ground of this dependence on God, so unequivocally presented, as consisting not in the sinner's inability as a moral agent, which excuses from duty; but in the inability of a moral perverseness, which is the most appalling aggravation of guilt? Why is the high and uncontrollable sovereignty of God in the gifts of his grace, so clearly announced and so formally and triumphantly defended against the murmurings of the ungodly, and the man that dares to open his mouth against it, encountered with the sternest severity of apostolic reproof? Have we no evidence that this is an unwelcome truth, and unwelcome because it is terrible, and terrible because it shows man's eternal destiny to depend on the unknown counsels of an offended God? Why the solemn and reiterated charge not to grieve,—not to resist the Holy Ghost? Why the solemn asseveration, that He shall not always strive with man? Why these monitory cautions, if there is no danger of being abandoned by His heavenly influence? Why, if there is no giving up to a reprobate mind, and to strong delusions that infallibly terminate in damnation,—why are we expressly told of those on whom this judgment lights even in this world? Why the absolute assurance, that some shall call, and not be answered, seek and not find; and that even He who redeemed sinners by his blood, will for their contempt of his mercy laugh at their calamity

and mock when their fear cometh? Why, without one word of exception or qualification throughout the sacred volume, in respect to all preliminary acts and doings as the ground of hope, is the sinner "shut up to the faith;" and all that can cheer or sustain his guilty bosom, fixed to the single point of duty with the mere "peradventure" that God will give him repentance? Why is all this, if God does not design to impart a fearful uncertainty to the prospect of the sinner's conversion?

We are still further confirmed in our opinion on the present subject, by comparing the practical tendencies of the two opposite views. We doubt not, that those who hold out to the sinner a high expectation of conversion, do so because they deem it a useful encouragement. And yet we are convinced that the true tendency of this view and of the encouragement it gives, is to confirm sinners in the stupidity of sin, and to defeat the end designed. We have already exposed the tendency of that hope and encouragement, which are derived from any acts of the sinner, previous to those which enter into the performance of duty. The same fatal tendency, results from the abstract belief, that the grace of God is, and always will be, ready for the sinner's use. We know how the sinner loves this world; and with what determination of purpose he still resolves to enjoy the pleasures of sin; how prone he is to presume on life, and to quiet present apprehensions of future misery, by a delusive confidence that he shall at last escape it. And what is better fitted to confirm this confidence, than the assurance or even a high probability, that the grace of God is, and ever will be, ready to renew the heart? It is the belief of thousands, who remain quiet in sin, that they shall infallibly, or with a high degree of probability, induce God to interpose and save them, before it shall be too late. It is this very presumption indeed which holds them in these death-like slumbers from which no accents of mercy—no, nor the note of the second death, can rouse them. Their very orthodoxy by a slight perversion, becomes their ruin. They believe in their dependence on God; but they also believe, that the necessary grace is, and will be ready for their use, when they shall be ready to use it. This is that grand opiate of the adversary by which he holds enthralled multitudes, under the light of salvation, in their guilty sleep of moral death. And thus it is, that the true practical bearing of the doctrine of man's dependence on grace, is fatally impaired or destroyed. Can there be a doubt on this point? Suppose the sinner to know that he is to be called the next hour to the judgement seat of that God, on whose sovereign will he depends for his preparation to appear before Him; could he sleep in sin, quietly relying on what he intends to do hereafter? Who does not see that to destroy this presumptuous reliance on futurity, these hopes and ex-

pectations from futurity, must also be destroyed? And who does not see, that the doctrine of dependence on God, like the assurance of sudden death, tends to destroy such hopes? What if the sinner may and shall live long? This doctrine shows him that his regeneration, and of course his salvation, must depend after all, on the counsels of a sovereign and offended God. It thus throws doubt and uncertainty over all his fond anticipations from futurity; and exhibits the fearful hazard of final perdition, which he incurs by the God-provoking purpose of delaying repentance. In this view of his dependence, a painful, oppressive uncertainty, an agitating anxiety must be felt by the sinner, utterly incompatible with that quietness of spirit, which the opposite view is fitted to foster, in the mind. He may indeed exclude it from his belief, and even from his thoughts, but can he steadily look at the fact, that by his own perverseness of heart, he has placed his salvation in the hands of an angry God; and as he thinks of His high counsels, and eternal retribution, be obliged to say, "perhaps heaven—perhaps hell—is my portion," and still remain at ease? He may as well look into the pit of everlasting burnings, without emotion. If there is any embodying of the entire moral influence of the Gospel, any bringing it to bear as "the power of God" upon the sinner, and thus constraining him to the most strenuous and unyielding effort, instantly to comply with the terms of life, it is done by just views of the sinner's dependence on the grace of God. Here in one comprehensive presentation, and in their combined power, he sees his helplessness, his guilt, his danger, and his only hope.

Nor shall we be prepared fully to appreciate the practical power of this doctrine, without adverting to one peculiarity of the case. It is not, then, the case of one, who with all his heart *desires* some object or end of difficult attainment. Were it thus, then indeed high and confident expectation of success, would have no tendency to prevent instant and vigorous effort. But such is not the case of the sinner. It is not that of a drowning man, who is to be prompted to efforts to escape death, in the cold waters that threaten to swallow him up. But it is that of a sinner, who has chosen the world for his portion,—his all; who here finds a warm and genial home, with all he can desire to gladden existence; and who is led to cheer his heart amid his joys, and to prolong his happy residence, with hopes of ultimate safety. It is such a being who is to be constrained by a hastening destruction, to forsake all that his heart holds dear. And the question is, when will danger prompt him to flight? When it is supposed on the one hand to be attended by a fair prospect of escape by efforts, deferred to a future day; or, when on the other hand, so far as he has the least warrant to believe, such effort must be made now or never. True it is, the uncertainty of life is a sufficient reason to prevent the delay of a moment. Spread then, the deepest

and most chilling shade on the prospect of life ; but how uniformly in the hey-day of health and strength, does the sinner still regard death as distant, with a confidence which frequent deaths, and sudden deaths, and deaths in sin, around him, can scarcely agitate. Can we then only repeat, "life is frail and death is near," and leave him to his dreams? How confidently does he cheer his spirit with the belief, that though others die without expecting death, or preparing for it, he shall be favored with timely monitions of its approach? The case is peculiar, and it calls for all that truth can utter. The sinner loves his sins—he loves the world—he is averse to God and His service, and will persist in his chosen way, till these presumptuous hopes of salvation are cut off. If then you would rouse him from his lethargy,—if you would suffer him to have no rest in sin, throw on his prospect the gloom and the forebodings in which truth invests it. His salvation, by his own perverseness, is forfeited into the hands of a sovereign and an offended God. Point then the thoughtless man to God's high counsels, and show him that God, who will save or destroy, "as seemeth good in His sight."

With this view of the practical tendency and influence of the doctrine of dependence, perfectly accords the view we have taken of using the means of regeneration. According to the principles which we have advanced, the gift of renewing grace cannot be inferred from the nature, tendency, or relations of any prior acts of the sinner ; for their whole tendency is to prevent his regeneration. It cannot be inferred from any divine promise, but is thrown into fearful uncertainty by the divine threatenings. It cannot be inferred as necessary to create the sinner's obligation to immediate duty ; or to vindicate the justice of God in the execution of the sentence of his wrath. Whether, therefore, this blessing be given or withheld in respect to individual sinners, is an inquiry which according to the views we have maintained in the previous discussion, as well as according to the scriptural doctrine of dependence, must be left with the sovereignty of God, whose secret counsels, no human eye can penetrate.

We now invite the attention of the reader, to the ultimate conclusion aimed at, in the preceding discussion ; viz. THE PROPRIETY OF EXHORTATIONS TO IMMEDIATE DUTY, IN VIEW OF THE SINNER'S DEPENDENCE ON THE GRACE OF GOD. We ask then, in view of the principles advanced, to what shall sinful men be exhorted by the ministry of reconciliation, except to the immediate performance of duty? Shall they be exhorted to any acts or doings, *prior* to those which enter into the performance of duty? But all such acts of the unregenerate are sinful, and the subject of God's unqualified prohibition and abhorrence. Shall they be told to take the attitude of passive recipients of a divine influence, and thus to come to the mercy seat as suppliants, and wait on God in persevering importunity, to change *the very constitution* of the soul, which God has given them? This would

be preposterous; no such change is needed, nor was ever wrought in the soul of man. Shall they then be required to ask in this manner, for a new heart, be it what it may? But how can they supplicate God for this blessing, when He frowns on all supplication not dictated by a holy heart? Shall they, then, be allowed, (as would be to their liking) to do nothing, except to lay themselves down in the sloth and stupidity of sin; and under the call of God to duty, wait for God to do something more than He is now doing, to move them to right action? This would be death. No sinner ever was, and no sinner ever will be converted in this state of inaction. Shall they then be told, that there are certain acts, which, though dictated by a sinful heart, and therefore sinful, are yet *necessary*; and though not to be required, are still to be done? Such acts are not *necessary*; but on the contrary have a direct and fatal tendency to prevent regeneration, and must be utterly abandoned, or the heart can never be changed. Shall they then be invited to take some neutral ground, and to perform acts which are neither holy nor sinful? But the Lawgiver knows no such acts in accountable subjects—no interval of accountable existence in which failure in duty is not sin,—no movement of a moral being, which is not towards heaven or towards hell. Shall they then plead, that there are some acts, which as elementary parts of the complex act of duty, have no moral quality? But these are unknown and undistinguished by God from the moral act itself. They occupy no *time*; they are essential parts of the act of duty; and the question of the moral state of man during their performance, might as well be decided by an appeal to the action of the nerves and muscles of the body. Shall it then be said, there is no hope for sinners; and that they have only to yield themselves to the gloom and sullenness of despair, or to its agonizing frenzies, even in a world of mercy? But we have shown them the way, and the only way, in which they *may*, and in which they are fully authorized to believe that they *may*, instantly comply with the terms of salvation, even *by putting themselves at once to the act of compliance*. Shall it be said, that it is uncertain whether the grace which will result in this mode of action, will be actually afforded, so that of course, this action is itself uncertain, and therefore irrational? We ask, then, what human act can be rational? Whoever thought, that the reasonableness of action depends on the previous known certainty that we shall act? The action proposed to the sinner, he is authorized to regard as that which *may* in fact be done. Not to perform it is to take the responsibility of going to hell, when he is fully warranted to believe that he *may* go to heaven. Shall he now say, that if this be so, then he may still cheer himself in his sins with the probability, that the requisite grace will hereafter attend the call to life, and that he shall be regenerated by this grace at some future hour of merciful visitation? God, in mercy to his soul, authorizes no such consolation in the delay of repentance; but imparts to such a purpose, and even to the thought of it, the terrors of an anticipated reprobation.

Thus the principles which we maintain, shut the sinner up to an immediate compliance with the terms of life. Not, on the one hand, that he should despair of the regenerating grace of that God, who cheers these hours of His forbearance with the assurance, that “He has no pleasure in the death of the wicked.” Not, on the other, that there is hope for the sinner, from any acts except those which are in-

volved in the direct performance of duty. No mercy, no grace, no compassion of God is revealed to authorize continuance in sin. Each passing moment of prolonged probation, should indeed be hailed as more auspicious to his conversion, than any future moment can be ; and should, as such, be consecrated, with instant and decisive effort, to the very act of giving his heart to God and his soul to Christ. And not only so ; but all future moments of life, instead of being viewed as bright with hope, and cheered with the prospect of successful effort, should be regarded as overcast with that uncertainty, apprehension, or even despair, which may be necessary to destroy all reliance on any future effort and to concentrate the whole energy of the soul in one present act of duty. True, delightfully true it is, that God is now on the mercy seat, and with the call to life, wears the smile of inviting love, to allure the sinner to return to Him by penitence and faith. But along with this attractive influence by which He draws, with "the chords of love and the bands of a man," He pours on the way of the sinner, who would persist in determined sin, the tempest and the fire of His indignation. In that path stands death, with which the sinner has made no covenant. In that path, even at the first step in it, a sin-avenging God may meet him—or, a reprobating God may say of him, "he is joined to idols, let him alone."

To right moral action—to duty—to compliance with God's terms of salvation, be the form of describing it what it may, and to this only, is the sinner to be exhorted by him, who comes with God's commission, to reclaim a sinful world from ruin. We need not say, how diverse from the other, this view of the subject must be in its practical influence, both on those who hear, and those who bring the message of salvation. The former instead of believing, that they are to take simply the attitude of passive recipients, and like statues to wait for a divine blessing, would feel themselves to be agents pressed and urged to instant *action*, by the moving message of wrath and of mercy. The later, instead of comforting themselves in the unfruitfulness of their ministry, by referring it to the counsels of irresistible grace, would find the way open for the summons of heaven's high sovereign to the conscience and the heart of his rebellious subjects, and would wield the weapons of their warfare not with a faint heart and palsied arm, but with the skillfulness and vigor of men who would expect and whom the world would expect, to produce results. These weapons, would thus become mighty through God, and the prayer of the church, 'thy kingdom come,' would sooner be answered. Oh ! when shall the day arrive, when the plain truths of the bible—the awful and enrapturing truths of the bible, shall thus become 'the power of God unto salvation ?' When shall the gospel be preached and heard with the impression, that it is designed to be a cause of present efficacy ? When shall this conviction possess the mind of its preachers, and rouse them to that zeal and strenuousness in effort, which become them as workers together with God ! And when, by relying on Him 'without whom nothing is strong, nothing is holy,' shall their labors be crowned not merely with the occasional conversion of a sinner, but with the results of Apostolic days !

Errata.—Page 626, for *receive* the order which Providence has assigned ; read *revere* the order which Providence assigned it. Page 651, l. 18, for *confined* read *confirmed*. Page 666, l. 18, for *force* read *fame*. Page 635, l. 33, for *long* read *large*.

